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Summary of the articles 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the economic impacts of seasonality in fish 
abundance on Norwegian trawler fishing effort allocation, with respect to quota constraints. 
Recognition of how fishing effort is allocated to exploit fish stocks in response to changes in 
the marine environment, market conditions, and regulations is a prerequisite for the attainment 
of successful management of fisheries. 
In the first paper, we investigated the presence of seasonality in cod fishery, in two 
regions, the west coast of northern Norway, and the high sea areas of the Arctic (i.e., Svalbard 
and Bear Island). We further investigated how trawlers adjust the allocation of fishing effort 
and utilize the cod quota in relation to the economic consequences stemming from the 
seasonality of cod fishery. The results of the study show that seasonality in cod fishery is only 
present in the fishing grounds along the north-west coast of Norway, and the spawning 
migration of North-East Arctic (NEA) cod shapes the seasonal pattern. The spawning 
aggregation of NEA cod in this region during wintertime encourages both trawlers and coastal 
fishers to increase the landings of cod, which in turn reduces the price of cod. Hence, trawlers 
withdraw from cod fishery and partake in other available fisheries (e.g., saithe and haddock). 
In other words, trawlers reserve the cod quota for the ensuing months towards the end of the 
year, when NEA cod swim back to the Artic area to feed. At this time, cod fetch higher prices 
due to less cod being landed as coastal fishers have already largely fished their cod quota during 
Lofoten fishery. 
In the second paper, we studied the harvesting behavior of trawlers in minimizing 
revenue risk in their fishing portfolio, consisting of cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries over the 
course of a year, while adhering to quota restrictions. These fisheries follow different patterns 




different. We concluded that holding a diverse fishing portfolio to reduce revenue risk is an 
irrational and untenable strategy for trawlers as it leads to inefficient allocation of fishing effort 
and fishing rights. We also found that profit generation is a more important business objective 
compared to revenue risk reduction. We speculate that the vertical integration of the trawl 
industry and the advanced technical specifications of trawl vessels could explain the 
prioritization of revenue enhancement over minimizing revenue risk. We further found that the 
seasonality in cod fishery dictates the dynamics of trawl fishery to generate and increase fishing 
revenue. 
In the third paper, we investigated the profit-maximizing behavior of trawlers targeting 
cod, saithe, and haddock. In essence, we studied how trawlers re/allocate effort over time and 
space across three fisheries and three regions including the southern and northern parts of the 
west coast of Norway, and the high sea areas of the Arctic including Svalbard and Bear Island. 
These areas are heterogeneous in terms of fish availability, prices of fish species, fuel cost to 
travel to the fishing grounds in these regions and availability of coastal fleet. We found that 
locational attributes play a significant role in shaping the harvest strategy that maximizes the 
profit of the fishing portfolio. The results of the study also show that trawlers are capable of 
identifying the economic benefits and costs associated with the selected regions, and thus the 
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The empirical investigation of fishers’ harvest behavior is an important but neglected 
strand of fishery science. In this thesis, we fill some of this gap by developing empirical models 
to investigate trawlers’ harvest behavior over time and space in codfish fisheries, managed 
using individual vessel quotas (IVQs). 
Fishers’ harvest behavior is reflected in the decision-making processes underlying effort 
allocation: when and where to fish, what species to target, and how much to fish in each haul 
to avoid over- and underutilization of quotas. Effort allocation is a challenging task, especially 
in multi-species fisheries as the fish stocks in the fishing portfolio may differ in feeding, 
breeding, and migration patterns. This biological heterogeneity together with constant 
movement of different fish stocks across various locations influences economic conditions such 
as market prices and operation costs. What adds more complication to optimal allocation of 
fishing effort is the constantly changing environmental conditions such as food availability and 
sea temperature, which influence fish behavior. Another complication arises from the inherent 
uncertainties and external disturbances such as abrupt oceanographic changes, which affect the 
catch size and profitability. On top of what has been mentioned, institutional regulations such 
as quota restrictions further complicate the decisions underlying effort allocation. 
Understanding how trawlers behave and why they behave the way they do reveals 
valuable information about marine resource status, as well as evaluating fisheries management 
options to anticipate the possible responses of fishers to changing regulatory schemes. 
Moreover, recognition of the fishing effort allocation of the trawl fleet enables fisheries 
managers to evaluate the status of the benthos and seafloor as dragging heavy nets across the 




This thesis focuses on codfish; that is, cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries as this portfolio 
includes economically important species in terms of volume and total revenue. These fish 
species are seasonally migratory and constantly swim over a vast geographical area to spawn 
and/or feed. The thesis aims to empirically investigate the fishing behavior of Norwegian 
trawlers in response to the economic changes stemming from the migratory behavior of these 
fish stocks, and to show how this could affect harvest attributes such as location choice, timing 
of production, preference in target species, and quota utilization. 
This study employs and combines multiple data sources for the empirical analysis of 
spatiotemporal allocation of fishing effort in trawl fishery. Our comprehensive data set covers 
the relevant information of trawl fishery during 2011–2016 to conduct empirical investigations 
of trawlers’ adopted harvest strategy and explain the drivers behind the chosen harvest strategy. 
The outcomes of this thesis are believed to be useful to fisheries managers in the policy-making 






Constant movement across different regions of the marine environment is among the 
most profound features of fish behavior. Fish move and adapt to the changing conditions of 
aquatic systems to grow, survive, and reproduce (Olsen et al., 2010; Schlosser, 1991; Wilson et 
al., 1994). 
Different fish species may exhibit a variety of movement patterns with different 
dispersal scales (Schlosser, 1991; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). Spatial and temporal fish 
movement is driven by various factors such as ecological conditions (e.g., substrate type, 
disturbance status, and food availability), biological factors, life-history traits of the fish species 
(e.g., recruitment dynamics, feeding, and spawning migrations), predator–prey interactions and 
environmental factors (e.g., sea temperature, light, and water flow) (Hersoug, 2005; Olsen et 
al., 2010; Schlosser, 1991; Shimadzu et al., 2013; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). 
The dispersal scale of fish species is influenced by their age, size, and type of movement 
(Nakken, 1994; Schlosser, 1991; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). For instance, larger and more 
mature fish species are capable of undertaking larger migrations as they have more energy to 
swim farther, while younger fish are less mobile. At the same time, the type of movement affects 
the migration range. For example, the North-East Arctic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) travels 
over a large geographical area from the Barents Sea, where it feeds, to the north-west coast of 
Norway to spawn (Jakobsen, 1987; Rose, 1993). In contrast to spawning and feeding 
migrations, movements driven by predator avoidance occur in a smaller range. 
Fish movement affects the distribution and abundance of fish species and the dynamics 
of the population. In addition, regulations such as seasonal closure and quota constraints can 
also affect fish availability across space and over time as these managerial tools control fishing 




& Myers, 1998; Hersoug, 2005). Relative fish abundance is usually expressed as the catch per 
unit of fishing effort (CPUE) (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Maunder et al., 2006; Myers & Worm, 
2003). 
The focus of this thesis is on the spawning and feeding migration of NEA cod (Gadus 
morhua), saithe (Pollachius virens) and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) fisheries. These 
fish species are migratory and migrate over a vast geographical area to spawn and to feed. The 
aim of this thesis is to investigate how migration of the aforementioned fish species influences 
economic considerations of the fisheries and shapes the harvest strategy of Norwegian trawlers, 
with respect to quota constraints. 
Migration of fish affects species distributions and catch composition, which then 
consequently influence fish price and the cost of fishing (Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 
2020; Smith, 2012). Fishers are generally identified as rational economic agents, who 
opportunistically switch between species/fishing grounds to maximize profit (Gordon, 1953, 
1954). Thus, following changes in the economic considerations, fishers reallocate their fishing 
effort to the locations and fisheries of maximum profit. 
In the first paper, we therefore investigated how migration of NEA cod from the Barents 
Sea, where it feeds, to the spawning grounds along the north-west coast of Norway influences 
economic conditions (e.g., price of fish and cost of operation) and fishing effort allocation as 
well as quota utilization by Norwegian trawlers. In this paper, we have used CPUE as a proxy 
for the change in the relative abundance of cod in two selected regions. Thereafter, we use Fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT) to detect seasonality patterns in these regions. The outcome of FFT 
analysis shows that seasonality is only present in cod fishery along the north-west coast of 
Norway during Lotofen fishery. Once we confirm the presence of seasonality, we use Fourier 




As the catch composition varies by fluctuations in fish availability, so does the fishing 
revenue. Fishing revenue is generated by catch level and market price. Production at sea is 
prone to a large degree of uncertainty in terms of the quantity and quality of landed fish. Each 
time a fisher puts out to sea, the catch is unpredictable as the constant movement of fish stocks, 
assemblage, and dispersion exert overwhelming uncertainty on the expected catch. 
Furthermore, besides the inherent uncertainty in the general market condition at the time of 
landing, price fluctuations, induced from changes in fish availability, quality of the landed fish, 
and variability on the demand side can add further uncertainty to the fishing revenue (Asche, 
Flaaten, et al., 2002; Birkenbach et al., 2020; Kasperski & Holland, 2013; Sethi et al., 2014). 
Another source of uncertainty that influences the catch size and fishing revenue is the weather 
conditions at sea. 
With fluctuating catch size and prices, fishers may pursue strategies to minimize 
revenue fluctuations over the fishing season, given quota constraints. One of the most common 
firm-level strategies to buffer revenue risk is to diversify catch by targeting multiple fish species 
(Kasperski & Holland, 2013; Sethi et al., 2014). This strategy was theoretically postulated in 
Markowits’ (1952) portfolio theory, showing that portfolio diversification can attenuate the 
total risk of portfolio return. 
An industry-level strategy to reduce risk is vertical integration, where one firm takes 
control over the adjacent stages of the production process (Porter, 1980; Riordan, 1990). A large 
part of the Norwegian trawl fleet is vertically integrated and targets multiple fish species (i.e., 
cod, saithe, and haddock) (Dreyer et al., 2006; Isaksen, 2007). In the second paper, we therefore 
investigated whether holding a diversified fishing quota portfolio is a rational and tenable 
strategy to reduce fishing revenue risk for a vertically integrated trawl company. The quota 
portfolio includes cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries, whose seasonal migration patterns and 




proxy expected fishing revenue and uses coefficient of variation (CV) to capture risk of RPUE. 
A decision-making frame work is used to evaluate the available options in terms of what and 
when to fish and how much to fish to minimize the risk of revenue.  
Similar to the effect of seasonal variation of fish stocks on fishing revenue, the constant 
change in relative fish abundance across different regions affects the relative profitability of the 
fishing grounds. Along with continual change in population dynamics and species interactions 
across habitats, location-specific characteristics such as proximity to the shore, availability of 
other fishing fleets and climatic conditions influence the relative attractiveness of different 
fishing grounds, and subsequently their relative profitability. A system of individual vessel 
quotas (IVQs) allows fishers to plan harvesting activities throughout the fishing year to 
maximize the profitability of the fishing quota portfolio. However, to do so fishers need to 
identify the economic benefits and costs of when and where to fish, and how much of a quota 
to fish at any given point in time. In this regard, in the third paper we investigated how spatial 
heterogeneity among different fishing locations influences the profit maximization behavior of 
the trawl fleet, which targets cod, saithe, and haddock. This study uses a Heckman’s (1976) 
selection model to identify the influential factors on trawlers’ effort allocation decisions.  
Despite the importance of investigation of the effort allocation in the codfish fishery by 
trawl fleet, little attention has been given to this strand of literature (Birkenbach et al., 2020; 
Eide et al., 2003). Unlike coastal fishery, trawl fishery is a year-round activity, which could 
secure a steady supply of codfish (Hersoug, 2005). Moreover, since trawl fleet target 
economically important species, identifying how the effort is allocation could improve the 
economic rent (Birkenbach et al., 2020). In addition, as investigation of effort allocation gives 
us insight about heavily trawled areas and times, implementation of proper management plans 




2 A brief historical background on the Norwegian fishery 
Throughout history, fishing has occupied an important place in Norwegian society, 
economy, and culture (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2014; Eide et al., 2013; 
Holm, 2001). Owing to its geographical characteristics such as extensive coastlines and large 
areas of marine and coastal waters, Norway is extremely well suited for fishing. 
The NEA cod stock is the most economically important species in the Barents Sea 
(Armstrong et al., 2014; Eide et al., 2013; ICES, 2012). Along with cod, other commercially 
important species such as saithe and haddock are abundant and available for fishers in 
Norwegian waters (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Cojocaru et al., 2019; Eide et al., 2013; Guttormsen 
& Roll, 2011). 
The history of commercial cod fisheries along the north Norwegian coast, and the 
international trade of this community dates back more than a thousand years (Årland & 
Bjørndal, 2002; Eide et al., 2013; Hallenstvedt, 1982; Solhaug, 1976). For thousands of years, 
codfish has been an important source of food, playing an important role in shaping livelihoods 
and settlements, particularly along the western coast of Norway (Hallenstvedt, 1982; Solhaug, 
1976). 
Besides food provision and survival purposes, codfish fisheries have created a 
foundation for commerce, employment, and money generation in coastal communities (Årland 
& Bjørndal, 2002; Hannesson et al., 2010; Maurstad, 2000; Solhaug, 1976). For example, for 
centuries Hanseatic merchants in Bergen, the largest city in Norway at that time, traded dried 
and unsalted cod from northern Norway with grains from merchants from other parts of Europe, 
in particular southern Europe (Solhaug, 1976). This has reinforced commercialization of the 
Norwegian cod fishery and international trade (Hallenstvedt, 1982; Hannesson et al., 2010; 




of southern Norway, and have contributed to wealth distribution throughout the country 
(Drivenes et al., 1994; Holm, 2001). 
By the beginning of the 20th century, the export of cod fish had increased considerably 
and constituted a large part of the foreign trade (Hallenstvedt, 1982). Today, most of the 
harvested cod is exported in several different product forms such as dried, salted, salted and 
dried, whole, and fillets (fresh and frozen). Southern Europe, and especially Portugal, is still an 
important market for Norwegian cod. The Norwegian fish market has extended to all the 
continents (Asche, Flaaten, et al., 2002; Asche, Gordon, et al., 2002; Gordon & Hannesson, 





3 General description of the codfish fishery 
NEA cod is a seasonally migratory fish species (Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Olsen et al., 
2010). It feeds in the high sea areas of the Barents Sea as well as the eastern part of the Barents 
Sea and waters around Svalbard and Bear Island. NEA cod is abundant in sub-Arctic areas and 
is by far the most commercially valuable species of the Barents Sea (Armstrong et al., 2014; 
Holm, 2001). It is reported that NEA cod stock lies within safe biological limits (Armstrong et 
al., 2014). 
Annually, the NEA cod stock undertakes spawning migration further south to spawn in 
the shallow waters along the north-west coast of Norway during winter from January to April 
(Garrod, 1967; Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Neuenfeldt et al., 2013; Olsen et al., 2010). The 
spawning cod stock remains in the coastal areas until around April–May (Olsen et al., 2010; 
Rose, 1993). The migration direction from the feeding areas of the Arctic to the spawning areas 





Figure 1. Map of the migration routes of NEA cod from feeding areas of the Arctic to the spawning 
grounds along the north-west coast of Norway 
As can be seen from the map in Figure 1, the amplitude of migration patterns can vary 
considerably. The amplitude of NEA cod migration is influenced by the age and size of the fish. 
Larger NEA cod have more energy to swim greater distances to reach spawning grounds 
relative to that of younger fish (Nakken, 1994; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). 
Unlike NEA cod, coastal cod spend their entire life span, including feeding and 
breeding, in the fjords and coastal areas of Norway. Hence, coastal cod is available to fishers 
throughout the year along most of the Norwegian coast (Hannesson et al., 2010; Jakobsen, 
1987). 
During wintertime and the spawning season, cod availability and catchability increase 
in areas along the north-west coast of Norway (Godø & Michalsen, 2000). This gives rise to 
the winter fishery known as the Lofoten fishery (Hannesson et al., 2010; Hermansen & Dreyer, 




the year (Hannesson et al., 2010; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). After spawning, cod swim back 
to the sub-Arctic areas to feed (Bergstad et al., 1987; Trout, 1957), which gives rise to the 
fishery in the Barents Sea and around Svalbard. 
Similar to NEA cod, saithe, and haddock are migratory species. They aggregate to 
spawn in wintertime, with a peak in February (saithe) and March–June (haddock) (Olsen et al., 
2010; Pethon, 2005). Saithe spawning takes place from the coastal banks of the Lofoten Islands 
and south to the North Sea. After winter spawning, young saithe are carried northwards by the 
ocean currents. Hence, saithe larvae are available in the north-east part of the Norwegian 
economic zone as late as August (Pethon, 2005). Adult saithe exhibit recurring migrations 
between spawning and feeding areas (Jones & Jónsson 1971; Olsen et al., 2010). Despite being 
a commercially valuable species, the migration pattern of saithe is poorly studied (Homrum et 
al., 2013). 
The migration and spawning pattern of haddock is more similar to that of NEA cod. 
Haddock aggregate along the slope between the continental shelf and the Norwegian Sea during 
winter to spawn. Similar to NEA cod, haddock swim northwards to the Barents Sea to feed after 





4 Participant fleets in the Norwegian codfish fishery 
4.1 Coastal fleet 
Historically and traditionally, fishers with small boats and conventional gears such as 
handlines, longlines and gillnets participate heavily in the Lofoten fishery (Hannesson et al., 
2010; Holm, 2001; Maurstad, 2000). Since small commercial boats are constrained in relation 
to moving offshore, aggregation of NEA cod along the west coast of northern Norway provides 
an important opportunity for employment and revenue generation for the coastal fishers (Årland 
& Bjørndal, 2002; Holm, 2001; Maurstad, 2000). 
The Norwegian fisheries management has allocated 65–80% of the codfish quota to 
coastal vessels (Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005; Holm & Rånes, 1996; Standal & Hersoug, 
2015). Hence, during a short period of the winter, a large amount of fish, in particular cod, is 
landed (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; Holm et al., 2000). 
Figure 2 depicts weekly cod landings by the coastal fleet in thousand tons over 2011–
2016. As shown in Figure 2, landings of cod by the coastal fleet are concentrated during the 
winter months when NEA cod congregates along the west coast of northern Norway to spawn. 






Figure 2. Weekly total landings of cod in thousand tons, caught by coastal vessels during 2011–2016. 
Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
The lack of a processing deck and limited capacity of the small boats necessitate taking 
shorter fishing trips (i.e., daily basis) in comparison to the fishing trip duration of large 
industrial vessels. Therefore, coastal fishers mainly land fresh codfish. 
4.2 Bottom trawling 
The bottom-trawl fleet consists of large ocean-going ships that are able to cover vast 
and distant areas of ocean to target multiple fish stocks (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Guttormsen & 
Roll, 2011). 
Prior to the advent of trawl technology, codfish fisheries (cod, saithe, and haddock) were 
operated solely by the coastal fleet along the west coast of Norway (Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 
2001). After industrialization, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, technological 
improvement in fishing gears and the rapid growth of fishing power led to the appearance of 
English trawl vessels in the Barents Sea to utilize NEA cod and haddock for the first time in 




However, despite the availability of new technologies, there was limited Norwegian 
trawl fishery development. There are three possible reasons behind this. The first obvious 
reason is that it was still possible for Norwegian fishers to catch cod using other conventional 
gears such as longlines and gill nets. The second reason is insufficient financial capital to invest 
in new trawl vessels and required equipment (Grekov & Pavlenko, 2011). The third reason is 
that the authorities were critical of trawl fishing as it can adversely affect coastal fishers’ catch 
and revenue in an open access fishery (Eide et al., 2013; Holm, 2001). Indeed, in the presence 
of trawl fisheries in Norwegian waters during both the Lofoten and offshore fisheries, coastal 
fishers saw themselves as losers because trawl vessels had better production possibilities. In 
essence, small boats were left with smaller catch sizes and revenues under an open access 
fishery. Both coastal and trawl fishers already had interest in the cod stock, and competing 
interests would naturally be seen as in opposition. There was also apprehension among coastal 
fishers that trawlers destroyed fish habitats and disturbed the fish (Hersoug, 2005; Johansen, 
1972). As a result, the Trawler Acts of 1936 and 1939 were introduced to limit the operation of 
the trawl fleet (Eide et al., 2013; Holm, 2001). Thus, initially the cod stock was harvested along 
the coast of Norway and little or no offshore cod fishery was conducted in the Barents Sea by 
Norwegian fishers. 
However, economic growth, particularly after the great depression during the 1930s, 
contributed to the development of the Norwegian offshore fishery in the Barents Sea, mainly 
operated by trawlers. In 1939, licensed trawlers became active in the Norwegian fisheries 
(Hersoug, 2005; Johansen, 1972; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). The development of a trawl fishery 
to target NEA cod and haddock in the Barents Sea continued after a period of limited fishing 
activity during World War II (1940–1945) (Nakken, 1994; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). 
The technological developments in designing Norwegian trawl vessels enabled trawlers 




in the Lofoten fishery, and extending into Arctic regions to target NEA cod and haddock. 
Powerful engines together with advanced technical characteristics make trawl vessels less 
susceptible to the harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & 
Hersoug, 2015). This means that, unlike coastal fishers that rigidly follow the spawning 
aggregation of NEA cod and largely operate in the Lofoten fishery, the advanced technology 
of large industrial vessels dilutes the seasonality of the Lofoten fishery. Hence, large industrial 
vessels have the opportunity to spread landings over the course of a year to take advantage of 
fluctuations in market price and availability of cod fish—unlike coastal boats. 
The current trawl fleet is equipped with onboard freezing facilities, and trawlers 
primarily deliver frozen products (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). The 
availability of modern freezing facilities over the last couple of decades has, to some extent, 
resolved the problem of perishability of fish. Hence, trawlers can take longer trips relative to 
coastal boats. Furthermore, supplying frozen cod provides an additional advantage for trawlers 
in the marketplace as they are not obliged to sell the fish immediately, unlike coastal boats that 
land fresh cod (Gordon & Hannesson, 1996). 
4.2.1 Gear specifications of bottom trawling 
Bottom trawling is classified as a fishing practice involving active/mobile gear where 
marine organisms are swept up from the seabed or get entangled in the net when the gear is 
dragged over the seafloor (Gabriel et al., 2005). A bottom trawl employs funnel-shaped nets, 
consisting of a belly, codend, trawl doors/boards, and ground gear (see Figures 3 and 4). The 
mouth of the net is held open vertically during towing by the use of trawl doors/boards and 
trawl floats to chase fish (Gabriel et al., 2005). Depending on the habitat and target species, the 




In the Norwegian trawl fishery, due to the availability of strong engine power and 
modern technology, double-rig trawling is also used. Double-trawl gear involves two trawl nets 
connected together so that they can be dragged side by side across the surface of the seabed 
from the same boat (see Figure 4). 
 
 








Figure 4. Double net bottom trawl. Source: https://www.seafish.org/  
Trawlers constantly monitor the seabed to avoid rocky surfaces to protect the gear 
against abrasion by the uneven sea bottom (Jørgensen et al., 2016). In addition, ground gear is 
placed under the trawl net to facilitate movement across rough seabed terrain and at the same 
time to protect the fishing line and netting from damage (Larsen et al., 2018). Furthermore, to 
lessen the potential environmental damage due to the physical and direct contact of heavy nets 
with the seafloor, trawlers seek to circumvent sponge areas and oyster beds. Based on 
Norwegian fisheries regulations, bottom trawling is prohibited within 12 nautical miles off the 
coast (Hersoug, 2005). 
A number of gear modifications have contributed to reduce the bycatch of trawling such 
as a minimum mesh size in the codend and placement of larger meshes in the belly of the net 
so that non-target species can escape from the net as they move across the belly meshes of the 
net (Gabriel et al., 2005; Stergiou et al., 1997). Despite all these modifications, the removal of 
some non-target species is unavoidable in trawl fisheries when the net is towed across the sea 




4.2.2 Industry characteristics of the trawl fleet 
Even though the coastal fleet has been the backbone of Norwegian codfish fisheries in 
terms of socioeconomic considerations, especially along the north-west coast of Norway 
(Armstrong et al., 2014; Holm, 2001; Maurstad, 2000), after World War II Norwegian 
politicians highlighted the fact that the coastal fleet is largely confined within the short season 
of the Lofoten fishery (Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979; Standal & Hersoug, 2015) (see also 
Figure 2). 
As discussed earlier, coastal boats are smaller in size and have less powerful engines in 
comparison to trawl vessels. This limits coastal fishers in allocation of fishing effort over time 
and space. The limited fishing activities of coastal boats means that they cannot provide a stable 
supply of codfish over the course of a year, thus reliance on the coastal fleet limits Norwegian 
fisheries’ potential for mass production and industrialization (Dreyer et al., 2006; Hersoug & 
Leonardsen, 1979; Holm, 2001; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). 
Norwegian politicians have highlighted the role of the trawl fishery in 1) building a 
modern and sustainable consumer market for codfish, where consumers are willing to pay 
higher prices for better quality products, and 2) to turn the entire supply value chain into a year-
round industry to provide a steady supply to cover the demand from consumers, primarily in 
Europe and in the United States of America (USA) and 3) economic efficiency considerations 
(Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Asche, Gordon, et al., 2002; Gordon & Hannesson, 1996; Hersoug 
& Leonardsen, 1979; Isaksen, 2007). 
Stability in the supply of fish not only requires regular fish landings over the course of 
a fishing year but also demands the year-round operation of processing plants. One way that 
processing plants could secure a stable supply of raw fish is to get control over fish exploitation 




fishing vessels. In this way, the owner of a processing plant can decide how the catch should 
be spread over the course of a fishing year to better utilize the capacity of the processing plants 
while ensuring a stable supply of fish (Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979; Isaksen, 2007). 
Political support for the industrialization of Norwegian fisheries has gradually shifted 
the large part of the trawl industry into vertically integrated businesses, where different stages 
in the supply chain—from the supply of raw material (e.g., fish) to the processing of raw 
material and to release of final products into the market—are conducted by the same firm. 
Figure 5 shows the business model of the Norwegian trawl industry with integrated adjacent 
stages of the supply chain. The direction of the arrows indicates the flow of goods and/or 
services between successive stages of the supply chain. 
 
Figure 5. Schematic diagram of vertical integration of the trawl industry with successive stages of the 
supply chain 
Vertical integration is thought of as a means to better cope with the competitive 
environment as the integration of different stages of the supply chain generates profound 
business advantages (Porter, 1980; Riordan, 1990). For example, the total cost of vertically 




inputs for processing constitute a large part of the total production costs (Porter, 1980; Riordan, 
1990). Moreover, lack of proprietary boundaries in different stages of the value chain facilitates 
information flow and reduces obstacles to obtaining new information about markets, which in 
turn increases administrative and operational efficiency. These characteristics again generate 
market power and lessen the risk exposure of the integrated business (Isaksen, 2007; Porter, 





5 Decision-making process underlying effort allocation of the trawl fleet 
The decision-making process underlying the effort distribution reflects the adopted 
harvest strategy and fishing behavior that aim to achieve specific business objective(s) (e.g., 
minimizing risk, dis/investment, and/or maximizing profit) with respect to the constraint(s) 
(e.g., physical and non-physical capital such as quotas) (Béné, 1996; Béné & Tewfik, 2001; 
Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; Vestergaard et al., 2005). The selection of fishing location and 
harvest time, and the decision underlying what proportion of fishing quota to utilize in each 
haul as well as shifts in the targeted species, are components of fishing effort allocation that are 
governed by fishers’ goals and/or constraints (Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Branch & Hilborn, 2008; 
Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984). 
Allocation of fishing effort in multi-species trawl fishery is a complex task as the 
decisions depend on a set of factors such as managerial, economic, environmental, and 
biological considerations, and their complex interactions (Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 
2020; Smith, 2012). 
It is conventionally assumed that commercial fishers take into account the expected 
profit when they make their choices about the location and time of harvest as well as target 
species (Gordon, 1953, 1954). However, in reality it is not straightforward to optimally and 
rationally allocate fishing effort across various species and different locations as fishers need 
to simultaneously identify changes in biological, economic, and environmental conditions as 
well as their complex interactions. This difficulty could result in deviation from making rational 
choices regarding effort allocation. Aberration from rationality in allocation of fishing effort 
has been identified in several fisheries articles (Jacobson & Thomson, 1993; Lane, 1988; 




The patterns of fishing effort allocation are influenced by fish movement and seasonality 
in fish abundance as well as by managerial rules such as quota constraints. As mentioned earlier, 
cod, saithe, and haddock are migratory species and perform a vast migration over a wide area. 
In this thesis, our focus is on how seasonality patterns of fish availability and quota regulations 
influence the adopted harvest strategy and allocation of fishing effort. 
Fishing involves a high degree of uncertainty. Fish move across space constantly with 
unpredictable patterns. The constantly changing marine environment, abrupt oceanographic 
changes (e.g., sea temperature and food availability), fluctuation in market conditions and 
changes in regulatory schemes can add more complexity to the decisions underlying effort 
allocation (Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 2020; Eales & Wilen, 1986; Holland & 
Sutinen, 1999; Smith, 2012). 
Additionally, species in the quota portfolio differ in habitat requirements and may differ 
in their congregational and/or dispersion behavior across different fishing grounds over the 
course of the year. Population dynamics affect the economic considerations (e.g., relative 
market price and cost of operation), and the magnitude of the economic effects might be 
different from one species to another (Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 2020). 
Besides variation in the relative abundance of fish stocks and species composition, 
fishing locations are heterogeneous in their availability of other fleet groups, weather 
conditions, and proximity to the shore (Eales & Wilen, 1986; Holland & Sutinen, 1999, 2000). 
For instance, NEA cod moves across a sub-Arctic area where it feeds after the winter 
months and the north-west coast of Norway where it spawns during wintertime. Fishing cod in 
the sub-Artic area is associated with higher transportation cost due to the longer traveling 
distance as well as the higher cost per unit of fishing as cod is less congregated in this period 




particular in wintertime, can also increase the risk of fishing operation. However, the market 
price of cod is higher out of the winter months as coastal fishers have already fished their cod 
quota, and landings of cod are smaller (Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 
In contrast, less transportation cost is ascribed to cod fishing during Lofoten fishery, 
because of proximity to the shore and a lower cost per unit of fishing effort due to the 
congregated cod stock (Hannesson, 2007b; Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006). Reduced cost 
motivates fishers including trawlers and coastal fishers to utilize the cod quota. 65-80% of the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of cod is allocated to the coastal fleet (Asche et al., 2014; 
Hersoug, 2005; Holm & Rånes, 1996; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). The limited geographical 
mobility of the coastal fleet encourages them to fish the cod quota. As a result of large landings 
of cod, the price of cod declines (Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 
At this time, a complication arises for the trawl fleet in terms of effort allocation as 
reduced cost is an encouraging factor to fish cod, while reduced price is a demotivating factor. 
If the magnitude of reduction in price is more than the reduction in cost during Lofoten fishery, 
then trawlers substitute cod fishery with other fisheries (e.g., saithe and haddock) available in 
their quota portfolio. 
Another source of complication is related to catch quotas. The Norwegian trawl fishery 
is quota-regulated. The introduction of catch quotas has thrown up new challenges regarding 
the allocation of fishing effort. First of all, the Norwegian quota system only allows for the 
transfer of a small portion of the unused quota to the next year (Hersoug, 2005). This means 
that trawlers need to utilize the quota portfolio by the end of the fishing year to avoid 
underutilization of quota and economic loss. Moreover, under a quota-regulated fishery, fishers 
need to constantly match the catch size and remaining quota to benefit from the fluctuation in 




Hilborn, 2008; Copes, 1986; Squires et al., 1998). This means that fishers need to identify 
economically favorable conditions for fishing (e.g., high prices, low costs and dense stock) to 
utilize the quota—a task that can be notoriously difficult to implement optimally. 
Empirical investigation of effort allocation reflects the characteristics of fleet dynamics 
and their impacts on exploited stocks (Anderson et al., 2019; Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; 
Vignaux, 1996). For instance, if heavy exploitation of a particular stock is detected at a specific 
time within a fishery year in certain areas, appropriate managerial regulations (e.g., season or 
area closure) can be undertaken for biological conservation. At the same time, knowledge of 
the spatial and temporal distribution of fishing effort contributes to a better understanding of 
fishers’ potential responses to various changes in managerial, biological, and economic 
conditions (Eales & Wilen, 1986; Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Wilen et al., 2002). 
Moreover, correct evaluations of temporal and spatial allocation of fishing effort across 
various species contribute to the economic prosperity of fishers, subsequently leading to an 
economically sustainable fishing industry (Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; Hilborn & Walters, 
1992). Related to this, Eales and Wilen (1986), and Hart and Pitcher (1998) mention that the 
degree of accuracy of decisions underlying spatiotemporal allocation of fishing effort and shifts 
between the available alternatives with respect to the constraint(s) and the business objective(s) 
identify either a good or a bad fisher. 
5.1 Empirical studies of effort allocation in the Norwegian cod fishery 
Despite the importance of investigating effort allocation and the fact that codfish fishery 
has been under intensive investigation for almost a century, the empirical literature of effort 





Hannesson (1983a), Flaaten (1987) and Eide et al. (2003) estimated a variety of harvest 
functions for NEA cod with the Cobb–Douglas specification. Hannesson (1983a) and Flaaten 
(1987) emphasized the analysis of technical efficiency. Eide et al. (2003) concluded that the 
fishing effort in cod fishery is elastic, meaning that one unit increase in fishing effort increases 
the cod catch by more than one unit. These studies lack the spatial aspect of the effort allocation. 
Birkenbach et al. (2020) studied profit-maximizing effort allocation in codfish fishery, 
caught by the trawl fleet. They concluded that fishing effort should be spread over the course 
of a year for cod, while for the less commercially important species (saithe in their study) effort 
should be congregated over a short period during winter. 
With the above considerations in mind, in this dissertation we have undertaken 
empirical analysis of the spatiotemporal effort allocation of the codfish caught by the trawl 
fleet. As stated earlier, the migratory behavior of the fish and seasonality patterns in fish 
abundance together with quota regulations influence effort allocation. Hence, in the following 





6 Seasonality: an important but neglected aspect of cod fishery 
Due to the commercial, socioeconomic, and cultural importance of cod fishery, 
literature abounds on this study subject. A wide range of studies have investigated different 
aspects of cod fishery, including work on productivity and efficiency (Asche, 2009; Bjørndal 
& Gordon, 1993, 2000; Eide et al., 2003; Flaaten, 1983; Guttormsen & Roll, 2011; Hannesson, 
1983a, 1983b, 2010; Kumbhakar et al., 2013; Salvanes & Squires, 1995), design of catch quotas 
(Hannesson & Steinshamn, 1991), cannibalism (Armstrong & Sumaila, 2001; Wikan & Eide, 
2004), age-differentiated and multi-cohort management (Diekert et al., 2010a, 2010b), multi-
species aspects (Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 2020), effects of climate change (Eide, 
2007; Hannesson, 2006), resource rent (Asche et al., 2009), gear selectivity (Brinkhof et al., 
2018; Diekert et al., 2010a, 2010b; Graham et al., 2007), market and price analysis (Asche, 
Flaaten, et al., 2002; Asche, Gordon, et al., 2002; Asche et al., 2007; Gordon & Hannesson, 
1996; Nielsen et al., 2009), the effect on stock of spawning aggregation (Hannesson, 2007b; 
Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006), allocation of fishing effort (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Flaaten, 
1987; Hannesson, 1983a), the history of technological transformations (Standal & Hersoug, 
2015), controversial issues regarding oil exploration and petroleum activities in codfish 
spawning areas (Misund & Olsen, 2013), managerial negotiations about Norway–Russia 
cooperation in cod fishery (Armstrong & Flaaten, 1991; Eide et al., 2013; Hammer & Hoel, 
2012; Hannesson, 1997, 2006; Stokke et al., 1999; Sumaila, 1997) and co-management 
advocates in Lofoten fishery (Holm et al., 2000). 
Even though fisheries scientists recognized the seasonal aggregation of NEA cod along 
the north-west coast of Norway a long time ago, little attention has been paid to the seasonality 
phenomenon from an economic point of view, or its impacts on fishers’ decision-making 




seasonality is the systematic variation in fish density between and within various geographical 
locations throughout the year. 
For the most part, the existing literature on the seasonality of cod fish investigates this 
phenomenon from a biological perspective, for example, how seasonal migration affects the 
physiological features of cod (Johannesen et al., 2015; Mello & Rose, 2005; Neuenfeldt et al., 
2013; Schwalme & Chouinard, 1999). 
A handful of applied studies have been carried out, analyzing the effect of seasonal 
spawning migration of NEA cod from an economic perspective. Eide et al. (2003) confirmed 
the presence of seasonality in cod fishery through estimation of a harvest function using data 
from the time that the Norwegian cod fishery was still open access. Thus, the possible effect of 
quota regulation could not be analyzed. Moreover, a lack of vessel monitoring systems (VMSs), 
to gather the data on geospatial positions at the time of the study, has confined this study to 
include the spatial dimension of effort allocation. 
Recently, Birkenbach et al. (2020) have investigated temporal effort allocation in 
codfish fishery, caught by the trawl fleet. Even though this study uses data from the time that 
codfish fishery has become quota-regulated, it lacks the consideration of quota regulations. 
Moreover, this study does not consider the spatial dimension of effort allocation. 
Indeed, spatiality and temporality are interlinked as fish movements over the year 
influence the relative attractiveness of different fishing areas. This being said, consideration of 
spatiality is of critical relevance to the decisions underlying effort allocation, in particular for 
migratory species as in the case of cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries. Migration and constant 
movement across specific locations influence species distributions, which in turn affect the 
catch composition, quota utilization, and relative profitability of different fishing locations 




patterns shape locational heterogeneity. This means that different fishing regions are 
characterized by different biological (e.g., fish abundance) and economic (e.g., cost of fishing 
operation and price) features over the course of a year, and fishers need to identify the costs and 
benefits associated with these features to optimally allocate effort (Asche et al., 2015; Flaaten, 
1983; Hannesson, 2007b; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). 
6.1 Measurement of seasonality patterns of fish stock 
Fish move constantly across space, hence the abundance and distribution of fish 
continually vary. This shapes seasonal patterns in fish abundance. For many fish populations, 
obtaining abundance and distribution information is a complex and costly task to evaluate 
changes in fish stocks (Campbell, 2004; Hilborn & Walters, 1992). In the absence of 
information of fish abundance, fisheries scientists use commercial data such as catch and effort 
records from fisheries to assess stock abundance (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Myers & Worm, 
2003). This is a reasonable way to assess stock abundance as fish exploitation patterns can give 
insight about relative fish availability (Campbell, 2004). The relationship between stock 
abundance and commercial catch and effort data is captured by Schaefer’s (1954) harvest 
function. Schaefer (1954) introduced a standard harvest equation (H) in linear form, consisting 
of two input factors, namely fishing effort (E) and fish availability (B): 
𝐻 𝑡 𝑞 𝐸 𝑡 𝐵 𝑡  
 
(1) 
This equation specifies that total catch at time t depends on both the level of fishing 
effort and the average stock or biomass at any point in time. Assume that catch size and stock 
abundance are measured in tons and let fishing hours per haul be the measurement of fishing 




indicates the efficiency of the technology that is used to harvest fish (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; 
Maunder et al., 2006). 
The positive first derivatives with respect to the fishing effort and stock size imply that 
as effort and stock size increase so does the catch size. Moreover, under this specification, 
output elasticities in stock and effort are unitary, meaning that the production technology is 
increasing returns to scale and its quantity is equal to 2. 
We re-cast Equation (1) to obtain the total harvest per number of fishing hours as a 
measurement of fishing effort. This will yield catch per unit of effort (CPUE): 
𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑡 𝐻 𝑡 /𝐸 𝑡 𝑞 𝐵 𝑡  
 
(2) 
The value of CPUE represents the total amount of harvested fish in tons per hour of 
trawling. As seen in Equation (2), CPUE is proportional to the average level of the fish stock at 
time 𝑡, having the catchability coefficient 𝑞, the factor of proportionality. Hence, CPUE can be 
used as an index of population abundance, which reflects seasonal aggregation and/or 
dispersion of fish stock at a particular point in time in a certain region. Higher values of CPUE 
reflect the availability of denser fish stock and vice versa (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Maunder 
et al., 2006; Myers & Worm, 2003). 
In fisheries, where independent measurements of stock abundance are lacking due to 
the difficulty of stock assessment, CPUE is a commonly employed index to provide an estimate 
of the average stock size, as data on total harvest and measures of the level of effort are more 
readily available to the researchers (Maunder et al., 2006; Myers & Worm 2003). 
Besides the seasonality implication of CPUE, from an economic point of view, CPUE 




has enhanced without any additional increase in fishing effort and operation cost (Cooke & 
Beddington, 1984; Cunningham & Whitmarsh, 1980; Hanchet et al., 2005). 
6.2 Seasonality patterns of the codfish fishery 
The radar plot in Figure 6 depicts the average monthly variation in CPUE of cod, saithe, 
and haddock during 2011–2016 in Norwegian waters, including the west coast of Norway and 
the Barents Sea. For this purpose, we obtained CPUE values from Equation (2), where the 
monthly total catch of 61 trawl vessels, measured in tons, is divided by the corresponding effort 
measured in trawling hours. The monthly values of CPUE are represented on the radial axis, 
ranging from 0 to 8 tons per hour of trawling (i.e., 8: most dense fish stock, 0: least dense fish 
stock). The months are assigned to the outer axis in a clockwise direction. It should be noted 
that the amount of bycatch of other species is considered in the calculation of total catch and 







Figure 6. Variation in monthly average CPUE, measured in tons per hour for cod, saithe, and haddock 
fisheries based on the fishing activities of 61 registered trawl vessels in Norwegian waters including the west 
coast and the Barents Sea. Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2011–2016 
From Figure 6, we see that the values of CPUE vary within and between the selected 
fish stocks over the course of a fishing year. The temporal variations in cod and haddock 
abundance follow similar patterns, with the first peak in March. The second peaks for these 
fisheries occur in the summer season, in July and June, respectively. Another resemblance 
between the temporal variations of cod and haddock is that after summer, the CPUE of these 
fisheries declines as time elapses towards the end of the year. 
The temporal variation of saithe fishery shows a different pattern, with its peaks in 
January and April. If we put these two months aside, the CPUE values of saithe are almost 
steady and remain around 2 tons per hour of trawling. 
The high values of CPUE in the three fisheries during the winter months are primarily 




requires less fishing effort (Hannesson, 2007b; Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006), resulting in 
increased CPUE (see Equation 2). After the winter months, cod and haddock swim dispersedly 
northwards to feed in the Barents Sea. At this time of the year, the Arctic weather is more 
suitable (e.g., ice-free sea and less windchill) (Årthun et al., 2012; Kvingedal, 2005). Hence, 






7 Overview of managerial changes in Norwegian fisheries management 
The current form of Norwegian fisheries management has evolved over the past century, 
often in response to some crisis in marine resources (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Hersoug, 2005). 
The imposed regulations and regulatory reforms are based on research and scientific advice 
from the Directorate of Fisheries and the Institute of Marine Research, both established in 1900 
(Årland & Bjørndal, 2002). Since most of the commercially important species such as cod are 
shared between Norway and other countries, Russia being the most important, the Norwegian 
authorities are in close cooperation with other neighboring countries (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; 
ICES, 2012). 
The current fisheries management regime is diverse and constitutes of a mixture of 
regulatory instruments including the setting of annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) quotas and 
licensing requirements. Today, almost all commercially valuable species are regulated through 
TAC and licensing (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002). 
The aim of the managerial regulations is to 1) boost the profitability of the fishery 
industry and avoid rent dissipation, 2) conserve marine organisms, 3) secure and maintain 
employment opportunities and 4) sustain settlement along the coast (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; 
Guttormsen & Roll, 2011; Salvanes & Squires, 1995). The first two objectives emphasize 
maximum resource rent and a biologically sustainable fisheries sector. The latter two goals of 
Norwegian fisheries management are closely connected as employment opportunities are 
prerequisite to sustain the livelihood of fishing communities along the coast. 
Throughout history, there have been many shifts and reformations in regulations 
governing marine resources, the most profound of which was the transformation from pure open 
access fishery to regulated open access, and eventually to rights-based fishery (Årland & 




harvesting property rights. Figure 7 shows the evolution of Norwegian fisheries management 
and the corresponding exclusiveness in harvest rights. Pure open access fishery and rights-based 
fishery lie at the two ends of the spectrum. In pure open access fishery, fish is communal 
property, whereas in rights-based management only fishers with allocated quotas have the right 
to fish. We will discuss this evolutionary process in detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
Figure 7. Evolution of Norwegian fisheries management 
7.1 Pure open access and regulated open access fisheries 
Initially, the Norwegian fishery was purely open access (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; 
Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017): there were no managerial constraints imposed on fishery, hence 
harvesters had equal and free access to exploit fish stocks (Anderson et al., 2019; Hersoug, 
2005). Pure open access fisheries are often characterized by biological overexploitation and 
dissipation of potential economic rent (Gordon, 1954). There is a surplus of fish, and this 
encourages too many fishers to maximize their profit by exploiting as much marine resources 
as they can (i.e., as long as unit revenue minus unit cost is positive) because if he/she does not, 




allocation of fishing effort to race for fish is unavoidable, resulting in overfishing and reduced 
profitability (Anderson et al., 2019; Hersoug, 2005). 
However, during early periods, the negative impacts were not very considerable due to 
the lack of technology to extract resources. Advances in fishing technology (e.g., large and 
decked boats, the advent of power blocks and modern fish-finding equipment such as sonar and 
navigational aids, and so forth) have increased fishing capacity which, in turn, has indelibly 
exacerbated the competition among fishers under open access fisheries (Bjørndal & Gordon, 
2000; Hannesson, 2007a). 
As fish stocks become more scarce, pure open access institutions transit to regulated 
open access, where access to a resource is still open (i.e., no exclusive fishing rights), but 
managerial regulations are also in place to implement and enforce regulations on fishers to 
avoid biological overexploitation (Anderson et al., 2019; Hersoug, 2005). 
The Norwegian cod fishery is a good example of a fishery that operated under regulated 
open access institutions. Prior to 1980s when the mortality of cod was increased, there was no 
comprehensive and coherent management scheme in the Norwegian fisheries (Årland & 
Bjørndal, 2002; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017; Mikalsen & Jentoft, 2003), although some regulatory 
tools were available, long before the collapse of cod. For example, the Limited Entry Act was 
enacted in 1972 as a capacity reduction tool (Hersoug, 2005; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). Another 
management tool is TAC, known as total quota. TAC is determined on an annual basis for each 
fish stock for the coming year. To avoid overfishing, the total catches should not exceed the 
agreed TAC. 
The increased mortality of cod was attributed to the feeding of young herring (Clupea 
harengus) on capelin (Mallotus villosus) larvae (Hamre, 2003). The Norwegian herring fishery 




of the herring was that fishers switched to capelin fishery (Lorentzen & Hannesson, 2004). 
Herring fishery eventually recovered in the 1980s (Lorentzen & Hannesson, 2004). Overfishing 
of capelin together with predation by herring eventually led to the collapse of capelin fishery 
(Hamre, 1985, 2003). 
The reduction in capelin biomass affected cod stock as a capelin predator. A lack or 
inadequacy of capelin has resulted in cannibalism in the cod stock (Hamre, 1985, 2003). 
Moreover, the growth rate of the cod stock has declined and the maturation process has 
experienced a delay (Hamre, 1985, 2003). 
In 1989, a moratorium was imposed on the coastal fleet and fishing was prohibited from 
April until the end of the year (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Maurstad, 2000). Relatedly, the TAC 
of cod was reduced considerably by the fisheries authorities. The consequence of the daunting 
crisis was a reduction in the landings of cod from over 340,000 tons in 1981 to 125,000 tons in 
1990 due to overfishing of cod. Figure 8 shows the immediate and short-term impacts of this 






Figure 8. Annual landings of cod in thousand tons during 1980–1997. Source: The Norwegian 
Directorate of Fisheries 
Vanishing cod and subsequent degradation of Lofoten fishery have brought severe 
environmental and socioeconomic consequences to Norwegian society. The negative impacts 
of increased mortality of cod were market failure, low profitability, maldistribution of capital 
and resources (i.e., existence of excess capacity), and decreasing quantity and quality of landed 
cod (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Gullestad et al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 2001; Maurstad, 
2000). This has threatened income sources, employment opportunities, and overall the 
settlement of coastal communities and indigenous groups (Armstrong et al., 2014; Holm, 2001; 
Maurstad, 2000). Due to the inadequacy of regulations and poor definition of harvesting 
property rights, overfishing and rent dissipation persisted under regulated open access 
(Hersoug, 2005). Thus, Norwegian authorities have advocated the need for further regulations 





7.2 Rights-based fishery and the introduction of individual vessel quotas (IVQs) 
In order to resolve the existing problem in Norwegian fisheries, IVQs were introduced. 
IVQs grant fishers the right to fish a certain proportion of the TAC from a commercial fish 
stock (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Gullestad et al., 2014; Holm, 2001). IVQs are essentially one 
form of output control, which circumscribe the catch size that every active fisher can harvest to 
prevent fish stocks from being overfished (Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). 
Traditionally, fisheries management has almost always implemented regulations with 
the purpose of preventing biological overexploitation and ignored regulatory rules that can 
trigger the economic motivations of fishers (Reimer & Wilen, 2013; Wilen et al., 2002). 
A secured share of catch corrects fishers’ incentives and ceases the race to fish. In other 
words, this prevents capital-stuffing and provides fishers with incentives to operate at the least 
cost by choosing the minimum levels of fixed and variable inputs that maximize returns per 
unit of quota (Copes, 1986; Nøstbakken et al., 2011; Squires et al., 1998). Another economic 
advantage of the introduction of quotas is that it allows fishers to take their time, and spread 
fishing effort optimally and catch better quality products across the entire fishing year to 
increase the value of the landed products and revenue (Dupont et al., 2005; Scott & Neher, 
1981; Squires et al., 1998). This indeed highlights the importance of spatiotemporal effort 
allocation under quota regulations. 
In order to transform from a regulated open access fishery to a rights-based fishery, 
some institutional preconditions must be present. The initial step to privatize fish stock was to 
establish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in Norwegian waters to deprive foreign vessels, 
to reserve commercial fish stocks for Norwegian fishers (Anderson et al., 2019; Hersoug, 2005). 
Cod quotas for trawl fleet were enacted in 1976 and applied to this vessel group in 1982, 




10 years, due to the dire state of cod, coastal vessels were made to adhere to quota regulations 
(Armstrong et al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005). The reluctance and hesitance to impose quota 
restrictions on the coastal fleet was because this segment has been the backbone of Norwegian 
fisheries in terms of settlements and employment, particularly in coastal regions (Armstrong et 
al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 2001). The authorities postponed quota imposition for regional 
considerations to prevent coastal communities from confronting economic hardship (Holm, 
2001; Maurstad, 2000). However, after the cod crisis, quota imposition on the coastal fleet could 
no longer be avoided. 
When the quota system was put in place for the first time, the initial allotment of quota 
among fishers was based upon historical catch levels and intensity of participation over the 
previous 5 years (Armstrong et al., 2014; Maurstad, 2000). One explanation for this was to 
ensure that only active fishers are entitled to the rent from the fisheries (Armstrong et al., 2014; 
Maurstad, 2000). 
Even though the implementation of a quota system has increased the effectiveness of 
the activities, it has brought some challenges to the fishers and concerns for fisheries managers. 
Regulation through a quota system not only involves fishers but also politicians and foreign 
countries. Hence, fishing quotas are very vulnerable to political and economic changes and 
conflicts (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Lazkano & Nøstbakken, 2016). 
Moreover, the imposition of IVQs can further complicate the decisions underlying effort 
allocation. This means that fishers need to constantly balance catch and remaining quota in each 
haul to maximize the expected profit from holding a fishing portfolio, a task that is arguably 
difficult to do (Copes 1986; Squires et al. 1998). For instance, if a fisher is left with a relatively 




the ability to constantly adjust catch with remaining quota becomes poor and decisions about 
when and where to fish what are not necessarily optimally made. 
Furthermore, as quotas restrict fishers’ access to different fisheries, fishers’ ability to 
diversify and target multiple species is undermined. Catch diversification is a common strategy 
in response to a changing marine environment to stabilize revenue (Kasperski & Holland, 2013; 
Sethi et al., 2014). Under IVQs, diversification might not be a valid harvest strategy to reduce 
revenue risk, and fishers need to develop a new strategy to lessen the revenue risk. 
7.2.1 Setting TAC and quota allocation among different fleets 
The annual TAC for fish stocks is set based on the inter-temporal stock assessments 
provided by fisheries biologists (Diekert et al., 2010a; Hannesson & Steinshamn, 1991; ICES, 
2012). Since NEA cod is shared between Norway, Russia, and third parties which include the 
European Union (EU), Iceland, and Greenland, the regulatory chain for determining and sharing 
TAC starts with advice and recommendations from scientists from the member countries of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) through international negotiations 
(ICES, 2012). Usually, Norway and Russia are entitled to approximately 43% of NEA cod, and 
14% is allocated to the third parties (ICES, 2012). 
Once the international negotiations are finalized, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
sets domestic regulations for quota allocation among various fleet groups including costal and 
trawl fleets. Later, the allocated TAC is broken down and further distributed within the 
Norwegian-registered vessel groups with license permits to participate. The larger part of TAC 
(i.e., between 65% and 80%) is allocated to the coastal fleet with conventional gears (Hersoug, 
2005; Holm, 2001). Accordingly, smaller vessels of the coastal fleet, whose range is between 




division is to alleviate economic hardship of the smaller boats during years when the catch is 
highly volatile. This matter is comprehensively explained in the next sub-section. 
Establishment of the TAC and quotas for saithe and haddock fisheries follows a similar 
procedure to that for cod stock (Birkenbach et al., 2020). The IVQs of the trawl fleet are 
allocated according to the size or tonnage of trawlers as well as the type of trawler license 
(Birkenbach et al., 2020). 
7.2.2 The trawl ladder 
The coastal fleet has been backbone of Norwegian cod fisheries. From the 1930s, 
licensed trawlers started to fish cod in Norwegian water (Hersoug, 2005; Johansen, 1972; 
Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Until the 1980s, when the quota regulations were put into place, 
there was a constant conflict between coastal and trawl fishers about exploitation of fish stocks, 
especially cod fish (Holm, 2001; Hersoug, 2005; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). 
Prior to the introduction of quota regulations, costal fishers considered trawling as a 
major threat to the sustainability of fish stocks and the livelihood of coastal communities as 
trawl vessels have spatial and temporal freedom, thus they can land more fish. In essence, there 
was apprehension that small boats were left with smaller catch size and revenues (Hersoug, 
2005; Johansen, 1972). 
The introduction of IVQs has resolved this historical conflict to some extent. The 
division of TAC between coastal and trawl fleets is based on a tool known as the “trawl ladder” 
(Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005; Holm & Rånes, 1996). Based on this management tool, a 
larger part of TAC is allocated to smaller and coastal vessels to protect them against fluctuations 
in TAC, and consequently variations in annual income (Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug, 2005; 




Fluctuations in the biological condition of fish and oceanographic characteristics (e.g., 
food availability and sea temperature) lead to variation in the abundance of fish stock and annual 
TAC. For example, assume a vessel holds a 1% share in the cod fishery (i.e., this 1% share is 
fixed for the trawl vessel). If the biomass of cod shrinks, so does the TAC as well as the potential 
landings of this fisher, because 1% of a smaller TAC will yield a smaller catch size, leading to 
less annual income. 
The trawl ladder specifies that in years with modest biomass (e.g., total cod quota is 
100,000 tons or smaller), the coastal fleet is granted a larger part of TAC (approximately 80%) 
to lessen the large variation in revenue and alleviate economic hardships for smaller vessels 
(see Table 1). In years with higher biomass and TAC, the coastal fleet gets a smaller share to a 
maximum of 65% of TAC (which is approximately equal to 300,000 tons) (Asche et al., 2014; 
Hersoug, 2005; Holm & Rånes, 1996). This division rule aligns with the objective of Norwegian 
fisheries management, which is to sustain employment and livelihood along the coast of 
Norway. Similar to cod fishery, coastal boats get a larger share of saithe and haddock in 
comparison to trawlers. 
Table 1. The trawl ladder rule for cod quota allocation between coastal and trawl fleets based on annual 
fluctuations in cod biomass 
Cod quota in tons Percentage share of coastal fleet Percentage share of trawl fleet 
 100,000 80% 20% 
100,000–150,000 75% 25% 
150,000–200,000 72% 28% 
200,000–300,000 69% 31% 




7.2.3 Transferability of IVQs 
As stated earlier, one of the goals of fisheries management is to increase economic 
efficiency in the exploitation of fisheries resource. Even though the implementation of IVQs in 
the 1990s has prevented rent dissipation and reduced excess capacity (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; 
Lazkano & Nøstbakken, 2016), there was still room for further improvement in terms of 
achieving higher profitability and efficiency by undertaking further regulation reforms in the 
quota scheme. 
Initially, quotas were by law non-transferable and non-divisible, and hence a 
competitive market did not exist for selling/purchasing the right to fish a certain quota stock 
(Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). 
The evident advantage of transferability of quota is that it can prevent rent dissipation 
and improve the economic efficiency of the fleet through a capacity adjustment process 
(Agnarsson et al., 2016; Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). More precisely, 
this means that transferability enables more efficient vessels to buy out the quota entitlements 
of less efficient ones. Thus, by the withdrawal of less efficient vessels (i.e., fishers with less 
return per unit of quota), quota rights are aggregated in the hands of the most efficient fishers. 
With transferability of quotas, remaining large boats adjust their level of production to 
maximize economic rent (Agnarsson et al., 2016; Asche et al., 2009; Copes, 1986; Salvanes & 
Squires, 1995). Another benefit of transferability is that it creates the potential for fishers to 
switch between target species. Fishers who cannot manage to fish their entire quotas may sell 
their fishing rights to willing buyers (Hersoug, 2005; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017). 
Recognition of the benefits of transferability has encouraged the Norwegian fisheries 
management system to gradually move towards buying and selling quotas within the same 




the country) (Årland & Bjørndal, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2014; Asche, 2009; Birkenbach et al., 
2020). For instance, based on the transferability rules it is not allowed to scrap a cod trawler 
operating in northern Norway and transfer the quota to a cod trawler operating in the southern 
part. Moreover, in order to hinder a great concentration of quotas in the hands of larger and 
more efficient vessels, there are restrictions on how much quota each vessel owner can hold. 
The implementation of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system has improved the 





8 Regulatory changes and subsequent alternation in harvest strategy 
Environmental regulations are often subject to modifications and reforms to achieve 
public interest and promote social welfare towards sustainable development (Gullestad et al., 
2014; Holm, 2001). As legislation regarding fish exploitation changes, so do patterns of effort 
allocation and adopted harvest strategy (Greaker et al., 2017; Quirijns et al., 2008). In the 
following sub-sections, we will discuss how the shift from open access fishery to quota-
regulated fishery has changed the allocation of fishing effort and harvest strategy in codfish 
fishery. 
8.1 Harvest strategy of codfish under an open access fishery 
Under an open access fishery, the only major constraint that fishers confront is 
environmental conditions such as weather unsuitability and fish availability (Maurstad, 2000). 
Under this circumstance, a wide range of aquatic organisms are available for the fishers, hence 
they can freely alternate fishery in response to the changing marine environment and climatic 
conditions, and fish as much as possible to increase fishing revenue. 
Under an open access fishery, it is rational to think that the race to catch cod encourages 
trawlers to start fishing as soon as the fishery opens to outdo other appropriators (including both 
other trawlers and coastal fishers) to reap bigger profits. This is because if fishers do not start 
catching cod as early as possible, their counterparts will exploit cod and nothing or little will 
be left for them. Put differently, latecomers have very little chance of catching anything as the 
cod stock has already been exploited by the incumbent fishers. Similarly, the incentive to pre-
empt cod before other competitors would encourage capital investment in the trawl fleet. In the 
fishing race between coastal and trawl fleets, it is rational to believe that the trawl fleet will get 




Since the opening of the fishing year coincides with the spawning migration of NEA 
cod along the west coast of northern Norway, one would expect to see that fishing effort is 
aggressively concentrated during the winter months along the coast. At this time, it is likely that 
the cod price will go down due to the large supply of cod, landed by both coastal boats and 
trawlers. However, it is less likely or unlikely that trawlers will withdraw from cod fishery 
because of the low price of cod and switch to other species such as saithe or haddock. The 
rationale is that cod is the most economically valuable fish stock and if trawlers do not utilize 
this opportunity, then the cod stock will be pre-empted by other fleets. This implies that under 
open access fisheries, trawlers would probably not respond to the supplied quantity and price 
fluctuations in the cod fishery. Once the cod stock is fished, it is expected that trawlers would 
switch to haddock and later to saithe fishery as haddock is commercially more valuable than 
saithe. 
In addition, from a spatial point of view, allocation of fishing effort in distant areas of 
the Arctic when NEA cod swim back to the Barents Sea to feed seems to be an untenable and 
foolish harvest strategy as the majority of this stock has already been fished earlier in the year 
during Lofoten fishery. Under this scenario, there will be little cod in the Barents Sea after the 
winter months of spawning. In essence, trawling in the Arctic area will be considerably costly 
because of the transportation cost as well as increased cost per unit of effort due to low fish 
abundance. Under this circumstance, it is expected that the total cost cannot be covered by the 
expected revenue, which leads to negative marginal profitability. Even if we assume that the 
market price of cod is better at the end of the year due to lower landings (i.e., if we assume that 
some trawlers fish in the Arctic and there is still a supply of cod out of the winter months), we 
cannot expect that the increase in price on its own could motivate trawlers to participate in the 
fishery in the Arctic area due to the high cost of fishing there. Hence, there will be no or little 




will be underutilized as trawlers fish during the winter months close to the shore and no freezing 
is needed. 
8.2 Harvest strategy of the codfish fishery under quota regulations 
The limited catch size together with assignment of property rights has brought some 
major economic considerations for fishers that have created the necessity to change their fishing 
strategy (Branch & Hilborn, 2008; Copes, 1986; Quirijns et al., 2008; Squires et al., 1998). 
Since IVQs assign fishing rights to eligible fishers, the race for fish has ceased. This 
means that unlike in an open access fishery, fishers do not need to act hastily and fish as soon 
as the fishery season starts. 
Moreover, the limited nature of harvest under the quota system encourages fishers to 
harvest in a cost-minimizing way while increasing revenue from fishing by correctly choosing 
when and where to fish what, and how much to harvest to take advantage of variations in stock 
abundance (i.e., CPUE) and in the prices of different fish stocks over the course of a fishing 
year (Anderson et al., 2019; Asche et al., 2015; Dupont et al., 2005). Fish prices fluctuate due 
to the quantity and quality of landings as well as variation on the demand side (Arnason et al., 
2004; Asche, Gordon, et al., 2002; Birkenbach et al., 2020). There may also be seasonal 
variations in price (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). Having a secured 
share of fish enables fishers to plan their activities throughout the season and respond to 
fluctuations in stocks and prices to maximize profit. 
In essence, fishers shift the target species when available alternative fishery is 
economically and/or biologically more favorable (i.e., higher market prices and/or higher 
CPUE) to maximize profit. This highlights the importance of recognizing the spatiotemporal 
allocation of fishing effort, in particular for migratory species like cod, saithe, and haddock. In 




depend on quota size and how well fishers can utilize their fishing rights in terms of optimally 
allocating fishing effort over time and space. The chosen strategy should be in accordance with 
quota regulations. This means that fishers cannot fish more than the assigned quota, otherwise 
overfished quotas are forfeited, or highly penalized (Hersoug, 2005). 
For a more comprehensive review on how the introduction of IVQs has affected the 
adopted harvested strategy and effort allocation, in Figure 9, we depict the effort allocation of 
trawlers operating in cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries over 2011–2016 on a fortnightly basis. 
Fishing effort is measured in thousand hours of trawling. As it is evident from Figure 9, unlike 
open access fishery, effort is spread over the course of a year. 
 
Figure 9. Fortnightly allocated fishing effort, measured in thousand hours of trawling for cod, saithe, 
and haddock fisheries, caught by 61 registered trawl vessels over 2011–2016. Source: The Norwegian 




Relatedly, in Figure 10 we show catch patterns of cod, saithe, and haddock, measured 
in thousand tons, caught by the trawl fleet over the course of a year on a fortnightly basis. In 
the calculation of catch, incidental catch of other species is also considered as trawling 
inevitably comes with bycatch. 
 
Figure 10. Fortnightly catch, measured in thousand tons for cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries, caught 
by 61 registered trawl vessels over 2011–2016. Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
The patterns of allocation of fishing effort and catch are similar. At the beginning of the 
year, shortly after the fishing year starts, there is a noticeable drop in both fishing effort 
allocation and the catch of cod fishery, despite the CPUE for cod fishery still being high (see 
Figure 6). Concurrently, at this time there is a rise in fishing effort and catch of saithe fishery. 
This means that during this time interval, trawlers withdraw from the cod fishery and start 
targeting saithe and haddock. 
As stated earlier, higher CPUE indicates higher productivity and less cost per unit of 




be due to the price effect. As soon as the fishing year starts, coastal boats target NEA cod, which 
migrates from the Barents Sea to the fishing grounds along the coast of north-west Norway to 
spawn. Coastal boats hold 65–80% of cod quotas, and since they are geographically less mobile 
relative to trawlers, they exhaust their cod quotas (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & 
Dreyer, 2010). Excess supply of cod lowers the price. The spatial freedom of the trawl vessels, 
together with being less susceptible to the harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic, makes them 
capable of catching cod in Arctic areas when NEA cod swim back to the Barents Sea to feed. 
Hence, the low price of cod during wintertime encourages trawlers to shift to saithe fishery and 
reserve the cod quota for the time when the price of cod is higher. As is evident in Figures 9 
and 10, the sudden drop in fishing effort and landings of cod is followed by a rise towards the 
end of the year. This means that trawlers utilize the reserved quota in this period in the Arctic, 
where NEA cod is available in this area to feed. At this time, it is rational to think that cod 
fetches higher prices as the trawl fleet is the only source of cod landings from the Arctic area. 
In agreement with the catch patterns in Figure 10, Birkenbach et al. (2020) concluded 
that Norwegian trawlers should spread cod landings over the course of a year while targeting 
saithe in a short period during winter to maximize profit. This is observable in Figure 10, where 
saithe is fished approximately between the 2nd and 11th fortnights. The catch pattern in Figure 10 
on its own gives the insight that trawlers are profit-oriented and seek to maximize profit. 
In order to support our argument about the responsiveness of trawlers to the price 
fluctuations under quota regulations, in Figure 11 we illustrate the monthly average prices of 
these three fisheries during 2011–2016. The prices are in Norwegian Krone (NOK) and ascribed 
to the frozen products of cod, saithe, and haddock as the trawl fleet is equipped with freezing 





Figure 11. Monthly average price for landed frozen products of cod, saithe, and haddock caught by the 
trawl fleet during 2011–2016. Source: Norwegian Fishermen’s Sale organization (Norges Råfisklag) 
As is evident from Figure 11, cod and saithe are the most and least commercially 
valuable fish stocks, respectively. The prices of cod and haddock show more fluctuations 
relative to those of saithe fishery. One reason for observing more fluctuation in cod price is that 
Norwegian trawlers face a downward-sloping demand schedule, meaning that price responds 
to the changes in quantity (Arnason et al., 2004; Birkenbach et al., 2020). This is because the 
cod market is effectively segmented from that of other white fish, while saithe and haddock are 
more integrated into the global white fish market (Arnason et al., 2004; Birkenbach et al., 2020). 
Therefore, seasonality in cod fishery and fluctuations in landings of cod may be reflected in 
prices. Similarly, saithe price does not fluctuate as much as the prices of cod and haddock, 
probably because the CPUE of saithe does not fluctuate considerably either, if we disregard 
January and April (see Figure 6). Another explanation could be that the demand for saithe is 




At the beginning of the year, cod and haddock fetch lower prices. The rationale behind 
this pattern is related to the intensive participation of the coastal fleet during Lofoten fishery. 
Proximity to the shore and lower cost per unit of effort because of the availability of 
congregated stocks (Hannesson, 2007b; Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006) provide a good 
opportunity for the fishers, especially the coastal fleet, to fish their quotas, in particular cod and 
haddock as these species are commercially more valuable. As stated earlier, excess supply leads 
to the lowering of prices (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 
As is shown in Figure 11, the prices of cod and haddock are higher towards the end of 
year, which motives trawlers to target these species in the Arctic areas, in particular cod. 
Interestingly, the price of saithe is highest in March (around 10 NOK per kilo) when the 
CPUE of cod and haddock is high as well. This could indicate that during Lofoten fishery the 
landings of saithe are lower as fishers fish cod and haddock. The reduced supply of saithe could 
be the reason behind the higher price of saithe in March. The price of saithe starts to decline in 
April, the time at which CPUE is the highest (see Figure 6). The price of saithe remains almost 
steady until the end of the fishing year. 
With the above considerations in mind, we see that under a quota-managed fishery, 
trawlers adopt a different harvest strategy in comparison to that in an open access fishery. Under 
rights-based fishery, trawlers spread their catch over the course of a year and respond to the 





9 Contribution: a gradual shift from conventional fisheries management 
Fishing is a process which is built upon constant interactions between fish and fisher. 
Hence, fisheries management on the one side should be concerned about fish dynamics, and on 
the other—–an equally important side—the need to investigate fishers’ behavior as fishers are 
part of, depend on, and affect the ecology and population dynamics of fish stocks (Fulton et al., 
2011; Hilborn, 2007). This means that an integrated management scheme, in which fish and 
fisher behaviors and their interactions are incorporated, is needed to sustain a biologically and 
economically sustainable fishing industry (Charles, 1995; Fulton et al., 2011; Hilborn & 
Walters, 1992). 
However, traditionally, fisheries management places greater prominence on fish 
population dynamics and conservation of target species, and focuses on the biological 
management of fish (Hilborn, 1985, 2007; Wilson et al., 1994). In other words, fishers’ behavior 
and the motivations governing the patterns of effort allocation have rarely been taken into 
account in developing and implementing regulatory schemes (Charles, 1995; Reimer & Abbott, 
2020). 
For instance, notable among the early managerial criteria to hinder overfishing is the 
traditional maximum sustainable yield (MSY), introduced in 1954 (Hersoug, 2005). MSY 
supports the largest possible annual fish production while ensuring sustainability of the fish 
population. When the fish population falls below the MSY, overfishing occurs (Hersoug, 2005). 
Larkin (1977) and Ludwig et al. (1993) argue that the attainment of biological and economic 
sustainability based upon merely biologically founded criteria such as MSY is impossible as it 
overlooks how fish is caught and how fishing effort is distributed. In agreement with the 
aforementioned scholars, Wilson et al. (1994) stated that the use of biological research results 




of fishing management requires an understanding of fishers’ behavior and the spatial and 
temporal distribution of fishing effort. 
Related to the inefficiency of fisheries management, the failure of strictly regulated 
fisheries where overfishing and excess capacity are still present has been abundantly reported 
by scholars (FAO, 2012; Fulton et al., 2011; Hilborn et al., 2001; Kelleher et al., 2009; Lazkano 
& Nøstbakken, 2016; Miranda & Brandon, 2017). 
NEA stock lies within safe biological limits (Armstrong et al., 2014). Despite meeting 
conservation objectives and having a biologically well-managed stock, fisheries researchers 
have found that the management of cod fisheries is still inefficient (Arnason et al., 2004; Asche, 
2009; Bertheussen & Dreyer, 2019; Diekert et al., 2010a, 2010b; Ottersen, 2008). For example, 
Diekert et al. (2010a, 2010b) revealed that overfishing still exists in cod fishery and economic 
rent could be improved. Similarly, Asche et al. (2009) have identified considerable overcapacity 
in the Norwegian trawl fleet. Additionally, Bertheussen and Dreyer (2019) have detected a 
market failure in cod fishery. Moreover, Arnason et al. (2004) and Ottersen (2008) have shown 
that the harvest pattern of cod is inefficient and the rent could be enhanced by redistribution of 
fishing effort. 
However, it is difficult to pinpoint a single prevailing reason for the inefficiency of 
management policies; human ecologists, anthropologists, and maritime social scientists argue 
that excluding fishers’ harvesting behavior, their motivations, and factors influencing the choice 
of adopted harvest strategies in designing policies has led to the failure of fisheries management 
and non-sustainability of fisheries (Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Hilborn, 1985, 2007; Hilborn & 
Walters, 1992; Ludwig et al., 1993; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984; Wilson et al., 1994). Scientists 
believe that pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors can drive fishers to allocate fishing effort in a 




Tewfik, 2001; Branch & Hilborn, 2008; Bucaram & Hearn, 2014; Fulton et al., 2011; O’Farrell 
et al., 2019; Salas & Gaertner, 2004). 
Related to this, Hilborn (1985) and Ludwig et al. (1993) mentioned that managing 
fisheries is indeed managing fishers. They argue that the inefficiency of fisheries management 
such as the problem of overfishing is not because of an inadequate amount of fish in the sea but 
rather it is attributed to the inability of managers to understand how fishing practices are 
conducted to catch fish, and what motivates such strategies. 
More than half a century ago, for the first time Gordon (1953) combined fishers’ effort 
allocation behavior with the biophysical characteristics of fish and introduced a bio-economic 
model. Even though the investigation of fishers’ behavior dates back to the 1950s, its 
incorporation in designing fisheries policies is neglected. Hilborn and Walters (1992), Charles 
(1995) and Wilen et al. (2002) claim that our understanding of fishers’ harvest behavior is at 
best rudimentary. Moreover, Heal (2007) claims that the current gap between potential and 
actual performance of fisheries management is the largest in comparison to other areas of 
environmental economics. 
Some scholars claim that one of the main reasons for this negligence is because of the 
complexity of fishers’ behavior (Deporte et al., 2012; Fulton et al., 2011). Maurstad (2000) 
agrees that in realistic settings human behavior is no less complex than fish behavior. However, 
she claims that unlike fish that constantly move across sea, and which are not directly 
observable to researchers, fishers are accessible to researchers. She suggested that, for instance, 
interviewing fishers can reveal valuable information about fishing effort allocation and the 
motivation behind the behavior of fishers. 
The contribution of this thesis is to improve the efficiency of fisheries management by 




10 Research questions and empirical methods 
As conventional fisheries management with a focus merely on fish population dynamics 
falls short in solving existing problems in Norwegian fisheries, the main aim of this thesis is to 
bring attention to trawlers’ harvest behavior and investigate how they allocate fishing effort and 
utilize quotas over time and across space, governed by trawlers’ goals and quota constraints. 
Since the fishing portfolio of cod, saithe, and haddock is among the most valuable quota 
portfolios, investigation of the spatiotemporal allocation of fishing effort in trawl fishery can 
contribute to enhancement of the industry’s profitability (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Cojocaru et 
al., 2019; Guttormsen & Roll, 2011). 
There are three relevant explanations behind choosing the trawl fleet in this thesis. First, 
the spatial and temporal freedom of trawl vessels and their capability to cope with the harsh 
climatic conditions could influence their fishing strategy. The reason is that these features could 
dilute the consequences of seasonal spawning aggregation of fish stocks during wintertime 
along the north-west coast of Norway (Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979; 
Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Moreover, these features enable trawlers to steadily supply white 
fish over the course of a year to reinforce Norwegian fisheries (Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979). 
Second, the Norwegian trawl industry is vertically integrated (Dreyer & Grønhaug, 
2004; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979; Isaksen, 2007), and this on its own might affect the way 
trawlers behave in comparison to non-integrated coastal fishers. As stated earlier, in section 
3.2.2, vertically integrated industries are able to operate at lower cost in comparison to non-
integrated businesses. At the same time, they are exposed to less risk due to an integrated supply 
chain and increased control over the market (Isaksen, 2007; Porter, 1980; Riordan, 1990). 
Third, as mentioned earlier, investigation of how fishing effort is allocated across space 




is of critical relevance to the trawl fishery as this fishing practice might harm the marine 
environment. If intensive and damaging trawling is identified at a specific time and location, 
managerial policies could be developed to prevent the destruction of ecosystems and marine 
resources, such as the designation of trawl-free zones. 
The empirical investigation of fishers’ behavior is a less developed area of fisheries 
research. Thus, the outcome of this thesis contributes to fill the gap in empirical literature 
concerning fishers’ behavior. 
10.1 First article 
In this article, first we investigated the presence of seasonality in the cod fishery in two 
distinct areas, namely the fishing grounds off the west coast of northern Norway and the high 
sea areas of the Arctic including Bear Island and Svalbard. Furthermore, we examined how 
seasonality affects economic considerations such as the price and cost of fishing as well as the 
utilization of quotas and allocation of fishing effort in the two aforementioned regions. 
We approximate seasonality in the cod stock by obtaining CPUE in the selected areas. 
Thereafter, Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) and Fourier series are used to detect and model 
seasonality. Our analysis detects seasonality in the cod stock along the west coast of northern 
Norway due to the spawning aggregation of NEA cod. The congregated stock in this area during 
wintertime reduces cost per unit of effort, which in turn encourages both trawlers and coastal 
fishers to target cod. As a result of a large supply of cod, the price of cod declines. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that the magnitude of the reduction in price outweighs the reduction in cost, 
hence it would then no longer be in the interests of trawlers to utilize the cod quota. At this 
time, trawlers withdraw from cod fishery and participate in available fisheries such as saithe or 




starts to increase when NEA cod returns back to the Barents Sea to feed. The increased price of 
cod is due to the limited landings of cod as coastal fishers are not able to fish in the Arctic areas. 
Based on the outcomes of this study, we conclude that Norwegian trawlers respond to 
changes in cod abundance and the market price of cod in an economically rational way. More 
precisely, this means that trawlers redirect fishing effort to other available fisheries in the winter 
months when the price of cod is lower. Trawlers start cod fishery when the price of cod starts 
to rise after Lofoten fishery. This result indicates that effort allocation and quota utilization of 
trawlers are consistent with the theory of rational choice. 
10.2 Second article 
In the second article, we examined whether diversification in terms of catching multiple 
species functions as a revenue risk reduction mechanism in Norwegian trawl fishery. Revenue 
from the fishing portfolio is characterized by considerable risk, stemming from fluctuations in 
population abundance, changes in the relative prices of fish stocks, and possible reforms in 
regulations. Hence, trawlers seek to minimize revenue risk and obtain a stabilized revenue over 
the fishing year, while adhering to quota constraints. 
Our quota portfolio consists of cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries. The seasonality 
patterns of these fish stocks and price reactions to the fluctuations in relative fish availability 
are different, hence trawlers need to constantly reallocate fishing effort across these species 
over the course of a year to accomplish revenue risk minimization. 
Bycatch considerations are also included in this study, as during wintertime the spatial 
distribution of cod, saithe, and haddock coincides along the north-west coast of Norway, hence 





This study uses coefficient of variation of revenue per unit of effort (RPUE) as a revenue 
risk measure. A decision-making framework, which incorporates the alternatives about when 
to fish what, and how much to fish, is used to assess the revenue risk-minimizing behavior of 
the trawl fleet under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that a risk-
minimizing trawler has only one business objective, which is to allocate fishing effort in a way 
that minimizes the revenue risk of the fishing portfolio. In the second scenario, the decision 
maker (i.e., representative trawler) has two simultaneous objectives: minimizing revenue risk 
and generating a sufficient level of revenue. The results from the first scenario show that 
minimizing revenue risk comes at a greater cost, and that is the underutilization of the cod 
quota. Since cod is the most commercially valuable species in this portfolio, it is unlikely that 
trawlers would forgo the revenue that could have been generated from cod fishery for the sake 
of minimizing revenue risk. This provides an insight that lowering risk by the means of 
diversification is economically irrational in trawl fishery, and an untenable strategy to adopt. 
The results of the second scenario show that trawlers manage to fully exhaust the quota portfolio 
by the end of the fishing year. Moreover, our findings prove that enhancing revenue is more 
important than minimizing revenue risk for the trawlers. Relatedly, we found that the 
seasonality in cod fishery plays an important role in shaping the adopted harvest strategy to 
enhance fishing revenue. 
Despite the fact that diversification has long been a strategy to stabilize revenue, we 
found that trawlers hold a diverse portfolio to enhance revenue, and not necessarily to reduce 
revenue risk. We speculate that the vertical integration of the trawl industry together with the 
spatiotemporal freedom of trawl vessels and their ability to cope with unsuitable climatic 




10.3 Third article 
Having confirmed that revenue enhancement is a more important business objective for 
the trawl fishers, in the third article we investigated the profit maximization behavior of the 
Norwegian trawl fleet under quota restrictions. Our quota portfolio includes cod, saithe, and 
haddock. Precisely, we examine intra- and inter-temporal allocation of fishing effort across 
three regions, namely the northern and southern parts of the west coast of northern Norway and 
the high sea areas of the Arctic, which include the Barents Sea area and Svalbard. In the 
southern part of the west coast of Norway, saithe fishery is dominant, while in the northern part 
of the west coast and in the sub-Artic areas, cod and haddock fisheries prevail. 
These three locations are heterogeneous in terms of the availability of different fish 
stocks and the corresponding prices, the fuel cost to travel to the fishing grounds (i.e., proximity 
to shore) and the presence of the coastal fleet. The relative attractiveness of these locations 
varies over the course of the year, hence trawlers need to constantly evaluate the economic 
benefits and costs associated with the selected regions. 
This study employs a Heckman’s two-step selection model and incorporates the 
aforementioned spatial features through a two-step procedure. In the first step, a probit 
regression model is used to determine whether trawlers allocate fishing effort at a specific 
location and time. The second step develops a distinct regression model to specify the factors 
influencing the allocation of fishing effort. 
The results of the proposed two-step Heckman’s selection model reveal that location-
specific costs have a great impact on how trawlers displace effort across the three different 
regions and over time. 
From intra-temporal analysis, we found that the presence of the coastal fleet during 




trawlers, hence they refrain from cod fishery and reserve the cod quota for a time when NEA 
cod swim back to the Arctic regions to feed. Moreover, our analysis shows that with higher fuel 
prices, trawlers would allocate fishing effort in saithe fishery in the southern parts of the west 
coast of Norway.  
Based on our results from inter-temporal analysis, we found that trawlers react to the 
congestion of the coastal fleet during Lofoten fishery during wintertime. Once the negative 
effect of stock congestion fades away (i.e., low market price for cod), trawlers utilize their quota 
in this region. Furthermore, trawlers respond to changes in fuel price and try to even out the 






The data used in this thesis are extracted from a combination of sources. We used vessel 
monitoring system (VMS) data for 61 trawl vessels engaged in cod, saithe, and haddock 
fisheries over 2011–2016. These data are collected by the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
(Norwegian: Fiskeridirektoratet). Almost all of the vessels had fished the previous years and 
were active over the 6 years of observation. 
Based on Norwegian fisheries management, all vessels more than 15 meters in length 
are obligated to be equipped with a VMS for surveillance of vessel sailing and enforcement 
(Pramod, 2018). The trawl vessels in this study range in size from 40 to 75 meters and are 
equipped with onboard freezing facilities. Data recorded by the VMS include haul-based 
observations of geographic coordinates on net set location (Loran) and time of set, location and 
time of lift, the depth at which trawling has occurred and the size of the towed area. A total of 
86,418, 67,071, and 38,928 haul-based observations were recorded for cod, saithe, and haddock 
fisheries, respectively. The application of spatial and temporal data recorded by VMS enabled 
us to investigate the spatial and temporal distribution of fishing effort. 
Another major source of data is the logbooks kept by fishers. We obtained the logbooks 
of the corresponding vessels from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, which include haul-
based records of fishing date, target species (e.g., cod, saithe or haddock fisheries), estimates 
of catch weights of the main target together with bycatch species, and soaking time. This data 
set contains information on vessels’ identity as well as technical characteristics of the vessels 
such as engine specifications. The vessels had the same identification numbers during the period 
of 6 years. Using catch, measure in tons, and effort, measured in trawling hours, we can obtain 
CPUE to investigate the possible effect of variation in fish abundance (see Equation 2) on 




The third data set was obtained from the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization 
(Norwegian: Norges Råfisklag), which includes weekly price data for frozen products of cod, 
saithe, and haddock over 2011–2016. The sales organization was established in 1939 (Hersoug, 
2005; Holm, 2001). Ex-vessel and minimum prices of fish stocks (Norwegian: Råfiskloven) are 
set by the Fishermen’s Sales Organization through negotiation with fish buyers. Trawlers have 
refrigeration facilities on board and they usually deliver frozen products (Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 
2001). Hence, we used price information for the frozen fish products. Using this data set shows 
how trawlers react to price movements in terms of effort allocation. 
In the third article, in order to investigate the effect of fuel cost on trawlers’ effort 
allocation, we utilized the data from two different sources. First, the annual average fuel price 
per liter for the trawl fleet was obtained from The Guarantee Fund for Fishers (Norwegian: 
Garantikassen for fiskere). We then obtained the monthly gasoline price per liter from Statistics 
Norway (Norwegian: Statistisk sentralbyrå; SSB). In order to capture the fuel price variation 
over the course of a year, we obtained the monthly fuel price of the trawlers by normalizing 
gasoline prices based on the annual average price (i.e., we used 2011), and multiplied the 
standardized price to the monthly data. 
It is worth mentioning that fishery data are affected by noise. Any interference from the 
environment (e.g., bad weather conditions), gear failure, or simply good/bad luck affects the 
size of the catch (Durrenberger & Pálsson, 1983; King, 2011; Thorlindsson, 1994). In order to 
eliminate noise from our data set to have meaningful features, we have aggregated the data on 
a fortnightly basis in the first and second articles, consisting of 26 fortnights over 6 years (i.e., 
156 fortnights in total). However, in the third article, we have used weekly and monthly data 
for the intra- and inter-temporal analysis of fishing effort, respectively. We have used weekly 




application of monthly data in the estimation of inter-temporality is to avoid collinearity caused 






The empirical investigation of fishers’ harvest behavior has received little attention in 
fisheries literature. As a result of this, including fishers’ behavior when designing policies for 
fisheries management has been neglected. In recent years, fisheries researchers have put 
forward the view that fisheries management requires further understanding of the fishers and 
their motivations behind choices for effective management. 
In this regard, the present work seeks to shed light on the spatiotemporal effort 
allocation of Norwegian trawlers, with special emphasis on the migratory behavior of codfish 
and quota regulations. The reason behind the choice of cod, saithe, and haddock fish stocks is 
that this portfolio constitutes economically important species in terms of volume and total 
revenue, caught by trawlers. 
Accessibility to comprehensive and detailed data sets, obtained from several sources, 
allows us to empirically investigate the choices regarding when and where to fish what, and 
how much to fish, to accomplish the considered business objective(s), while adhering to quota 
constraints. 
Making optimal decisions underlying the effort allocation of the trawl fleet can be 
notoriously difficult due to several reasons. First of all, the bottom-trawl fleet operates in multi-
species fisheries (here, cod, saithe, and haddock). These species have heterogeneous biological 
characteristics (i.e., feeding and breeding patterns) and their habitat requirements might vary as 
well. Hence, they exhibit different seasonal patterns across different locations over the course 
of a year. As a result of heterogeneous patterns of seasonality in these fish stocks, the potential 
economic consequences and the magnitude of these consequences might be different. 
Besides the unpredictability of fish behavior, the varying states of the ocean in terms of 




conditions, and abrupt reformations in regulations add more complication to the allocation of 
fishing effort. 
Another source of complexity is that the Norwegian trawl fleet is quota-regulated and 
trawlers need to constantly track catch sizes and remaining quotas to take advantage of 
variations in stock abundance and price over the course of a fishing year to attain the considered 
goal(s). Moreover, based on the Norwegian quota system, only a small percentage of unused 
quota can be granted in the subsequent year. Hence trawlers need to fully utilize the quota 
portfolio by the end of the fishing year, otherwise underutilization is considered an economic 
loss. 
The results of the three articles are in line with each other. In summary, our analysis 
suggests two major conclusions. One of the common take-away messages from the three articles 
is that trawlers are profit-oriented and swiftly redistribute fishing effort in response to changes 
in fish availability and prices to obtain the highest level of possible profits. This implies that 
the selections of where, when, and what to fish are in accordance with the theory of rational 
choices. The second common outcome among all papers is related to the cascading effect of 
spawning migration of NEA cod and intensive participation of the coastal fleet in shaping the 
harvest strategy adopted by trawlers. 
The outcomes of this study aim to shift the focus of fisheries management from fish 
behavior to fishers’ behavior. Recognition of how trawlers allocate fishing effort contributes to 
the refinement and improvement of fisheries management as this enables us to compare how 
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Fisheries are characterized by variations in space and time. This study investigates the characteristics of seasonality in cod 
trawl fisheries in two distinct areas: the coast along the northern Norway and the high sea area of the Barents Sea. Catch 
per unit of effort (CPUE) is used to proxy variation in stock abundance. A CPUE function has been estimated in the 
frequency-domain framework, to detect the presence of seasonality. Our analysis reveals that seasonality in stock 
abundance is only present in the northern coast of Norway. We conclude that as a consequence of seasonality in stock 
aggregation during the first quarter of the fishing year, possible economic losses caused by reduced prices -stemming from 
a large supply of cod- is larger than the economic benefits from cost reduction per unit of harvest. We speculate that 
declined price and consequently potential economic losses encourage trawlers to substitute cod by other high value 
fisheries during the winter months. As the price of cod starts to rise after the first quarter, trawlers begin to target cod in the 
high sea areas, a region with less seasonality. 
Keywords: Seasonality; spatiality; Frequency domain; Trawl fishery; Cod fishery 
Recommendations for resource managers  
Taking into account findings, policy formations and management considerations may include: 
 Improving understanding of the spatial and temporal distribution of CPUE. This allows 
for better long- and medium term planning of vessel capacity and technology. 
 Allowing also for better planning of the distribution of fishing effort across the year, 
which improves economic yield. 
 Sharing the result of the study will improve short-term utilization and economic yield 
among the fishing fleet. 
 Information on variations in CPUE over time and space may be relevant for authorities 









1. Introduction  
Almost all fisheries are subjected to constantly changing marine environment and various 
biological responses by fish stocks (e.g., migration pattern) conditioned by environmental fluctuations 
(Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Maslov, 1972; Mello & Rose, 2005a, 2005b). When fluctuations are 
repeated annually, seasonality may become a significant and persistent characteristic of fisheries 
utilizing such resources, as in the fishery of migratory cod (Gadus morhua) (Bartolino et al., 2012; 
Garrod, 1967; Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Maslov, 1972; Mello & Rose, 2005a, 2005b). The 
seasonality is defined by systematic fish density variations between and within various geographical 
areas throughout the year. Seasonality in fish behavior could influence harvest pattern and fisher’s 
decision about how to allocate fishing effort (Flaaten, 1987). Perhaps the best known example of 
seasonal harvest is the Lofoten cod fishery (Hannesson et al., 2010; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; 
Standal & Hersoug, 2015). 
The seasonality of the cod fishery is described in a vast number of studies (Eide et al., 2003; 
Flaaten, 1987, Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Maslov, 1972; Sundby & Nakken, 2008; Trout, 1957; and 
more). However, the seasonality studies on cod is mainly dominated by biological literature, posing 
questions such as how seasonal cycles affect the physiological conditions of cod (Johannesen et al., 
2015; Mello & Rose, 2005a, 2005b; Neuenfeldt et al., 2013; Sundby & Nakken, 2008; Schwalme & 
Chouinard, 1999). While this focus remains important, it is only a part of the wider issue of 
seasonality in cod fisheries. A neglected but important dimension is to see how seasonality affects 
market conditions as well as fishers’ behavior in terms of redirecting fishing effort over time and 
space, and how it affects quota utilization in regulated fisheries.  
Changes in environmental and oceanographic conditions leading to biological aggregation, 
could affect economic considerations such as price and cost per unit of harvest (Asch et al., 2015; 
Flaaten, 1983; Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). For instance, Asche et al., (2015) 
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have detected that market price of cod varies with harvest attributes such as when and where the fish 
was caught over the course of a year, which in turn could influence the effort allocation. Moreover, 
according to bioeconomic theory the cost per unit of harvest is inversely proportional to fish density, 
hence it might be advantageous to take large catches when the stock is dense (Hannesson, 2007; 
Sandberg, 2006). However, immediate drop in unit prices of harvest during periods of large catches 
works in the opposite direction (Flaaten, 1987; Hannesson, 2007; Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Larkin & 
Sylvia, 1999). These economic consequences could affect fisher’s harvest behavior.  
Eide et al., (2003) investigated and detected the existence of seasonality in the Norwegian 
trawl fishery of cod through fitting a harvest function while this fishery still was an open access 
fishery (1971-1985). However, this study lacks the spatial dimension and it is not obvious how the 
seasonal pattern affects the fishing behavior after the introduction of quota regulations. In fact, spatial 
dimension of fishery is not distinguishable from its temporality as different fishing grounds feature 
different biological and economic condition to catch fish over the course of a year (Asche et al., 2015; 
Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Flaaten, 1983; Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999).  
Bottom trawling is a common method of fishing cod. The trawlers are ocean going vessels, 
reasonably homogenous in terms of length (size) and engine power, with the possibility of combining 
cod quota with quotas for other species such as saithe, haddock and shrimp (Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017; 
Standal & Hersoug, 2014; Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Salvanes & Squires, 1995). Trawlers have an 
advantage in coping with the rough climate condition in the high sea area (e.g., Svalbard) as well as 
providing fresh seafood throughout the year due to availability of advanced technology and equipment 
(e.g., processing deck and slurry ice machine or freezing capacity) (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & 
Hersoug, 2015). Technical characteristics of the trawl fleet together with flexibility of shifting from 
cod to other species , when cod is not favorable economically (e.g., low price) and/ or biologically 
(e.g., low abundance cod stock), could provide opportunity for the trawlers to mollify the potential 
adverse effect of seasonality (e.g., low prices) in the cod fishery (Salvanes & Squires, 1995). Despite 
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voluminous literature on productivity studies of Norwegian trawl fleet (Asche et al., 2009; Bjørndal & 
Gordon, 1993, 2000; Guttormsen & Roll, 2011; Salvanes & Squires, 1995; Sandberg, 2006), the effect 
of seasonality on trawler’s harvest pattern is far less researched. 
Given the homogeneous structure of the fleet (e.g., size and length), here we assume equal 
technology among 54 active cod trawlers over 6 years (2011-2016). The ratio between catch and 
fishing effort; catch per unit effort (CPUE) therefore is assumed to reflect variation in stock abundance 
and possible seasonal pattern as well as partial productivity of the trawlers at a certain time in a certain 
location (Cooke & Beddington, 1984; Cunningham & Whitmarsh, 1980; Hanchet et al., 2005). Using 
fortnight CPUE values -catches per time (each haul is measured in hours)-, the first objective of this 
paper is to detect possible seasonality in the two areas: 1) along the northern coast Norway and 2) the 
high sea area of the Barents Sea. Using the CPUE values, we estimated a CPUE function through Fast 
Fourier Transformation (FFT) and Fourier series. The second objective is to provide a description of 
underlying causes of seasonality and the possible effect of seasonal cycles on the market conditions, 
fisher’s decision-making process about reallocation of fishing effort and quota utilization. In addition, 
the present paper investigates whether the introduction of quota regulation has any effect on observed 
fishers’ behavior and decision criteria in response to seasonality in cod stock. 
It is worth mentioning that the behavioral researchers of fisheries believe that failure to 
incorporate fisher’s behavior, even when fishery is biologically well-managed, leads to inefficiency of 
management (Charles, 1995; Hilborn, 1985, 2007; Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Wilen et al., 2002). 
Related to the preceding point, Diekert et al., (2010) claim that in spite of strict regulations on 
Norwegian cod fishery, overfishing is still detectable. Similarly, Asche et al., (2009) have identified 
substantial overcapacity in the Norwegian trawl fleet. Hence, understanding the extent of seasonality 
and its potential effect on fishing strategies, the decisions that trawlers make in deciding when, where 
and what to fish could lead to more efficient fisheries management. Moreover, as bottom trawling 
damages the seafloor and its habitat, recognition of intense trawling pressure in certain areas at certain 
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times, could mitigate negative effects of trawling by implementing proper management practices 
(Bergman & Van Santbrink, 2000; He & Winger, 2010). 
2. Method 
2.1 Theoretical framework  
Assume a fishery where the harvest of a given stock is a function of two variables:  (1) the 
amount of fishing effort applied and (2) the stock's biomass. Using the canonical harvest model, which 
was introduced by Schaefer (1954), we have: 
𝐻 𝑡, 𝛾 𝑞 𝐸 𝑡, 𝛾 𝐵 𝑡, 𝛾  
  
(1) 
where 𝐻 𝑡, 𝛾  is the harvest (here measured in tonne) at time 𝑡 and location 𝛾, 𝐸 𝑡, 𝛾  is the 
amount of fishing effort allocated at the same time and location (here measured as trawling hour per 
haul) and 𝐵 𝑡, 𝛾  is the corresponding biomass of the exploited stock, e.g. total weight of the stock 
present at time 𝑡 in location 𝛾. The parameter 𝑞 is the catchability coefficient, e.g. the portion of the 
available stock captured by one unit of effort. 𝑞 reflects the efficiency of the effort in catching fish 
(Hilborn & Walters, 1992). The output elasticities of the two variables in Equation (1) are equal to 
one and the elasticity of scale is two. Equation (1) can be rearranged to express the catch per unit of 
effort: 
𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑡, 𝛾 𝐻 𝑡, 𝛾 /𝐸 𝑡, 𝛾 𝑞 𝐵 𝑡, 𝛾  
  
(2) 
Since the CPUE is proportional to stock abundance by “catchability coefficient" 𝑞, CPUE may 
be used to detect seasonality, given that Equation (1) provides a reasonable description of catch 
production. The CPUE values presented here are measured in tonnes of cod caught per trawling hour 
for each haul. 
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2.2 Frequency domain analysis  
If a periodic function is represented by a single sine function it provides a consistent repetition 
and regular periodicity over all time. However, real-world signals, such as CPUE, come with noises of 
different frequencies (Bloomfield, 2004; Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001). 
When graphing such a signal in the time domain it is difficult to detect the periodicity, as the cycles 
may not be regular. Even though a real signal oscillates over time, the lengths of the cycles cannot be 
determined easily in the time domain, as peaks of signal are not evenly distributed (Bloomfield, 2004; 
Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001). 
Another limitation of analyzing a signal in the time domain is that noises are not separable 
from desirable signal (Bloomfield, 2004; Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001). 
One solution to detect the periodicity of signals containing noise is to represent the signal of interest in 
the frequency domain. In the frequency domain, a particular signal is characterized by its fundamental 
periodicity, 𝑇, or fundamental frequency 𝑓 and angular frequency 𝜔. The reciprocal relation between 
the period 𝑇 and the frequency yields 𝑓 , furthermore, 𝜔  or 𝜔 2𝜋𝑓.   
The Fourier transformation decomposes any arbitrary signal with periodicity 𝑇, into a weighted 
sum of infinite sets of sinusoidal series of frequencies with 𝑓 0, 1, 2,3, … 𝑛, which are called the 𝑛𝑡ℎ 
harmonics of the signal. The continuous Fourier transform of the signal 𝑥 𝑡  is defined by the 
following (Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001): 
𝑋 𝑓 𝑥 𝑡  𝑒 𝑑𝑡  
  
(3) 
where 𝑋 𝑓  shows the signal representation in the frequency domain. As can be seen, Fourier 
transform basically exhibits the signal with a bunch of complex exponential functions, each with its 
own frequency. The relationship between the exponential and the sine/cosine is given by Euler’s 
Formula (Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001): 
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𝑒 cos 𝑥 𝑗 sin 𝑥    
This allow us to modify the Fourier transformation to  
𝑋 𝑓 𝑥 𝑡 cos 2𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝑗 sin 2𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑡 
 
(4) 
Note that in our analysis, Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) has been employed, which is a more 
efficient algorithm to compute the Fourier transform of the input signal. The output of the FFT is 
complex data points in the frequency spectrum showing the amplitude of the signal at different 
frequency components present in the signal. The output of FFT helps us to identify the sufficient 
number of harmonics to reconstruct our signal. 
Based on the Fourier series representation, it is known that the original periodic signal can be 
approximately generated by the sum of infinite sinusoidal functions (Bloomfield, 2004). Once we 
identified the number of relevant harmonics from output of FFT, we can build our trigonometric 
regression model (Fourier series), presented by 
𝑓 𝑡 𝑎 ∑ 𝛼 cos 𝜔𝑛𝑑 𝑏 sin 𝜔𝑛𝑑 𝜀 , 𝑑 1,2, … 26         (5) 
 
with 𝑎  representing the periodic mean, 𝛼  and 𝑏  being the coefficients of the cosine and sine 
functions in the series, 𝑛  the current number of harmonics and 𝑁 the maximum number of harmonics. 
𝜔 is angular frequency while 𝑑 represents the fortnight number running from the beginning of 2011 to 
the end of 2016. 𝜀  represents random error in the model. We determine 𝑎 , 𝛼  and 𝑏  using the 
following equations (Bloomfield, 2004; Oppenheim & Schafer, 1983; Proakis & Manolakis, 2001):  
𝑎  ∑ 𝑎     (6) 
𝛼  ∑ 𝑎 cos 2𝜋𝑛𝑑/𝑇               (7) 




Model (5) above theoretically estimates and supports the entire real numbers for CPUE. 
However, we know that CPUE is non-negative. To constrain the estimated values of CPUE to be non-
negative, we square our regression equation in model (5) to obtain only feasible range for CPUE. The 
Fourier coefficients are designed to minimize the square of the error from the actual observation to 
acquire the best fitting components. 
3. Data  
3.1 Fishery areas and geographical distinction  
Cod (Gadus morhua) is a commercially valuable fish species found throughout the shelf seas 
of the North Atlantic (Godø & Michalsen, 2000; Maslov, 1972). It is a population-rich species that 
exhibits migratory behavior (Neuenfeldt et al., 2013; Rose, 1993; Sundby & Nakken, 2008). In 
Norwegian waters cod is traditionally classified into two types: coastal and Northeast Arctic (NEA) 
cod. NEA cod, the cod considered here, migrates from the Barents Sea, aggregating during the period 
of mid-January to late February at particular geographical locations, mainly along the northern coast 
of Norway, to spawn (Mello & Rose, 2005b; Neuenfeldt et al., 2013; Rose, 1993). The migratory 
pattern and congregation in the same spawning field occurs every year in succession, representing a 
seasonal distribution pattern (Godø & Michalsen, 2000). Spawning migrations of NEA cod towards 
the coastal areas of Norway gives rise to a winter fishery. After spawning, NEA cod swim to offshore 
areas where it is available to the high seas cod fisheries. Figures 1 and 2 show the spatial and temporal 
distribution of trawling activities over a period of six years (2011-2016), including a total of 64,747 




   Figure 1. Positions (geolocations) of 64747 individual tows by 54 Norwegian registered trawl vessels 2011-2016  (Figure 
1. excludes exceptionally short or long hauls and abnormal catch sizes) - Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
As it can be seen from Figure 1, fishing activity is concentrated in the fishing grounds off the 
northern coast of Norway (region A) and high north areas of northern Norway (region B). These 
arbitrary areas are chosen to reflect spatial heterogeneity such as level of resource availability, climate 
condition and proximity to shore. It should be noted that some of region A is not close to coast, rather 
following the slope down to deeper water. Since this constitutes a continuum with the near-coast 
activities, which southern part also is defined by the slope, it is included in region A. Figure 2 shows 
how trawlers allocate their fishing effort (thousand trawling hours) in the two regions over the course 




Figure 2. Total trawling time per fortnight spent on targeting cod in the two regions during the period 2011-2016. 
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
As it can be seen from figure 2, effort allocation shows opposite patterns in the two regions. At 
the beginning of fishing season, effort is concentrated in region A, with its peak in January. The 
pattern is followed by a sudden drop in the fifth fortnight (March), and then it displays a plateau 
towards the end of the year. Whereas fishing effort in region B is dominantly concentrated at the end 
of the annual fishing season with its peak in December. A complete halt of production and effort 
allocation in the winter months for region B is observable, probably due to the harsh climate with 
extreme wind chill. Lack of fishing activities during the first quarter could be also attributed to the fact 
that trawlers are more attracted to region A due to cod assemblage and lower cost of fishing.  
The economic benefits of stock aggregation (i.e., lower cost per tonne of catch) is even more 
highlighted for the coastal fleet using gears such as long lines, gillnets and Danish seine, as they are 
not able to traverse to distant areas to fish their quota (Asche et al., 2014; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; 
Maurstad, 2000). In the Norwegian cod fishery, it is the coastal fleet that takes the largest share of the 
total quota (approximately 65%), hence 80% of the Norwegian cod is landed in the first quarter of the 
fishing year along the northern coast of Norway (Asche et al., 2014; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; 
Standal & Hersoug, 2015). 
In figure 3, we graph cod catches in thousand tonnes per fortnight broken down by years 
(2011-2016). The catch also includes cod that incidentally was caught as bycatch in fisheries targeting, 
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for example, saithe or haddock. The pattern of catch is reasonably similar to the pattern of fishing 
effort evident in Figure 2. Not surprisingly, for region A, monthly catch is highest in at the beginning 
of the year (January) due to high densities of cod. Similar to the pattern of effort allocation in graph 2, 
there is a sudden drop in catch in February and March, even though cod stock density is still high. 
Comparable with Figure 2, catch size starts to rise in region B by May (fortnight number 10). 
Trawling is predominant in this region until the end of the fishing year.  
 
      Figure 3. Fortnight cod catches (thousand tonnes) in the two areas during 2011-2016. Bycatch of cod when    
      targeting other species is also included. Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
 
Figure 4 shows monthly average CPUE pertaining to regions A and B over the course of a 
year. The scores on the radar plot are on the scale of 0 to 8 in steps of 2, showing values of CPUE. 
From Figure 4, it can be seen that there is substantial variation in the magnitude of CPUE between the 
two regions. CPUE in region A displays a significant degree of variation where it reaches its peak in 
March. Looking at Figure 3, we see that even though in March (5th and 6th fortnight) catch size is 
considerably low, CPUE has the highest value of approximately 6 tonnes per hour of trawling, on 
average. The high value of CPUE arises because trawlers require less amount of fishing effort to catch 
cod when the stock is dense. Hence, reduction in trawling hour determines high CPUE in March. By 
April, when NEA cod migrates back to the high sea areas to feed, CPUE starts to decline considerably 
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in region A. Since higher/ lower values of CPUEs are related to the time when the stock is 








Figure 4. CPUE (tonne/ hour) in the selected areas (2011-2016) with radial axes representing different months with 
center at zero in steps of 2- Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
It is worth mentioning that initially we split the high sea area into two separate regions, a 
western and an eastern region. Since it was detected a strong resemblance between the level of CPUEs 
in the two regions, the regions were merged, recognizing them as one (region B). The rise in CPUE in 
region B occurs when NEA cod swims back to the Barents Sea. At this point in time, sea ice melts and 
weather becomes suitable in high north areas, encouraging fishers to redirect their fishing effort from 
region A to B. Productivity reaches its highest score in July and January with approximately 4 tonnes 
of cod per one hour of operation in region B. If we leave winter months (February and March) aside, 
CPUE is almost steady for the rest of the year. As pointed out earlier, when assuming a bi-linear catch 
equation, CPUE is proportional to stock (see Equation 2). Invariability in CPUE could drive the lack 
of seasonality in the high sea areas. 
Figure 5, provides a richer description of the underlying distribution of CPUE and its 




Figure 5. Comparative Box plot of fortnight distribution of CPUE (tonne/ hour) in the selected areas (2011-2016) with 
the corresponding number of trawling operations- Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 
Figure 5 shows that the average CPUE and the number of trawling operations in the first 
quarter in region A is greater than that of those in region B. The opposite pattern is discernible for 
region B out of winter months. Excluding fortnights four to seven, we see that average values and 
interquartile ranges are reasonably similar in region B.  
Seasonality in fish behavior could play an important role on price movement due to possible 
fluctuation in supply volume. Figure 6 shows the percentage change in the ex-vessel price of cod with 
respect to an average price of 15.92 NOK (per kilo) for trawl catches in 2016. From the figure, it is 
evident that the cod price is characterized by strong seasonal fluctuations. The price drops at the 
beginning of the year and stays below the average price until May, probably due to large cod supply in 
the market (Standal & Hersoug, 2015). As stated earlier, coastal fishing vessels, which holds a large 
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share of cod quota, fish a significant part of their quota during the first quarter of the year, thus fishing 
industry has a good supply of fresh cod, leading to decline in the first-hand price. During the same 
period, it is rational to expect that trawlers switch to other fisheries –if these fisheries are available and 
profitable- as trawl fishery is multispecies fishery (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Salvanes & Squires, 1995). 
When the busy winter season is over, the price of cod starts to rise and reach higher values in 
comparison to average price due to low landings as a small share of cod quota is left for the low 
seasons towards the end of the year (Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). The monthly ex-vessel price data 
for cod caught by trawl fleet in 2016 is obtained from The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.  
 
 Figure 6. Percentage change in the frozen cod price in comparison to average price caught by trawl fleet in 2016 
 Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries published data  
3.2 Fortnightly basis for estimation of CPUE  
Time series data of fisheries are inherently noisy. When the trawlers leave port they do not 
know with any degree of certainty, whether the catch will be good or poor. Unexpected failures in 
equipment, good or bad luck, weather conditions and other factors can introduce random variation into 
the magnitude of the catch (Kirkley et al., 1995; Salvanes & Steen, 1994; Squires & Kirkley, 1999; 
Thorlindsson, 1994). One way to reduce the random variation in CPUE is to aggregate CPUE data by 
fortnight. The rationale behind choosing fortnight data resolution is to cancel out most of the positive 
and negative randomness in the CPUE. We believe that a-14 day- period is long enough duration to 
offset positive and negative shocks of random occurrences in fishing activities. In this regard, our 
original data of 23,256 and 41,491 observations for CPUE  for region A and B, obtained from 
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individual tows of 54 active vessels over 2011-2016, are reduced to 157 fortnight datasets over 2011-
2016 for each of the two regions. The effort component of CPUE is measured in trawling hours while 
catch is measured in tonnes. The CPUE values encompass fishing by single and double trawl 
operations. It is worth mentioning that since the chosen time resolution is fortnightly, fundamental 
periodicity 𝑇 has fortnight units, hence fundamental frequency 𝑓 shows the cycles made in a two-week 
time resolution.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that, even though we have zero observations for catch and 
effort during fortnights four to seven (see Figure 2 and 3) in region B, which yields no CPUE, we 
conduct linear interpolation to obtain values for CPUE to fill the observations. The rationale behind 
this is that by doing so, our assumption that CPUE is taken as an estimate of stock size is still valid as 
no values for CPUE confound indexes of abundance (see Equation 2). Secondly, interpolation 
enhances the fit of our model. 
4. Empirical results  
Figure 7 shows the output of the FFT, which is the result of running a Fourier transform on the 
fortnightly CPUE signals for region A and B in the time domain after converting these signals to the 
frequency domain. Note that the frequency spectrum starts at zero, which is basically a constant, 
demonstrating the time average of the signal. For convenient frequency analysis, the absolute value of 
the FFT, which renders real-valued magnitudes, is employed. Figure 7 connects the magnitude of FFT 
points of the CPUE signals in region A and B to two line plots. 
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Figure 7. FFT of fortnight time-series of CPUE in region A and B- It extracts dominant frequency ( ) 
components in CPUE signal- Two detectable spikes are marked in region A, indicating seasonal behavior while no 
distinguishable spike is observed or marked for region B 
Figure 7 carries important information on the existence of seasonality by detecting dominant 
frequencies and corresponding periods. What we mean by dominant frequencies are frequencies with 
the highest and most distinguishable spikes (amplitudes), as the frequencies with the highest amplitude 
represent the dominant periodic components in the original signal.  
As it can be seen from Figure 7 the output of FFT in two regions are different. The CPUE 
spectrum for region A exhibits two strong peaks marked with triangles whereas no distinguishable 
spike is detected for region B. The existence of two conspicuous spikes in the signal in region A 
demonstrates the presence of seasonality in this region. For region A the first and highest spike is at 
the frequency 0.03822 and the second at a frequency of 0.07643, corresponding to the first and second 
harmonics. The corresponding period cycles for these frequencies for region A in terms of fortnights 
are 𝑇 1/0.03822 26.16  (annual) and 𝑇 1/0.07643 13.08 (semi-annual). The 
fundamental period of the signals for region A is 𝑇 26.16, which corresponds to approximately one 
calendar year (26.16 14 366.24 days). The spectrum displayed in Figure 7 shows no more 
distinct spikes in higher frequencies and remaining bumps are interpreted as random noise. Since 
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seasonality in stock abundance through CPUE is only detected in region A, we estimate the CPUE 
function for region A.  
After having identified the two harmonics from the FFT output, we run a trigonometric 
regression model (Fourier series) as described by model (5). The estimation results and corresponding 
𝑃-values for region A are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Estimated Fourier coefficient from aggregated fortnight hauls for region A 
 Parameters Fourier coefficient 𝑃-value  
𝑎  1.211 0.001 
𝛼  0.712 0.001 
𝑏  0.845 0.001 
𝛼  -0.251   0.001 
𝑏  0.39 0.001 
𝜔 0.2386 0.001 
𝑅  0.6478 - 
 
𝑎  in the Table 1 shows the periodic mean while 𝑎 , 𝑏  and 𝜔 represent the estimated 
coefficients for the period functions of cosine and sine, and angular frequency, respectively. Based on 
the 𝑃-values, it can be concluded that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.  The 
estimated angular frequency for region A is 𝜔 0.2386, which yields a period of 26.33 in fortnight 
units. This means that the cyclic pattern in cod stock aggregation repeats itself approximately every 26 
fortnights, which is equal to one year.  This result is consistent with the duration of the fishing year.  
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Figure 8 displays the scatterplot of observed data for fortnightly CPUE versus nonlinear 
regression line, obtained from model (5) with two harmonics. We also include the CPUE of individual 
hauls (gray dots) for a better visualization. Upon visual inspection in Figure 8, we could see that the 
reconstructed signal for region A (red line) satisfactorily follows the original observation CPUE data 
(blue dots). 
Figure 8. Scatter plot of fitted (red line) and actual observation of fortnightly CPUE (blue dots) in region A derived 
from model (5) by two harmonics * Gray dots represent actual observation of CPUE for each individual haul  
Oscillation with almost regular and detectable cycles are evident over 6 years, implying that 
seasonality in cod stock recurs every year in succession. As can be seen in Figure 8, CPUE peaks in 
the beginning of the calendar year when NEA cod migrate from the Barents Sea southward to shallow 
waters of the northern coast of Norway. After the winter months are over, they swim back to the 




5. Discussion  
CPUE is used to show the variation in cod stock abundance over the course of a year in two 
regions; 1) shallow waters of the northern coast of Norway and 2) the high seas area. Migration of 
NEA cod to spawn in shallow waters (region A) and subsequently stock aggregation lead to high 
values of CPUE at the beginning of the fishing year. After the winter season, when NEA cod swim 
back to the Barents Sea to feed, the value of CPUE declines because the stock is less dense. The 
association of high/ low values of CPUE during first quarter of the year/ remaining months with 
dense/ dispersed stock availability reflects the presence of seasonality in region A. However, trawlers 
do not rigidly follow the seasonal pattern of stock abundance due to some economic considerations, 
which will be discussed below. 
 In contrast, in further offshore areas during winter months, there is almost no trawling activity 
probably due to high productivity of region A and/ or the harsh climate condition in the Arctic. If we 
relinquish winter months, there is no considerable variation in CPUE over the course of a year in 
region B, indicating that the cod stock does not follow a seasonal pattern.  
We confirmed our primary assertion about the existence of seasonality in region A and lack of 
seasonality in region B by conducting FFT. The outcome of FFT shows two dominant frequencies for 
region A while no distinguishable peaks are detected for region B. The satisfactory fit for region A 
based on the trigonometric regression, using average values of fortnightly CPUE resulted in a fairly 
high 𝑅 , meaning that, leaving other influential factors on CPUE aside, 64.78% of variation in CPUE 
is due to seasonal variation in cod distribution. This finding is “partially” consistent with the result 
from study of Eide et al., (2003) where they conclude that the availability of cod stock is seasonal. We 
use the term “partially” as their study lacks the geographical distinction.  
What seems interesting is that despite the seasonality in the cod stock in region A, trawlers and 
their harvest patterns do not follow the seasonal pattern of the stock. This may be due to the fact that 
high CPUE creates two opposite effects through price and cost reduction.  The availability of dense 
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stock during winter months in region A reduces cost per tonne of catch (Hannesson, 2007; Sandberg, 
2006). Therefore, from an economic point of view, it is advantageous to take large catches when the 
stock is dense. Lower cost of fishing per unit of harvest, also encourages coastal vessels with 
conventional gears, such as gillnet, to operate strictly during winter months (Hermansen & Dreyer, 
2010; Maurstad, 2000; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). In addition, due to the limited mobility and simpler 
technology of coastal vessels, fishing near the northern coast during winter months is a great 
opportunity for them to utilize (Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; Maurstad, 2000; Standal & Hersoug, 
2015). The influx of cod supply in the marketplace in relatively short period results in price reduction 
(Asche et al., 2015; Norges Råfisklag; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Reductions in the price of cod may 
offset or even reverse the advantages of fishing on an aggregated stock. This situation confines 
trawlers’ time preferences to either fish during winter months at lower cost and lower price (region A) 
or to fish out of winter season at slightly higher cost and significant higher price (region B). 
 In order to find out which of the aforementioned strategies is chosen by the fishers, we need to 
know which of the strategies, pays off better. Considering trawl companies as rational agents, they 
would only continue participating in the cod fishery in region A during winter season if the magnitude 
of reduction in the cost per tonne of catch is big enough to offset the reduction in sales price. If we 
look at Figure 3 where there is a sudden drop in catch during winter season, we could conclude that 
the reduction in price outweighs the reduction in cost. In this situation, it is expected that trawlers 
redirect their fishing effort to the alternative fisheries with higher market value and reserve their cod 
quota for when the winter season ends and price of cod starts to rise (see Figure 3 and 6). To support 
our speculation, comparing the productivity level from radar plot in Figure 4, we see that the 
productivity of the cod fishery in region B out of winter season could be almost as high in region A 
during the winter fishery. Logically, while trawlers can achieve high productivity in region B and get 
higher sales price (see Figure 6) out of the winter season (Asche et al., 2015; Norges Råfisklag), it 
would be irrational for them to utilize the cod quota with low market price during first quarter of the 
calendar year in region A.  
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From a management point of view, the flexibility to combine quotas of different species 
together with readiness to switch among various target species plays an important role for the trawlers 
to cope with adverse effect of seasonality (price drop) in the cod fishery. 
In addition, one of the underlying reasons for why fishers catch part of their cod quota at the 
beginning of the year while price is low and then withhold it in the hope of getting a better price, is 
that fishers have to make the most economical configuration of the quota portfolio. This means that by 
waiting too long until the price starts to rise (from May and after, see Figure 6), there is apprehension 
of not being able to catch the whole cod quota in the remaining part of the year. Under an open access 
fishery we would not expect to see this fishing pattern because the race for fish would compel fishers 
to commence harvesting as soon as the season opens and continue until the quota is exhausted 
irrespective of any financial advantages of distributing the catch over the year to take advantage of 
price swings and seasonal aggregations of cod. 
6. Conclusion  
The economic and managerial consequences of seasonality in the cod fishery have been 
overlooked by fisheries researchers. The purpose of the present paper is threefold: 1) to examine how 
the characteristics of seasonality vary between the west coast of northern Norway and the high seas 
areas under a regulated fishery, 2) to study the possible effect of seasonality on market conditions, 
fishers’ harvest behavior and quota utilization, and 3) to investigate whether or not the introduction of 
quota has any effect on trawlers’ fishing behavior. 
In order to investigate the presence of seasonality, this study employs CPUE measures, as 
CPUE values reflect variation in fish availability. The analysis suggests that there is no seasonality in 
region B, where CPUE remains almost constant during fishing seasons. In contrast, in region A, CPUE 
exhibits large variation, indicating the presence of strong seasonality. Thereafter, the analysis of 
CPUE in frequency domain validated our initial speculation about presence and/ or lack of seasonality 
in the selected areas.  
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Seasonality in region A, induced from NEA cod aggregation in the northern coast of Norway 
has a ubiquitous effect on trawler’s fishing strategy and how they utilize their fishing quota. The 
availability of a dense cod stock has two opposite economic effects on harvest decision through a 
reduction in the cost of fishing per tonne caught and decreases price of fish. Trawlers are enticed by 
the reduced cost per tonne of catch. However, drop in price reduces their incentive to target cod.  
Availability of a dense stock means lower unit cost of harvest encourages trawlers and fishers 
with passive gear to catch cod. This, in turn, leads to large cod landings and may reduce cod price. At 
this time, despite reduction in the cost per tonne of cod caught, trawlers may switch to targeting other 
species, which have higher market prices, suggesting that potential benefits from cost savings may not 
fully offset reductions. The crucial point to note, however, is that the promise of cost savings in the 
winter fishery in region A, by itself, may not be sufficient to encourage trawlers to remain in cod 
fishery. Later in May, when the cod price starts to rise, trawlers reallocate their effort to catch cod in 
the high seas areas where catch has better quality.  
This shifting behavior indicates that trawlers are adaptive in their fishing strategies to 
overcome the adverse effects of seasonality. They switch to other fisheries when the payoff of the cod 
fishery falls below that available in the alternative fisheries. Any legislative change that could restrict 
the access to the different fisheries (e.g., area or seasonal closure) and readiness to bind quota will 
affect the adaptive behavior of the trawlers. This adaptive behavior further reveals that the collective 
behavior of trawlers is in accordance with economic theory of rational choice as they redirect fishing 
effort to a different fishery with higher expected profitability in comparison to other available 
alternatives. Surprisingly, our finding contradicts the outcome of several studies, which indicate that 
the fishers do not respond rationally to the changes in fishery conditions and that the economic man 
hardly exists in this sector (Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Holland, 2008).  
As an additional contribution, investigating seasonality, its characteristics and potential effects 
could provide valuable information about destructive effect of intense trawling pressure at a certain 
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time in a certain location including physical damage on seabed, benthic communities and reduction of 
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The revenue from fishing portfolio exhibits substantial intra-annual variation and carries a significant degree of 
risk due to the presence of intrinsic volatilities in marine environment such as seasonal fluctuations in stock size, 
changes in market conditions and varying management regulations over the course of a year. A classic harvest 
strategy to buffer revenue risk in the face of varying fishing environment is to catch a diverse fishing portfolio. 
Switching between target species to reduce revenue risk is a challenging task, as it embeds multiple interrelated 
decisions such as when to fish what and, how much to harvest to match the catch size and remaining quota, given 
the constraints set by the quotas. In this regard, a decision-making framework based on a bio-economic model is 
used to explore revenue risk minimization behavior of the Norwegian trawl fleet, targeting three different species 
(cod, saithe, and haddock). The study comprises trawl catches and fishing effort from 2011 to 2016 and two 
different scenarios of behavior have been investigated. The results indicate that catch diversification originates 
from different ways to enhance revenue, not necessarily to reduce the risk associated with the revenue. We argue 
that the advanced technology of the trawl vessels together with vertically integrated trawl industry may explain 
the prioritization of revenue enhancement over revenue risk minimization. The seasonal spawning aggregation of 
NEA cod and how this affects market prices, shape the trawlers’ harvest strategy on increasing fishing revenue. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that a risk minimizing strategy could lead to inefficient allocation of fishing 
rights and fishing effort, and that potential economic losses from minimizing revenue risk outweighs its benefits.   













 Trawlers are profit-oriented and the main purpose of holding a diverse fishing portfolio 
is to increase fishing revenue, not necessarily to minimize revenue risk.  
 The seasonal migration of North-east Atlantic cod predominantly determines the whole 
dynamics of the trawl fishery in generating profit.  
 Vertical integration of the Norwegian trawl industry together with the advanced 
technology of the trawl fleet makes trawlers less vulnerable towards revenue 
fluctuations.  
 Minimizing revenue risk leads to inefficient allocation of fishing effort and quota 
portfolio in the Norwegian trawl fleet.  
 Since vessel and industry characteristics could sustain trawlers from revenue 
fluctuations, the implementation of enforcement rules such as season closure or area 












1   Introduction 
Fishing is one of the most economically risky activities as fishers face high levels of 
revenue variability within a fishing year, particularly in the case of migratory fish species 
(Anderson et al., 2017; Kasperski & Holland, 2013; Sethi, 2010; Smith & Wilen, 2005). 
Revenues are generated by catch per unit of effort (CPUE) (reflecting fish availability (Hilborn 
& Walters,;Maunder et al., 2006)) and price, both of which could be affected by biological 
characteristics of fish species such as feeding and spawning migration patterns (Alizadeh 
Ashrafi et al., 2020; Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 
The constant variation in fish availability and price together with possible changes in 
management schemes shapes revenue risk (Asche et al., 2015; Cline et al., 2017; Kasperski & 
Holland, 2013; Smith & Wilen, 2005).  
Harvesting a diverse portfolio of fish stocks as a revenue risk reduction strategy has 
long been a critical feature of fisheries (Cline et al., 2017; Hilborn et al., 2001; Kasperski & 
Holland, 2013; Minnegal & Dwyer, 2008; Van Oostenbrugge et al., 2002). Analogous to 
portfolio effect (Markowits, 1952), the overall revenue risk of a fishing portfolio gets lower if 
the revenues from different fish stocks vary asynchronously (Kasperski & Holland, 2013; 
Schindler et al., 2010). Reducing revenue risk enables fishers to pay off the loans that were 
borrowed to purchase vessels and/or additional tangible (e.g., equipment) and non-tangible 
(e.g., fishing permits) capitals, which in the long-run leads to an economically viable fishing 
industry (Heady, 1952; Minnegal & Dwyer, 2008; Perruso et al., 2005; Sanchirico et al., 2008; 
Schindler et al., 2010; Sethi, 2010; Sethi et al., 2012). 
Kasperski and Holland (2013), Sethi et al. (2014), Anderson et al. (2017), Finkbeiner 
(2015) and Cline et al. (2017) have acknowledged the inverse relationship between holding a 
diverse fishing portfolio and revenue risk in the small-scale fisheries. Although this is an 
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important finding, they shed no light on the effect of seasonal migration of fish stocks on effort 
allocation and quota utilization to accomplish this objective, nor if the outcome of quota 
utilization to reduce revenue risk is efficient. Baldursson and Magnússon (1997) conclude that 
a diversification strategy by targeting different age cohorts of cod stock to buffer revenue risk 
in the Icelandic cod fishery, leads to inefficient effort allocation.  
The Norwegian bottom-trawl fleet is quota-regulated and multi-species fisheries, 
targeting North-east Atlantic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) as the main species, together with 
large quantities of other economically important fish species, such as haddock 
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) and saithe (Pollachius virens) (Asche, 2009; Flaaten & Heen, 
2004; Salvanes & Squires, 1995). 
Every winter,  NEA cod, saithe and haddock aggregate and spawn along the north-west 
coast of Norway (Olsen et al., 2010; Rose, 1993). The stock aggregation could create two 
opposite effects on revenue through CPUE and price (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Eide et al., 
2003; Flaaten, 1983, 1987), which might contribute to stabilization of revenue over the course 
of a year. The availability of dense stock increases CPUE (Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; 
Maunder et al., 2006). However, the increased CPUE might encourage fishers (including 
coastal fishers) to increase landings, which in turn could lower the price (Alizadeh Ashrafi et 
al., 2020; Asche et al., 2015; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). In Norwegian fishery, coastal fleet 
gets a larger share of total quotas, and due to the confined geographical mobility coastal fishers 
almost exhaust their quotas during stock aggregation in winter (Asche et al., 2014; Hermansen 
& Dreyer, 2010). Hence their harvest behavior is expected to influence trawlers’ adopted 
harvest strategy to stabilize revenue (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Asche et al., 2015; 
Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). After spawning and out of the winter months, these fish stocks 
swim dispersedly (Olsen et al., 2010), leading to reduced CPUE. At this time, cod and haddock 
swim northward to the nutritious areas of The Barents Sea to feed (Olsen et al., 2010; Rose, 
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1993). The prices might increase due to the lower landings after the winter months. This is 
because, at this time, coastal fishers have already fished their quotas (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 
2020; Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 
In essence, trawlers not only need to know how market reacts to stock dynamics over 
the course of a year but also need to recognize the magnitude of CPUE and price variabilities 
and their impacts on revenue fluctuations to choose the target species to stabilize revenue. This 
can be deceptively complicated given the contemporaneous spawning assemblages of these 
species in winter along the north-west coast and subsequently possible impact of the coastal 
trawlers’ harvest strategy.  
What adds more complication is that, under a quota management system shifting 
between target species involves considerations of how much to fish to match the catch size and 
quota, and to take advantage of possible seasonal aggregations of different stocks as well as 
price fluctuations, to buffer the risk of total revenue (Branch & Hilborn, 2008; Copes, 1986; 
Squires et al., 1998).  
In this regard, the aim of this study is to address the sequential nature of decisions on 
when to target what (cod, saithe and haddock), and how much to fish, in order to minimize 
revenue risk in the Norwegian trawl fleet, respect to quota constraints. The empirical data from 
2011 to 2016 have been used within a decision-making framework based on a bio-economic 
model. An important contribution of this paper is that revenue risk reduction has not been 
investigated for large-industrial fleet. In addition, this study explicitly considers two important 
aspects of fisheries: catch quotas and the effect of variability in stock availability in the 
decision-making process of trawlers, in relation to revenue risk minimization. Furthermore, 
since trawling practice often includes catch of non-targeted species, we take bycatch into 
consideration in our analysis. 
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The outcome of our analysis reveals trawlers’ adaptive behavior in terms of allocating 
fishing effort towards revenue stability. Implementing fishers’ behavior in fisheries 
management will promote the efficiency of regulatory systems (Charles, 1995; Hilborn, 1985, 
2007; Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984; Wilen et al., 2002). 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Measuring the risk of the portfolio revenue based on a bioeconomic model 
Adopting Schaefer's (1954) harvest function to our framework, we have: 
𝐻 𝑡 𝑞 ∙ 𝐸 𝑡 ∙ 𝐵 𝑡               
 
(1) 
where 𝐻 𝑡 , 𝐸 𝑡  and 𝐵 𝑡  are measurements of total catch measured in tons, the 
amount of fishing effort expressed in trawling hours and, stock availability, expressed in tons 
at time 𝑡, respectively.  𝑖 refers to the available fisheries (here: cod, saithe and haddock). The 
constant factor 𝑞  refers to the catchability coefficient of each fishery, which addresses the 
efficiency of fishing operations (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Maunder et al., 2006). Equation (1) 
shows unitary output elasticity in stock and effort, meaning that the production technology 
provides increasing returns to scale.  




𝑞  𝐵 𝑡  
 
(2) 
CPUE is measured in tons of fish being caught per trawling hour. As it can be seen 
according to the underlying assumptions, 𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑡  varies proportionally with the stock biomass 
 𝐵 𝑡 , with a constant proportionality factor of 𝑞 . Hence, CPUE can be used as an indication 
for fish availability/ seasonality over the course of a year (Hilborn & Walters; Maunder et al., 
2006). Higher/ lower values of CPUE address the availability of dense/disperse fish stock 
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((Maunder et al., 2006). Based on Equation (1) the revenue function for each fishery could be 
obtained by: 
𝑅 𝑡 𝑝 𝑡 ∙ 𝐻 𝑡         
 
(3) 
where 𝑅 𝑡  refers to the revenue generated from fishery 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  𝑝  shows the unit price 
of species 𝑖 caught by trawlers, in Norwegian currency (NOK). The Norwegian trawlers are 
equipped with processing and freezing facilities and mostly deliver frozen products (Flaaten & 
Heen, 2004; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Hence, the price that trawlers receive may differ from 
the prices of fresh products caught by coastal vessels with conventional gears such as gillnet 
and long line. Equation (3) in terms of revenue per unit of effort (RPUE) is:  
𝑅𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑡 ∙ 𝑝 𝑡  
 
(4) 
Since expected revenues of fishing trips could not be observed directly (i.e., when 
fishers leave the port, catch sizes and prices are uncertain), RPUE is utilized to approximate 
expected fishing revenue. Trawlers take longer trips, approximately two week, hence the prices 
at the time of landing may be different from the prices when fishers left the port. In order to 
capture revenue risk of fishing portfolio, we use coefficient of variation (CV) of RPUE for each 
fishery over the course of a year (Sethi, 2010; Sethi et al., 2014). 






𝐶𝑉  captures the risk of RPUE of  𝑖th fishery at time 𝑡. 𝜎 𝑡  and 𝜇 𝑡  are the standard 
deviation and mean of  RPUE in fishery 𝑖 at time 𝑡, respectively. The greater the CV, the greater 
is the revenue risk.     
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Equation (4) indicates that risk of RPUE of fishing portfolio comes from the volatility 
in stock aggregation/ dispersion, measured by CPUE and prices. In Figure 1 and 2 we look at 
volatilities in the CPUE and prices for these fisheries over the course of a year.  
The radar plot in Figure 1 display the temporal fluctuations of CPUE within and between 
the three species; cod, saithe and haddock. The spokes represent the average monthly values of 
CPUE, starting from zero. The values of CPUE are obtained from total catch and effort data of 
individual hauls of sixty-one active and registered trawlers in 2011-2016. A total of 86,414 cod 
hauls, 67,071 saithe hauls, and 38,928 haddock hauls were recorded over six years.  
Figure 1 indicates that the temporal variation of the cod and the haddock fisheries follow 
similar patterns, reaching the highest peak levels in March. The second highest peak appears in 
the summer season for both cod and haddock, in July and June, respectively. The CPUE values 
of the cod fisheries decline and remain almost stable after July. Similarly, towards the end of 
the year also the CPUE values of haddock decline.  
The saithe fishery shows lower catchability compared to the cod and haddock fisheries 
over the course of a year. In addition, the temporality exhibits a different pattern, with its peaks 
in January and April. Apart from these two months, the CPUE value of saithe is almost invariant 





Figure 1. Monthly average of CPUE (tons per trawling hour) for cod, saithe and haddock fisheries based on 
individual hauls of 61 registered trawl vessels Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2011-2016. 
Cod, saithe and haddock aggregate and spawn during wintertime along the north-west 
coast of Norway, with peak activities in March-April, February and March-June, respectively 
(Olsen et al., 2010). Hence, observing high values of CPUEs in the winter months is primarily 
due to the congregated fish stocks. After spawning in winter months, cod and haddock swims 
towards the high sea areas of sub-Arctic, while saithe does not undertake considerable migration 
(Olsen et al., 2010; Rose, 1993). 
Figure 2 depicts the prices movements of these fisheries. This figure shows the average 
monthly prices for frozen products of cod, saithe, and haddock during 2011-2016, obtained 




Figure 2. Monthly average price for the landed frozen products of cod, saithe and haddock caught by trawl fleet 
in 2016 Source: Norwegian Fishermen’s Sale Organization (Norges Råfisklag)  
As it is evident from Figure 2, cod and saithe are the most and the least valuable fish 
stocks in this portfolio, respectively.  At the beginning of the year, the prices of cod and haddock 
decline. This is the time when these fish stocks aggregate along the coastal areas to spawn 
(higher CPUE). In contrast, towards the end of the year, cod and haddock fetch higher prices 
(lower CPUE).  
Unlike the price patterns of cod and haddock, the first hand price of saithe is highest in 
March (around 10 NOK per kilo). From April, price starts to decline and remains almost 
constant until the end of the year. Generally, saithe price does not fluctuate as much as the 
prices of cod and haddock, probably because the CPUE of saithe does not vary considerably 
either, if we disregard January and April. Another explanation could be that the demand for 
saithe is very limited and saithe is preserved in different forms when landed (Birkenbach et al., 
2020; Hersoug, 2005). Moreover, unlike the cod fishery, the processing capacity of the industry 
is not challenged by fluctuations in the saithe fishery (Hersoug, 2005).  
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3 Material and method 
3.1 Proposed model 
Here, we treat a representative holder of a quota portfolio as a decision-maker, aiming 
to minimize revenue risk by constantly making decisions about when to fish what, while 
adhering to the quota constraints.  
The main assumptions used in the formulation of this problem are the following: 
Trawlers switch between target species every two weeks (i.e., we cannot target two different 
species during the same fortnight). The assumption is considered realistic due to the high cost 
of frequent switching between target species. Trawlers are assumed to operate at full capacity. 
The time resolution is fortnight and one fishing year is equal to maximum of 26 fortnights. 
Bycatch is not discard (Hersoug, 2005; Johnsen & Jentoft, 2017) (assuming a given trawler to 
act according to actual legalization). This assumption necessitates that trawlers adeptly match 
catch size and remaining quota and reserve part of their quota for expected bycatch in future 
hauling. For example, during the winter months, NEA cod, saithe and haddock aggregate along 
the north-west coast of Norway to spawn. The spatial overlay of these three species at this 
period causes landings of main catch to come with incidentally caught species (Olsen et al., 
2010). Hence, the bycatch could constitute a profound share of the landings.  
Furthermore, the following notations are used in the formulation of the proposed 
research question. 
Sets 
𝑖 ∈ 1,2,3                 Potential sets of fisheries; cod 1 , saithe 2  and haddock 3  




𝑄      Initial quota allocation of a representaive trawl vessel for fishery 𝑖 
Decision variables 
𝐻        Landing of species  𝑖 in tons at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑄      Remianing quota of species 𝑖  over the course of a fishing year 
Business objective 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑉 𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 , 𝑃                                   (6) 
𝐶𝑉  indicates the revenue risk of the fishing portfolio. Equation (6) indicates that in a 
given year, a representative trawler seeks to minimize total risk of fishing portfolio revenue 
across species 𝑖 and time periods 𝑡.  
Constraints 
∑ 𝐻 𝑄𝑖                              ∀ 𝑖       
 
(7) 
∑ 𝐸 𝐸                                ∀ 𝑡       
 
(8) 
𝐸 0                                             ∀ 𝑡       
 
(9) 
Equation (7) ensures that the trawler’s total landings of three species (including bycatch) 
over the course of a fishing year do not exceed the quota allocations. In addition, we use the 
smaller-than-or-equal sign to address the fact that misallocation of fishing effort and fishing 
right could lead to rest quotas at the end of the fishing year. Hence, there is a possibility that 
trawler is not able to fully exhaust their quotas. This constraint defines our first scenario. 
Equation (8) indicates the time and capacity constraint of the vessel. Equation (9) guarantees a 
non-negative effort. 
 In the second scenario, we assume that the representative fishing firm pursues a set of 
business goals, including minimizing revenue risk and generating sufficient and reasonable 
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revenue from holding this fishing portfolio. Under such circumstance, the constraint expressed 
by Equation (7) becomes stricter in the cod fishery. 
𝐻 , 𝑄𝑐𝑜𝑑                            
 
(10) 
Since cod is the most economically valuable species in the portfolio (Asche, 2009; 
Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Salvanes & Squires, 1995), constraint (10) assures that the trawler will 
generate sufficient money by fully exhausting the cod quota by the end of the fishing year, 
while minimizing revenue risk. 
3.1.1 Solution algorithm 
Once the CV of RPUE is calculated for each fortnight and fishery from Equation (5), it 
is sorted from lowest to highest to acquire what species, in which fortnight and, in what catch 
proportion will result in the lowest risk of portfolio revenue. This does not mean that we exhaust 
the quota for species with the lowest CV, because if we do so, then we are left with no quota 
and no more fishing is allowed for that species in the future attempts. Put differently, we take 
expected catch and bycatch compositions in the future landings into account that contributes to 
the lowest risk. Hence, we constantly rebalance catch size (i.e., including bycatch) and 
remaining quota by tracking how much catch and bycatch the trawler might still get during the 
remaining fortnights, to minimize risk of RPUE of portfolio. Assume that a specific species that 
minimizes the risk is selected at a given time. If the remaining quota for this species is small, 
given the remaining fortnights; we choose the second best option, as the trawler is likely to 
exhaust the remaining quota of first option with the bycatches of future hauls.  Thus, the risk 




In the second scenario, since we articulate the exhaustion of cod quota to generate 
enough revenue, we perform the same as above but then twice. We first go over each CV value, 
from lowest to highest, but skip any CV from a different species than cod. By doing so, we 
prioritize catching cod to generate money while minimizing portfolio revenue risk. We then 
perform the same procedure with all three species. When we do that, we basically skip any CV 
for cod, since we already have utilized the cod quota. 
4 Construction and utilization of data 
We employ two different data sets to explore the risk minimizing harvest strategy of the 
trawl fleet. Fortnightly prices for cod, saithe, and haddock, caught by trawlers during the six 
years (2011-2016) are obtained from the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization (Norges 
Råfisklag). Since the trawlers mostly deliver frozen products the prices are associated with 
frozen products. 
Haul-based catch and effort data of sixty-one trawlers, including single and double 
trawls,  targeting cod, saithe and haddock over the period (2011-2016), are derived from The 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries to obtain CPUE (see Equation 2). Almost all of the sixty-
one vessels, were active in all three fisheries over the six years period. The total numbers of 
single trawl hauls targeting cod, saithe and haddock are 86,418, 67,071, and 38,928, 
respectively. Multiplying fortnightly prices and CPUEs per haul in each fortnight yields the 
corresponding RPUE (see Equation 4).  
The CVs of RPUEs are obtained by the aggregated standard deviation and mean of the 
fortnightly RPUEs of the three fisheries for 26 fortnights (see Equation 5). The choice of time 
resolution is that the fortnightly data enables to levels out random noises in harvest attributed 
to luck, weather conditions, and stochastics in general. Additionally, due to the availability of 
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freezing facilities on board, trawlers take longer fishing trips – about two weeks on average – 
including running time to and from the fishing grounds.  
In order to see how the catch composition looks in revenue risk minimization strategy, 
we obtain the total of main catch and bycatch of three species per vessel over 26 fortnights, to 
implement it in our model. To account for the quota constraints in shaping the adopted harvest 
strategy, and to investigate whether or not the allocation of  quotas are efficient, we use total 
landings of each species to approximate the allocated quotas. The Norwegian trawl fishery is 
strictly regulated through catch quotas, and fishers cannot fish more than the allocated catch 
shares, otherwise overfished quotas are confiscated, or highly penalized (Hersoug, 2005). 
Hence, total catch could be a reasonable approximation for the quota size. Table 1 shows the 
average annual quota allocation per trawl vessel in tons for three species over 2011-2016. Cod 
quota constitutes the largest part of quota portfolio and the catch entitlements have increase 
over six years. Quota allocation of saithe and haddock fisheries is almost stable.  
Table1. Calculated average annual allocation of quota per vessel in tons for cod, saithe, and haddock over 2011-
2016  
Species 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cod 2912.749 3230.679 3650.051 3522.420 3353.478 4121.903 
Saithe 1588.563 1802.133 1414.457 1547.285 1334.687 1794.641 
Haddock 1857.306 2077.503 1066.616 1076.089 1052.776 1500.121 
 
In order to obtain the initial quotas for a given vessel, which operates in three fisheries 
and aims to minimize revenue risk, we find the average of annual quota allocations for each 
species over six years, presented in Table 1. By doing so, we obtain quota sizes of 3465.21, 
1580.29 and 1438.4 tons for cod, saithe and haddock, respectively. The adopted harvest strategy 




Figure 3 shows how CV of RPUE of three species varies over the course of a fishing 
year. The CV of RPUE of cod varies in wider range in comparison to saithe and haddock 
fisheries. This could indicate that cod fishery is riskier than saithe and haddock fisheries. 
Haddock shows the least fluctuation in RPUE, probably because increase/decrease in 
CPUE offsets decrease/increase in price. Cod exhibits less volatility at the beginning of the 
fishing year, probably due to the opposite effect of high values of CPUE and low prices. After 
the seventh fortnight (April), when the price starts to rise, CV of RPUE of cod increases. In 
contrast, saithe shows more fluctuations at the beginning of the year with its peak in January 
due to high values of CPUE (See Figure 1). After May, the CV of RPUE of saithe shows less 
fluctuations in comparison to cod. One possible explanation is that at this period both CPUE 
and price of saithe remain almost stable (See Figures 1 and 2).  
 
Figure 3. Fortnightly values of coefficient of variation of RPUE of three species (cod, saithe, and haddock) over 
the course of a fishing year, caught by trawl fleet  
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5.1 Scenario 1 
 Figure 4 reveals catch composition (upper panel), quota utilization (middle panel)  and 
generated revenue from the adopted harvest strategy (lower panel) to minimize revenue risk 
under the scenario that minimizing revenue risk is the only business objective for the trawlers.  
Since CV of RPUE of cod fluctuates within a wider range (See Figure 3), a trawler 
whose aim is to minimize volatility of portfolio revenue, redirects fishing effort on haddock 
and saithe fisheries. The middle panel of Figure 4, shows how the quotas are allocated to 
accomplish this business objective. Here, trawlers only use half of the allocated cod quota, but 
fully exhaust saithe and haddock quotas as the revenues from saithe and haddock fisheries carry 
less fluctuations (See Figure 3). Cod quota is utilized in March-May and July-August. The 
unused cod quota means that minimizing revenue risk leads to inefficient allocation of fishing 
effort. This is not expected to be the case in real fishing practice as quotas are markedly 
expensive, notably the cod quota, and having leftovers of cod quota is a big economic loss. 
Moreover, in the lower panel of Figure 4, we show how these three fisheries contribute to the 
total revenue from the risk minimizing harvest strategy. The total revenue from this harvest 




Figure 4. Catch composition, quota utilization, and revenue of fishing portfolio of the first scenario over 
26 fortnights 
5.2 Scenario 2  
Figure 5 shows the results of the second scenario where the trawler aims to minimize 
revenue risk while generating a sufficient and reasonable amount of revenue. The upper, 
middle, and lower panels of Figure 5 show catch composition, quota utilization and generated 
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revenue of this harvest strategy. The upper panel of the figure shows that trawlers use the cod 
quota early in the fishing year (January-mid April) as well as towards the end of the year. From 
fortnights 10 to 13, trawlers partake in saithe fishery when both CPUE and price are almost 
stable (See Figure 1 and 2). Busy time for haddock fishery is winter time when CPUE is high 
and price is low. However, a part of haddock quota is used in July (fortnight 14-15-16) when 
CPUE is still high and prices are still low (See Figure 1 and 2). The middle panel shows that 
the representative trawler can fully exhaust the fishing quota portfolio. This is a win-win 
situation for fishing firm as the trawler meets two important business objectives simultaneously. 
The lower panel of the Figure 5 shows how revenue of the fishing portfolio, decomposed by 




Figure 5 . Catch composition, quota utilization, and revenue of fishing portfolio of the second scenario 
over 26 fortnights 
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6 Discussion  
6.1 First scenario 
In the first scenario we assume that the only business objective of the trawlers is to 
minimize revenue risk. Under such circumstance, the results show that trawlers give up on cod 
fishery and operate in haddock and saithe fisheries as CV of RPUE of these two fisheries show 
less fluctuation over the time. The Norwegian quota systems are built upon “use-it-or-lose-it” 
principle and if trawler cannot manage to fully exhaust cod quota, the unfished quota will not 
be awarded in the subsequent years (Hersoug, 2005). Hence, in reality fishers would not forgo 
utilization of cod quota for the sake of minimizing revenue risk as refraining from cod fishery 
is considered as a huge economic loss. The revenue attributed to this harvest strategy is 60 
million NOK. The trawler could have enhanced the potential revenue by taking a more risky 
harvest strategy by partaking in cod fishery (See Figure 3).  
Moreover, the un-used cod quota implies that diversification through targeting multiple 
species to minimize revenue risk leads to inefficient allocation of fishing effort in the trawl 
fishery. This finding is somehow in line with the results from Baldursson and Magnússon 
(1997), which reveal that the optimal fishing pattern through diversification in Icelandic cod 
fishery to attenuate risk is inefficient. They define diversification in terms of age cohorts of cod 
stock.  
6.2 Second scenario 
As the results of the first scenario are incompatible with rationality in conducting 
business, in the second scenario, we adopt a more realistic approach where trawler aims to 
simultaneously minimize revenue risk and generate a sufficient and reasonably good amount of 
revenue. Since the cod fishery is the most economically valuable in this portfolio (see Figure 
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2), in this scenario, we articulate that trawlers fully exhaust cod quota by the end of the fishing 
year to reach a satisfying and adequate level of revenue, while minimizing revenue risk.  
The result from this scenario shows that not only trawlers minimize revenue risk but 
also they manage to fully exhaust quota portfolio, which addresses the fact that the trawler 
generate satisficing (i.e., combination of satisfy and suffice) revenue. As shown in the lower 
panel of Figure 5, adopting this strategy, enhances the total revenue by 20 million krone, in 
comparison to the strategy that was merely based on revenue risk reduction. Additionally, 
comparing the lower panels of Figure 4 and 5 reveals that increasing expected return and 
minimizing revenue risk are two antagonistic business objectives. In the first scenario, trawlers 
sacrifice some of the expected return by refraining from cod fishery — which is associated with 
higher risk — in order to lower the variability of gain (i.e., RPUE of portfolio), whereas in the 
second scenario they generate more revenue by partaking in cod fishery at the cost of higher 
risk of revenue. This is consistent with financial theories, which imply that the greater/less the 
risk, the greater/less the potential for gain (i.e., expected returns) (Markowits, 1952).   
6.3 Illustration of the real adopted harvest strategy  
In Figure 6, we depict the real harvest pattern of the trawlers, obtained from our data to 
compare it with the harvest pattern from the second scenario. In the second scenario the 
representative trawler follows two business objectives; to minimize revenue risk and to generate 
satisficing revenue. We relinquish the first scenario as it is an untenable strategy to be adopted. 
Figure 6 displays the total catch of cod, saithe and haddock, harvested by sixty-one trawlers on 
fortnightly basis over the period 2011-2016. Bycatch of other species is also included in the 
calculation of total catch of each fisheries.  
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As it is evident from Figure 6, the cod catch is the largest in the first and second 
fortnights, followed by a sudden drop in the cod landings (starting from fortnight 3). 
Interestingly, during the same period catch of saithe has increased.  
After the winter months and toward the end of the year the cod catches increase. This is 
probably due to the higher cod prices towards the end of the year (See Figure 2). Similarly, 
catches of haddock and saithe decrease as the fishing year gets closer to the end.  
 
Figure 6. Fortnightly total catch of cod, saithe and haddock, caught by the 61 registered trawl vessels Source: 
The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2011-2016 
The comparison of the harvest patterns in the upper panel of Figure 4 with Figure 6 
reveals some degree of resemblance. Similar to the observed harvest strategy in Figure 6, from 
Figure 4 we see that the cod catch is also largest at the beginning of the year. Another 
conspicuous resemblance is the sudden drop in the cod landings at the beginning of the fishing 
year (i.e., fortnights 8-13 and 3-11 in Figure 4 and 6, respectively), and substitution of cod 
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fishery with other available fisheries. The other similarity is that the cod landings increase 
toward the end of the year. 
One justification for observing large landings of cod at the beginning of the year is due 
to the effect of stock aggregation on reducing cost per unit of effort (Hannesson, 2007; 
Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006). Proximity to the shore and higher fish densities provide 
opportunities for both the coastal and the high sea fleet to operate at lower cost (Hannesson, 
2007; Kvamsdal, 2016; Sandberg, 2006).  
The sudden drop in cod landings at the beginning of the year and shifting from the cod 
fishery to other available fisheries, despite the high values of CPUE of the cod fishery (see 
Figure1) and lower cost per unit of effort, could be explained by the impact of the behavior of 
coastal fishers. Cod fishery is the most important fishery during winter (Lofoten fishery). 65% 
up to 80% of the cod quota is granted to the coastal fishers (Asche et al., 2014; Hermansen & 
Dreyer, 2010). The less advanced technology of the coastal boats limits their geographical 
mobility. This means that coastal fishers cannot chase NEA cod after spawning when the stock 
swims back to the high sea areas of the Barents Sea. Hence, the spawning migration along the 
north-west coast of Norway during winter months is an unprecedented opportunity to exhaust 
the cod quota (Asche et al., 2014; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010; Maurstad, 2000; Standal & 
Hersoug, 2015). The large supply of cod lowers its price (See Figure 2) (Alizadeh Ashrafi et 
al., 2020, Asche et al., 2015; Birkenbach et al., 2020). The declined price of cod motivates 
trawlers to adjust fishing effort by reallocating to more profitable fisheries (saithe and haddock) 
and reserve the cod quota for the periods at the end of the year as the price is higher (See Figure 
2).  
From Figure 6, we see that, in reality the shift from cod fishery to other fisheries takes 
place earlier in the year in comparison to what we have found from the second scenario 
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(fortnights 8-13 and 3-11 in Figure 4 and 6, respectively). This could mean that, in real cases, 
trawlers react to price reduction in the cod fishery more swiftly, underpinning that trawlers are 
more concerned about increasing profit than reducing revenue risk. All the above argument 
provides an insight that trawlers are responsive to the fluctuations of CPUE of the cod fishery 
and its effect on price, indicating that trawlers adjust fishing effort to enhance revenue.  
One may argue that the increased landings of cod at the beginning/ end of the year in 
Figure 5 and 6, may be stemmed from risk minimization motives as the high/low values of 
CPUE might offset low/high prices. This cannot be the case as we would have seen the 
increased landings of cod at the beginning/ end of the year in the harvest pattern obtained in the 
first scenario (See the upper panel of the Figure 4), where we focus only on risk minimization.  
In short, dissimilarity between harvest patterns obtained from the first scenario —where 
the only focus is on minimizing revenue risk— and the second scenario—where trawlers aim 
to minimize revenue risk and enhance revenue—together with similarities between the harvest 
patterns of the real case and the second scenario, could confirm that generating and enhancing 
revenue outweighs minimizing revenue risk.  
6.4 Industry structure and fleet characteristics  
Norwegian trawl fishery is a vertically integrated seafood industry, meaning that a 
single fishing firm owns and coordinates various adjacent stages of the supply chain from 
harvesting fish to processing the catch, distributing, and selling the products (Dreyer & 
Grønhaug, 2004; Dreyer et al., 2006; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979). This combinatory process 
works as a hedging mechanism and lessens the risk exposure for the trawl fleet relative to non-
integrated businesses (e.g., small-scale fishers) (Porter, 1980; Riordan, 1990). The reason is 
that with vertical integration trawlers have higher control over the industry and markets as the 
combinatory process provides them better knowledge and information (e.g., what is selling well 
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at which time period) (Dreyer et al., 2006; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979). The integrated nature 
facilitates information flows and exchange across supply chain since there are no proprietary 
boundaries encountered (Porter, 1980; Riordan, 1990). These characteristics generate some 
potential market power for the integrated industry, which could lessen the revenue fluctuation 
faced by trawlers (Dreyer et al., 2006; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 1979).  
Unlike small-scale fishers that rigidly follow seasonality of fish stocks and operate along 
the coast during winter months when fish stocks are aggregated, trawl vessels possess 
progressive technology (e.g., processing plants and freezing facilities on board), enabling them 
to run a year-round operation. Moreover, trawlers are less vulnerable to the harsh climate and 
can move freely to explore vast geographical areas –from southern Norway to Svalbard and 
Bear Island- at greater depths to extract fish (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). 
In short, the industry and vessel characteristics provide multiple useful tools for the 
trawlers to cope with revenue fluctuations. While trawlers have many tools to attenuate 
fluctuations, they do not need to diversify catch to buffer revenue risk.  
7 Conclusion 
The fishing revenue is highly volatile due to uncertainties about prices, seasonal and 
cyclical fluctuations in stock size and, possible changes in regulatory schemes over the course 
of a year. Given the extreme economic risk, catch diversification has been identified as one of 
the common fishing strategies to reduce revenue risk and stabilize yield. The inverse 
relationship between holding a diverse fishing portfolio and revenue risk has been confirmed 
in small-scale fisheries. However, the existing studies have ignored how efficient this strategy 
is in terms of allocating fishing effort and quota utilization. 
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 Switching between fisheries is not a single and straightforward decision to make, as the 
fish species in the portfolio have different seasonality patterns and the effect of seasonality on 
species prices might be different as well.   
Our study complements and extends this literature by jointly considering the intricately 
related decisions about switching between species (e.g., when to fish what and how much), with 
respect to quota constraints and the possible effects of seasonality in fish stocks to minimize 
revenue risk of the trawl fleet. We further investigate whether the revenue risk minimization is 
an efficient strategy.  
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to determine harvest strategy in terms of 
revenue stabilization in the Norwegian trawl fishery targeting 3 species; namely cod, saithe and 
haddock. On this basis, we build a decision-making framework of a highly complex decision 
problem where fishers are faced with wide range of choices about when and what to target as 
well as considering quota constraints to minimize revenue risk.  
There are at least three motives for choosing risk minimizing behavior of the trawl fleet. 
First, unlike small-scale fishers who are rigidly confined with fish seasonality and inshore 
fishing, bottom trawling is a year-round fishing practice (Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug & 
Leonardsen, 1979; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Second, owing to the progressive technology and 
capability to cope the harsh climatic conditions of the sub-Arctic areas, trawl vessels can exploit 
fish stocks in the high sea areas of the Barents Sea and Svalbard. Third, the industry structure 
of Norwegian trawl is based on vertical integration whereas the business strategy of small-scale 
fishers is non-integrated.  
The results from our model reveal that minimizing revenue risk in the trawl fishery leads 
to inefficient allocation of fishing effort and quota, which is in a sharp contrast with economic 
rationality. In addition, our results suggest that the Norwegian trawler fleet holds diverse fishing 
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portfolio to increase profitability rather than minimizing revenue risk. We further conclude that 
trawlers are profit oriented, where the seasonal pattern in cod aggregation/dispersion and its 
economic consequences (e.g., price fluctuations based on supply) shapes the trawlers’ fishing 
strategy. We speculate that the industry and fleet structure could explain the prioritization of 
generating revenue over minimizing risk. These features make trawlers less susceptible towards 
revenue fluctuations. This could be a valuable information for the fisheries managers when 
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The Norwegian bottom trawlers are profit-oriented and operate over a vast geographical area. Allocation of the 
fishing effort in multi-species trawl fishery to maximize profit is a complex and multi-facet process. The available 
fish species in the fishing portfolio might exhibit different feeding and spawning migration patterns as well as 
congregation and/or dispersion behavior. Hence, the magnitude of economic consequences stemmed from the 
constant variation in fish abundance might be different across different fish species. In addition, the spatial 
heterogeneity among different fishing areas in terms of fuel costs and travel distance from port, and availability of 
other fishing fleets further complicates decisions underlying effort allocation such as when and where to fish what 
and how much to fish to obtain the highest level of profits. In this regard, the purpose of this article is to identify 
the key drivers of intra and inter-temporal effort allocation of the trawl fleet targeting cod, saithe and haddock, 
where the aim is to maximize fishing profit within the quota constraints. We have developed a two-step Heckman 
estimator that incorporates the relative attractiveness of three heavily trawled areas including southern and northern 
parts of the west coast of Norway, and the high sea areas of the Arctic. The relative attractiveness is specified by 
catch per unit of effort (CPUE), prices of the target species, fuel cost and the intensity of coastal fleet participation 
over 2011-2016. Our results show that region-specific costs have a profound impact on intra-temporal and inter-
temporal allocation of fishing effort to maximize profit. Furthermore, we have found evidence of economically 
rational behavior of the Norwegian trawlers in constantly reallocating fishing effort in response to the changes in 
the relative attractiveness of the selected regions. 
Keywords: Bottom Trawl, Profit maximization, effort allocation, multispecies fisheries, Heckman estimator, intra-





1 Introduction  
Large-industrial vessels like bottom trawlers are profit-oriented and seek to maximize 
profit by constantly redistributing fishing effort across multiple species over time and space 
(Abernethy et al., 2007; Asche et al., 2009; Birkenbach et al., 2020). The Norwegian bottom 
trawl fleet is quota-regulated and targets commercially valuable species including Northeast 
Arctic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) as the main target together with saithe (Pollachius virens) 
and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Cojocaru et al., 2019; 
Guttormsen & Roll, 2011).  
Particular interest lies in identifying the effort allocation of the trawl fleet, which leads 
to profit maximizing harvest strategy. One reason is that, cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries 
constitute one of the most economically valuable fishing portfolios (Asche, 2009; Asche et al., 
2015; Cojocaru et al., 2019; Guttormsen & Roll, 2011). The spatial and temporal freedom of 
trawlers as well as capability to cope with  less desirable climatic conditions of the sub-Arctic 
areas (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & Hersoug, 2015) could secure a steady supply of codfish 
throughout the year (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Asche et al., 2014; Hersoug & Leonardsen, 
1979). This in return could ensure a long-term economically sustainable fishery (Birkenbach et 
al., 2020; Cojocaru et al., 2019; Guttormsen & Roll, 2011). The investigation of fishing effort 
allocation in codfish fishery has received little attention (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; 
Birkenbach et al., 2020; Eide et al., 2003). In this regard, the aim of this paper is to identify the 
influential drivers of the effort allocation of the codfish trawl fishery to maximize annual profit.  
Under a quota-managed fishery, allocation of fishing effort consists of multiple 
interlinked decisions including when and where to fish what, and what proportion of quotas to 
consume to match the catch size and remaining quotas (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Branch & 
Hilborn, 2008; Copes, 1986; Squires et al., 1998).  
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The interplay between spatial and temporal dimensions is primarily ascribed to the 
different habitat requirements for the fish stocks to feed and/or breed over the course of a year 
(Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Birkenbach et al., 2020). Cod, saithe, and haddock undertake 
spawning migration and aggregate along the west coast of Norway during wintertime (Garrod, 
1967; Hannesson et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2010). After spawning, cod and haddock migrate 
dispersedly to the sub-Arctic areas of the Barents Sea and Svalbard to feed (Bergstad et al., 
1987; Trout, 1957). Saithe is dispersed along the south-west of Norway as well as in the 
northern part of the west coast as late as August (Pethon, 2005). 
The constant movements, congregational and/or dispersion of fish stocks across 
different fishing locations over the course of a year shape locational heterogeneity in terms of 
relative population abundance measured by catch per unit of effort  (CPUE) (Hilborn & 
Walters, 1992; Maunder et al., 2006) and economic considerations such as relative prices of 
fish  species and cost of fishing operation (Asche et al., 2015; Hannesson, 2007; Sandberg, 
2006). 
Additionally, different fishing locations have different attributes that is specific to that 
location, which could affect profit of trawling. For example, less fuel consumption and less 
required travel time might make nearshore areas economically more desirable relative to the 
high sea areas of the Arctic, all else being equal.  
The harvest strategy of trawl fishers is intimately related to the behavior of coastal fleets 
(Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Asche et al., 2015). Cod, saithe, and haddock are jointly fished 
by coastal fleets using conventional gears such as gill nets and longlines. Coastal boats cannot 
venture into the off-shore fishing due to the limitation in technical specifications (i.e., limited 
engine power and smaller size) (Flaaten & Heen, 2004; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). As a result, 
they are heavily reliant on nearshore fisheries such as Lofoten fishery (Hannesson et al., 2010; 
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Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). 65-80% of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of codfish quotas belong 
to the coastal fleets (Asche et al., 2014; Standal & Hersoug, 2015). Hence, large landings of 
fish by the coastal fleet during spawning aggregation in wintertime could affect prices,  which 
would then influences the effort allocation decisions of the trawlers (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 
2020; Birkenbach et al., 2020). Considering the argument above, the constant variation in the 
relative attractiveness of different fishing areas affects the spatio-temporal effort allocation and 
the way trawlers utilize fishing quotas (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Asche et al., 2015; 
Holland & Sutinen, 1999, 2000).  
The recent work by Birkenbach et al. (2020) investigates the profit maximizing harvest 
strategy of the Norwegian trawl fleet. However, this study lacks the consideration of spatial 
dimension. Effort allocation cannot be comprehensively analyzed without considering the 
interrelation between temporality and spatiality, in particular for the migratory species as the 
constant movements of fish influence the profitability of different locations.  
This article employs Heckman's (1976) two-step estimator to scrutinize the drivers of 
intra-temporal and inter-temporal effort allocation respect to the changes in the attractiveness 
of different fishing areas in the Norwegian trawl fleet to maximize annul profit. The model 
emphasizes on locational heterogeneity and incorporates fish abundance measured by CPUE, 
market prices of the fish species, fuel cost and availability of coastal fishers in three heavily 
trawled regions including the northern and, southern parts of the west coast of Norway, and the 
high sea areas of the Barents Sea. What we mean by intra-temporal effort allocation is that how 
fishers reallocate fishing effort across three selected areas within the same time period. Inter-
temporality refers to the reallocation of fishing effort over time within the same location.  
The investigation of fisher’s behavior underlying effort allocation reveals important 
information about the possible responses of fishers to the changes in biological, economic, 
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environmental, and regulatory conditions, which ultimately contributes to the improvement of 
the present management scheme (Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Charles, 1995; Hilborn, 1985, 2007; 
Holland & Sutinen, 1999; Maurstad, 2000; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984; Wilen et al., 2002).  
2 Data description  
2.1 A description of fishery area, its sub-regions and the corresponding attributes 
Figure 1 shows the predominant areas of the trawl fishery where cod, saithe, and 
haddock fisheries are conducted. The area consists of the Norwegian west coast, from south in 
the North Sea to the shallow shelf along the northern parts of the west coast, extended towards 
the deep-sea areas of the Arctic (including Svalbard and Bear Island). We divide the fishing 
area into three arbitrary sub-regions A, B and C based on the relative availability of fish species 
according to the feeding and spawning migration patterns over the course of a year.  
Region A attributes to the high sea areas of the Barents Sea where predominantly cod 
fishery and to a lesser extent haddock fishery are conducted. After spawning in the winter 
months, cod and haddock swim to the sub-Arctic areas to feed. 
Region B corresponds to the west coast of northern Norway, where three fisheries 
overlap mostly during winter. Every winter mature NEA cod and haddock perform an extensive 
migration from the Arctic sub-areas, where they feed to the shallow waters of north-west coast 
of Norway to spawn, with peak activities in March-April and March-June, respectively 
(Korsbrekke, 1999; Olsen et al., 2010; Rose, 1993). Similar to NEA cod and haddock, saithe 
spawns in winter during February-April, with its peak in February along the coastal banks of 
west of Norway (Olsen et al., 2010). The congestion of NEA cod, saithe, and haddock to spawn 
along the west coast of northern Norway leads to an intensive trawling in this area. 
7 
 
 Region C depicts the southern part of the west coast of Norway, where saithe fishery 
is dominant. Spawning of saithe occurs over a wider area than for NEA cod and haddock 
towards southern parts of Norway in the North Sea. Feeding migration of saithe takes place 
across a narrower area towards northern parts (Jakobsen & Olsen, 1987; Olsen et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 1. Map shows three arbitary regions where cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries are conducted. Cod and 
haddock fisheries are prevailing in regions A and B, while saithe fishery is dominant in region C. The map 
also shows the location of  trawling based on the individual hauls in the selected areas over 2011-2016. Trawl 
vessels dominate fishing along the west coast of Norway and the sub-Arctic areas  
Figure 2 shows the average monthly variation in CPUE within and between these three 
fisheries in the selected regions over 2011-2016. Monthly CPUE is calculated by dividing the 
total catch by the corresponding trawling hours. Incidental catches of other species are also 




Figure 2.  Temporal variation of CPUE, measured in tones per hour of traweling in cod, saithe, and haddock 
fisheries in the selected regions on monthly basis. Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. 
As it is shown in Figure 2, cod and haddock fisheries are prevailing in region A and B, 
while saithe fishery is dominant in region C. In area B, the CPUEs of cod and haddock are high 
at the beginning of the fishing year. This is probably related to the spawning aggregation of cod 
and haddock along the north-west coast of Norway. After May, there is a sudden reduction in 
CPUEs of these fisheries in region B. Concurrently from May, the CPUE of these two fisheries 
start to rise in region A. As it is evident from Figure 2, there are no fishing activities in February 
and March in region A. This is probably because of the unsuitable weather conditions in region 
A (i.e., Arctic area). CPUE of saithe fishery exhibits a stable trend in regions B and C.  
Figure 3 shows the average monthly variation in allocation of fishing effort in cod, 
saithe, and haddock fisheries over 2011-2016. The fishing effort is measured in thousand 






Figure 3.  Fishing effort allocation of the Norwegian trawlers in cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries, measured 
in thousand trawling hours in the three selected regions on monthly basis over 2011-2016. Source: The 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. 
The highest concentration of effort in region A in cod and haddock fisheries takes place 
towards the end of the year. This is the time when cod and haddock are available in the Arctic 
waters to feed. The patterns of fishing effort allocation in cod and haddock fisheries in region 
B follow a declining trend over the course of a year. A sharp drop is obvious at the beginning 
of the fishing year in these two fisheries in region B. Concurrent to the drop in fishing effort in 
cod and haddock fisheries, the effort allocation in saithe fishery has increased in region C in 
February. The effort allocation in saithe fishery in region C follows a decreasing pattern towards 
the end of the year. 
Figure 4 depicts the average monthly catch, measured in thousand tons in the cod, saithe 
and haddock fisheries in the three selected regions over 2011-2016. It should be noted that 






Figure 4.  Distribution of the total catch of cod, saithe and haddock fisheries, measured in thousand tons in the 
three regions on monthly basis over 2011-2016. Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.  
In region A the catch of cod and haddock is highly concentrated towards the end of the 
year.  In region B, the largest landing of cod takes place in January, followed by a considerable 
and sudden decline towards the end of the year. Right after this drop, the catch of saithe in area 
C has increased. This might indicate that trawlers redirect fishing effort from cod fishery in 
region B to saithe fishery in region C. The catch of saithe declines after the winter months.  
In order to investigate the possible impact of the availability of coastal fishers during 
winter fishery in region B on trawlers’ harvest strategy, in Figure 5, we depict the average of 
total weekly cod catch of coastal vessels measured in thousand tons during 2011-2016. Since 
cod fishery is the most important element of the winter fishery (i.e., Lofoten fishery), Figure 5 




Figure 5. Total weekly landings of cod, measured in thousand tons, caught by the coastal vessels during 2011-
2016. Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. 
As it is evident, cod landings are concentrated at the beginning of the fishing year during 
spawning migration. The limited geographical mobility of the coastal boats relative to the trawl 
vessels mandates them to fish close to the shore and rigidly follow seasonality of codfish.  
In Figure 6, we depict the average monthly prices of the three species over 2011-2016. 
The prices for the frozen products of codfish are measured in Norwegian currency per kilo 
(Norwegian Kroner (NOK)). Since trawlers are equipped with processing and freezing facilities 




  Figure 6. Monthly average prices for the landed frozen products of cod, saithe, and haddock, caught by trawl 
fleet during 2011-2016. The prices are in Norwegian krone. Source: Norwegian Fishermen’s Sale organization.  
As it is clear from Figure 6, cod and saithe are the most and least commercially valuable 
species in the codfish portfolio. At the beginning of the year, prices of cod and haddock follow 
a declining pattern. This is the time when these fish stocks aggregate in region B to spawn.  
In contrast to the price patterns of cod and haddock, saithe fetches the highest price in 
March (around 10 NOK per kilo). One justification is that during this time, fishers, in particular 
coastal boats are intensively engaged in cod and haddock fisheries and the landing of saithe is 
probably lower. This might lead to the higher price of saithe. Generally, saithe price does not 
exhibit considerable fluctuations relative to the prices of cod and haddock. This could probably 
because the CPUE of saithe does not vary considerably over the course of a year (See Figure 
2). Another relevant explanation could be that the global demand for fresh saithe is very limited 
and saithe is conserved in different forms than cod (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hersoug, 2005). 
Moreover, due to the limited demand the processing capacity of the trawl industry is not 
influenced by the fluctuations in the landings of saithe (Birkenbach et al., 2020; Hersoug, 2005).  
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2.2 Construction and utilization of data  
The data used in this study is obtained from multiple sources, covering 2011-2016. The 
statistical analysis for the intra and inter-temporal analysis are based on the weekly and monthly 
time resolutions, respectively. The reason to use monthly data for the inter-temporal effort 
allocation analysis is the lack of accessibility to the weekly fuel price data (i.e., using weekly 
data in inter-temporal analysis leads to collinearity as fuel price does not vary on weekly basis). 
Hence, in total we have 312 (i.e., every year consists of 52 weeks) and 72 observations for the 
intra and inter-temporal analysis.  
A haul-level data set of fifty-one codfish trawlers is provided by the Norwegian 
Directorate of Fisheries (Norwegian: Fiskeridirektoratet). The main targets of these trawlers are 
cod, saithe, and haddock. Every observation in the data set is associated with geographical 
coordinates (spatial dimension) and harvest time (temporal dimension). The catch and effort 
data is used to estimate standardized CPUE for individual vessels (See Equation 17 in section 
3.3.1). In addition, this data set comprises the information about the technical features of the 
vessels such as engine power and tonnage.  
Weekly fish prices for the frozen products of cod, saithe, and haddock are obtained from 
the Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales organization (Norges Råfisklag). Codfish trawlers are 
equipped with freezing and storage capacities, and the harvested fish is processed and 
refrigerated onboard. In order to tackle the potential problem of endogeneity of cod price 
(Section 3.3.2), we utilize weekly exchange rate of NOK/EURO as instrumental variable. The 
weekly exchange rates are derived from Statistics Norway Bureau (SSB).  
For calculation of fuel cost, we acquire annual fuel data for the trawl fleet from 
Guarantee Fund for Fishermen (Garantikassen for fiskere). Table 1 shows the average cost of 
fuel for the trawl fleet per liter. Value added tax (VAT) is subtracted from the prices.  
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Table 1- Average annual fuel price for the trawl fleet- Source: Guarantee Fund for Fishermen (Garantikassen for 
fiskere). Value added tax (VAT) is deducted from the prices. 








In order to account for the variation in the fuel expenditure, we also obtain monthly data 
of gasoline price from Statistics Norway Bureau (SSB) for 2011-2016. We calculate the percent 
change of monthly gasoline price respect to the average price of 2011, which is equal to 13.95. 
Then we multiply the percentage changes by the annual fuel prices, presented in Table 1.  
Moreover, in order to address the possible effect of the coastal fleet’s behavior on 
trawlers’ adopted harvest strategy, weekly landings of cod, measured in tons is obtained from 
the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Since cod is the most important fish species for the 
coastal and trawl fleet during winter fishery, we only consider the possible effect of cod 
landings of coastal fishers on trawlers’ harvest behavior. 
3 Method 
3.1 Theoretical framework  
Our proposed model considers an owner of a trawl vessel, holding a quota portfolio of 
cod, saithe, and haddock as a perfect foresight decision-maker, whose aim is to maximize the 
annual profit. To do so, fisher constantly re/allocates fishing effort across space and over time, 
respect to the quota constraints. The expected profit rates of different fishing locations depend 
on fish availability (measured by CPUE), market prices, fuel expenditure, and aggregation of 
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the coastal boats. Considering this argument, we articulate that the relative attractiveness of 
fishing locations determines the choice(s) of target species. 
To formulate our problem, we specify model’s sets as follows. Set 𝐴𝐴 shows the available 
fishing regions, each region is represented as 𝑎𝑎. 𝑇𝑇 is the set of time period, where each period 
is indexed as 𝑡𝑡. We index each species (here, cod, saithe and haddock) as 𝑗𝑗 in the entire set of 
species 𝐽𝐽. For the sake of simplicity, we disregard any in-season stock dynamics such as 
recruitments and growth dynamics of the fish stocks.  
The decision variable is the fishing effort 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 to target species 𝑗𝑗, which maximizes the 
profitability of the fishing portfolio. We should bear in mind that fishing effort includes only 
the subscripts of location and time as we already delineated that location choice over the course 
of a year specifies the choice of target species. 
Profit is represented as a discounted sum of the difference between periodical revenue 
and cost. The revenue is obtained by fish price 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 multiplied by harvest function 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗�𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ,𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�, 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 shows the availability of each species at specific location and time. The cost is a 
function of fishing effort 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and location-specific costs 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. Here, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 comprises the cost related 
to fuel consumption to travel to location a and the cost caused by congregation of coastal fishers 
along the north-west coast of Norway, particularly during winter fishery. The objective function 













     
(1) 
where 𝜌𝜌 is a discount factor. In the following equations, different constraints of the 








≤ 𝑄𝑄�𝑗𝑗 ,           ∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}                  






≤ ?̅?𝑒                        𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
 
     (3) 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≥ 0                            𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 0 < 𝑎𝑎 < 𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇 
 
     (4) 
𝑄𝑄�𝑗𝑗 indicates the annual allocated quota for species 𝑗𝑗. Under a quota-managed fisheries, 
fishers cannot fish more than the allocated quota, and overfished quotas could be confiscated, 
or penalized (Hersoug, 2005). Equation (3) refers to the upper limit for the total effort that could 
be allocated per period. This is specified to show that the fishing operation is constrained by 
the fishing duration and vessel’s capacity. Equation (4) guaranties the non-negativity of the 
decision variable 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. The profit maximization problem is solved using Lagrangian method. 
The Lagrangian is set up as follows: 







































= ?̅?𝜅𝑎𝑎 − 𝜅𝜅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  (6) 
𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗, ?̅?𝜅𝑎𝑎 and 𝜅𝜅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 are Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian multiplier 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 represents the 
shadow value of quota. Equation (5) indicates that if discounted (the present value of) periodical 
marginal profit exceeds the shadow value of quota, fisher would choose to allocate fishing 
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effort. Equation (6) shows the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. If the periodical profit is below the 
shadow value, the allocated effort in area 𝑎𝑎 at time 𝑡𝑡 becomes zero. 
3.1.1 Intra-temporal and inter-temporal substitutions of the effort  
An important aspect of effort allocation is to see how substitutions in the spatial and 
temporal senses are connected. The intuition is that as the relative attractiveness of a particular 
area changes over the course of a year, the fishing effort might be displaced to other areas or 
time periods. Here, an important question arises and that is: how trawlers would substitute 
fishing effort across different locations within the same period (intra-temporal), and over time 
within the given location (inter-temporal).  
We derive the equations for the intra-temporal and inter-temporal effort substitution 
based on Equation (5), where trawlers choose location 𝑎𝑎 at time 𝑡𝑡 to target species 𝑗𝑗 to maximize 
profitability of the quota portfolio. To do so, we first define the net value of fish species as 






− 𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0  , 𝑎𝑎 = {1,2,3}      (7) 
 
If the number of areas 𝐴𝐴 is equal to or greater than the number of targeted species 𝐽𝐽, the 
system of equations for 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 is solvable because there are 𝐴𝐴 equations and 𝐽𝐽 unknowns. In our 
case study, there are three target species and three defined areas. Hence, the system of equations 
is exactly identified. The solution for 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 will be a function of  𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 , �𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ,𝜌𝜌
𝑎𝑎, for all 𝑎𝑎 ∈
𝐴𝐴 given 𝑡𝑡. Once we obtain 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎, we substitute 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  into Equations (7) to yield 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 for all 𝑎𝑎 in 
terms of contemporaneous variables. 
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, 𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎�      (8) 
From equation (8), we see that the fishing effort turns out to be function of area-specific 
costs, resource abundance, and discount factor.  






− 𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0  ,   𝑡𝑡 = {1,2, … ,12}      (9) 
 
If the number of 𝑇𝑇 is equal to or greater than 𝐽𝐽, the equation can be solved. In our case, 
we choose own period 𝜏𝜏 and two-period lagged variables, so that the system of equation is 
exactly identified. We obtain 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 for the multiple time periods given an area 𝑎𝑎 in Equation (10). 
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖−𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 �{𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎}𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎−2𝑎𝑎 , �𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎−2 
𝑎𝑎 , �𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎−2 
𝑎𝑎 , {𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎}𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎−2𝑎𝑎 �      (10) 
The fishing effort is expressed as a function of area-specific costs, resource abundance, 
and price of target species in the contemporaneous and the past two periods, and as well as the 
discount factor.  
3.2 Empirical model  
In this section, we estimate the inter-temporal and intra-temporal effort substitutions in 
response to the variations in attractiveness of different fishing locations.  
As stated earlier, the decisions underlying fishing effort of individual trawlers are 
influenced by combination of factors. A possible adaptive response of trawlers when the fishing 
condition is unfavorable (i.e., expected profit becomes negative) at specific location and time, 
is to switch to other available alternatives. Simply, this means that we have missingness in the 
fishing effort allocation data (i.e., dependent variable). Statistically, including substantial zero 
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observations would bias the estimation results because the distribution of the effort observations 
is truncated or bunching at zero.  
The Heckman's (1976) selection model provides a potentially useful tool under this 
circumstance, as it enables us to both test and correct for the potential bias created by the 
missingness in the fishing effort data. Another benefit of employing Heckman’s two-step 
estimation approach is that it enables us not only to estimate the decision to fish or not (i.e., 
using Probit model (first step)), but it also acquires the continuous effort allocation conditional 
on the participation decision (second step).  
Our dependent variable is the allocated fishing effort in area 𝑎𝑎 and time 𝑡𝑡 by trawler 𝑖𝑖. 
The explanatory variables, which define the relative attractiveness of locations are fish 
availability measured by CPUE (tons per hour of trawling), price of fish per kilo (Norwegian 
Kroner (NOK)), fuel price per liter to travel to the available locations (Norwegian Kroner 
(NOK)) and intensity of coastal fleet’s participation during the winter cod fishery (i.e., 
approximated by total landings of cod in tons by coastal boats). 
3.2.1 Estimation of intra-temporal effort allocation  
We start with the estimation of intra-temporal effort allocation for the fifty-one codfish 
trawl vessels. The estimation equation for the intra-temporal substitution is based on the 
theoretical results, expressed in Equation (8).  
Equation (11) and (12), show the estimation procedure for the Probit model, where 
trawler 𝑖𝑖 decides whether to allocate fishing effort in area 𝑎𝑎 and time 𝑡𝑡, in respect to the 
attractiveness of the selected area. The latent variable for fishing effort 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖   in the Probit model 
is specified in Equation (12). 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if trawler allocates 
fishing effort at location 𝑎𝑎 and time 𝑡𝑡 and 0 otherwise. Superscript 1 in Equation (11) refers to 
the first step of the estimation procedure. Superscript 𝑟𝑟 refers to the intra-temporality equations.  
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1   𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗𝑖𝑖 > 0
0         𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
      (12) 
𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 refers to individual vessel fixed effect which is either engine power or gross 
tonnage. 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖1, and 𝜔𝜔𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖1 are period and area fixed effects, respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 is the 
standardized catch per unit of effort (i.e., The standardization procedure is explained in section 
3.3.1). 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 refers to the fuel price, which approximates the cost of traveling to the considered 
location. 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 refers to the total landings of cod by the coastal fishers, which is a proxy for the 
possible congestion effect of the coastal boats on trawlers’ harvest strategy. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧1   refers to the 
residuals. 
In the second step, the continuous effort, in logarithmic form, conditional on the 
participation decision (first step) is estimated. Superscript 2 in Equation (13) refers to the 
second step of the estimation procedure. 







+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2                                                                                                                                                 (13)
 
Here, we add varying coefficients 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 on CPUE, which refers to the vessel’s technical 
attributes (e.g., engine power or gross tonnage).  We take the vessel characteristics into account 
as fishers might allocate fishing effort differently even when they target the same species at the 
same location and time due to the distinct features of the vessel. The specification of varying 
coefficient is linear: 𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖) = 𝜂𝜂1𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜂𝜂2𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖2   refers to the residuals. 
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3.2.2 Estimation of inter-temporal effort allocation  
The estimating equation for the inter-temporal substitution is based on the theoretical 
result expressed in Equation (10). However, we need to refine Equation (10) to specify the 
corresponding empirical model. Perfect foresight assumption means that the trawler’s choices 
are made at the start of the planning horizon (period zero), but indeed trawlers decide about 
effort allocation at time 𝑡𝑡. Hence, the discounted factor is not included in the empirical model. 
Moreover, Equation (10) includes the historical CPUEs. In the empirical model, we include 
past catches instead of CPUEs. Additionally, since inter-temporal effort allows for time 
variation, we also include the prices of fish species in our model. Superscript 𝑧𝑧 refers to the 
inter-temporality.  









+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧1                                                                                                                                                   (14) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧 = �
1   𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗𝑧𝑧 > 0
0         𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 
 
     (15) 
 The key differences from the first step equation of the intra-temporal substitution (See 
Equation (11)) are the inclusion of current period and two previous periods (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑡𝑡 − 1, 𝑡𝑡 − 2) 
as well as the prices of target species. 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 refers to the price of target species 𝑗𝑗 at time 𝑡𝑡. 
The varying coefficient is linear: 𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧1 �𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎� = 𝜂𝜂1𝑧𝑧1 + 𝜂𝜂2𝑧𝑧1𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧1   refers to the 
residuals. The second step estimation equation for the inter-temporal substitution is specified 
in Equation (16).  
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ln 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖
𝑧𝑧2 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡
𝑧𝑧2 + 𝜔𝜔𝑎𝑎
𝑧𝑧2 + � � 𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝜏𝜏












𝑧𝑧2                                                                                                                                                   (16) 
The varying parameter on CPUE is specified as 𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧2 �𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎� = 𝜂𝜂1𝑧𝑧2 + 𝜂𝜂2𝑧𝑧2𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 +
𝜂𝜂3𝑧𝑧2𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧2   refers to the residuals. 
3.3 Correction of some potential econometric issues 
In order to properly specify our model, prior to the estimation of intra and inter-temporal 
effort substitutions, we discuss and correct the potential problems in using CPUE and cod price 
as explanatory variables.  
3.3.1 Standardization of CPUE  
Within fisheries research CPUE is a commonly employed index to assess the average 
stock size (Hilborn & Walters, 1992; Maunder et al., 2006). To calculate the values of CPUE, 
total catch of each haul is divided by the corresponding fishing effort. In this article, we are 
dealing with the effort allocation decisions of fifty-one individual trawl vessels over 2011-2016. 
Even if trawlers coexist at the same time and location, and being exposed to the same level of 
fish abundance, the effort allocation decisions and, subsequently catch sizes might be different. 
In order to take this heterogeneity into account, we construct a vessel-specific index for the 
CPUE for each trawler to implement it in the estimation equations. 
 To this aim, in Equation (17) we regress individual catch sizes of species 𝑗𝑗 in 
logarithmic form at location 𝑎𝑎 and time 𝑡𝑡, caught by trawler 𝑖𝑖 against fishing effort in 
logarithmic form and a series of dummy variables to capture the fixed effects.  
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡.𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + ln 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 




 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is a quantity of catch in metric tons of species 𝑗𝑗 ,caught by vessel 𝑖𝑖 in area 𝑎𝑎 in 
period 𝑡𝑡. D𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎 refers to dummy variable for week effect in intra-temporality analysis and month 
effect in inter-temporality analysis. 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎, 𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎 and 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  refer to dummy variables to capture area, 
year and individual specific effects, respectively.  We include the interaction variable between 
week/month and location as CPUE can be different across different locations given the same 
week/ month. The variable 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is measured in trawling hours. Once, we estimate catch size, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is calculated by divining catch by corresponding effort. The unit of estimated CPUE 
is tons of fish, caught per hour of trawling.  
3.3.2 Endogeneity problem of the cod price  
Another estimation issue is related to the potential problem of price endogeneity of the 
cod fishery. Birkenbach et al. (2020), Asche, Gordon, et al. (2002) and Arnason et al. (2004) 
discuss that the Norwegian trawlers confront a downward-sloping demand for cod. This is 
probably because the cod market is segmented. Therefore, a large supply of cod, in particular 
during winter fishery may reduce the price, while we estimate the response of trawlers to the 
exogenous variation of cod demand.  
As a large portion of Norwegian cod catch is exported to foreign countries, particularly 
those in European Union (EU) (Asche, Flaaten, et al., 2002; Asche, Gordon, et al., 2002), the 
exchange rate NOK/EURO is expected to affect the international buyers’ evaluation of fish 
market, but it is not affected by weekly cod landings (i.e., definition of instrumental variable). 
Therefore, we first estimate the cod prices by instrumenting the exchange rate of NOK/EURO. 
Thereafter, we implement the estimated cod prices in the estimation equations.  
4 Results  
We estimate Equations (11), (13), (14), and (16) using the comprehensive panel dataset 
discussed in section 2.2. Table 2 and 3 show the estimation results for the intra-temporal effort 
24 
 
allocation, while Table 4 and 5 refer to the inter-temporal analysis, using Heckman’s two-step 
estimator. The results represented in Table 2 and 4 report the estimations based on the first step 
—participation decisions— (Probit regression). They also provide the magnitude of effort 
displacement by marginal effects. Marginal effects show how fishing effort changes for a one 
unit change in the explanatory variables.  
The estimation results based on the second step, —trawling hour— conditional on 
participation decisions are presented in table 3 and 5. The first step estimates are used to 
calculate the inverse of Mill’s ratio, which is used to estimate the second step. In the second 
step, two vessel specifications are used: engine size and gross tonnage.  
4.1 Results of intra-temporal effort allocation  
The results in Table 2 and 3 show how trawlers switch between region A, B and C in 
response to the changes in the relative attractiveness of these regions within the same time 
period to maximize profit.  
Table 2. Estimation results of the first step from Equation (11)- Marginal effects show the magnitude of effort 
displacement- intra-temporal analysis 
Explanatory variables Probit estimations Marginal effects 
Fuel price, region  A -0.035 0.014 
Fuel price, region B -0.113*** -0.044*** 
Fuel price, region C 0.347*** 0.135*** 
Coastal landing, region A -0.017*** -0.042*** 
Coastal landing, region B -0.039*** -0.015*** 
Coastal landing, region C 0.146*** 0.057*** 
Cod: CPUE 0.006*** 0.002*** 
Saithe: CPUE -0.004 -0.001 
Haddock: CPUE -0.131*** -0.051*** 








Table 3. Estimation results of the second step from Equation (13)- intra-temporal analysis  
Explanatory variables Engine power Tonnage 
Fuel price, region  A -0.063* 0.063 
Fuel price, region B -0.098*** -0.98*** 
Fuel price, region C 0.229*** 0.228*** 
Coastal landing, region A -0.002 -0.002 
Coastal landing, region B -0.015 -0.015 
Coastal landing, region C 0.03 0.03 
Cod: CPUE 0.008 0.001 
Saithe: CPUE 0.002 -0.002 
Haddock: CPUE -0.09 -0.094 
Cod: Engine × CPUE -0.002* - 
 Saithe: Engine × CPUE -0.003* - 
 Haddock: Engine × CPUE -0.000 - 
Cod: Tonnage × CPUE - -0.001 
Saithe: Tonnage × CPUE - -0.004* 
Haddock: Tonnage × CPUE - 0.002 
Inverse of Mills ratio 0.12 0.124 
* 𝑝𝑝 <  0.1, ** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.05, *** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.01 
𝑅𝑅2 = 0.173 
Note: The dependent variable is trawling hour per week in a specific location. 
 
The negative and significant coefficient of the fuel price in region B, and positive and 
significant coefficients of the fuel price in region C in the first and second steps indicate that 
higher fuel prices increase the likelihood that trawlers shift from region B to region C to fish 
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saithe. This harvest behavior is justifiable. When travel cost increases, fishing regions nearshore 
are more preferable (regions B and C). However, the negative coefficient of region B shows 
that the trawlers would spend less trawling time in this region. Region B is not favorable 
probably because of the adverse effect of the presence of coastal fleet in this region. 
Unsurprisingly, the negative and significant coefficient of region A in the second step (when 
the chosen vessel characteristic is engine power) shows that the participant trawlers would 
avoid region A when the fuel price is high as this region is farther and costs of fishing increase 
with distance. This provides insight about effort substitution among different regions to 
maximize profit.  
With regard to the effect of coastal fleet on adopted harvest strategy of the trawlers, the 
negative signs in region A and B, and positive sign in region C indicate that the intensity of 
participation of coastal boats during the winter months shifts the effort allocation of the trawlers 
to region C (first step). Observing this choice is unsurprising as it is rational to avoid region B 
to fish cod and haddock, probably because of the low prices during Lofoten fishery (See Figure 
6). Region A will be avoided as well probably due to the less desirable climatic conditions of 
the sub-Arctic areas during wintertime. However, once trawlers decide where to fish, the 
magnitude of allocated effort is not affected by the intensity of coastal fishers’ participations. 
This means that the decisions underlying fishing effort is made while being aware of the 
possible negative impacts of the congestion of the coastal boats. Probably, the participant 
fishers have evaluated the situation and come to the conclusion that they are able to overcome 
or at least offset the possible negative impacts of the congregation of the coastal boats on the 
profit of the fishing portfolio.  
The probability of allocation of fishing effort is increased/ decreased with higher/ lower 
values of CPUE for cod and haddock fishery. In the second step, the effect of CPUE is captured 
through two variables, one is CPUE itself, and the other one is the interaction between CPUE 
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and vessel technical specifications. The coefficients of the interaction variables have small and 
negative values. This implies that the overall effect of CPUE is positive on the allocated effort, 
if the vessel is less powerful or smaller in size. This means that fishers with less powerful boats 
need to rigidly follow the seasonality of fish.  
The inverse of Mills ratio is statistically not different from zero. This means that the 
model does not suffer from sample selection problem. The explanatory power of Heckman’s 
two-step estimator is 18%.  
4.2 Results of inter-temporal effort allocation 
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show how trawlers allocate fishing effort over time in a 
given region.  
Table 4. Estimation results of the first step from Equation (14)- Marginal effects show the magnitude of effort 
displacement inter-temporal analysis 
Explanatory variables Probit estimations Marginal effects 
Fuel price -0.022 -0.008 
Fuel pricet−1 -0.03 -0.011 
Fuel pricet−2 -0.055 -0.02 
Coastal landing  -0.011*** -0.004*** 
Coastal landingt−1  0.012*** 0.004*** 
Coastal landingt−2  -0.007*** -0.003*** 
Cod: CPUE -3.413*** -1.297*** 
Saithe: CPUE -1.096*** -0.394*** 
Haddock: CPUE -5.408*** -1.944*** 
Cod: Price ×  CPUE 0.187*** 0.067*** 
Saithe: Price ×  CPUE 0.082*** 0.029*** 
Haddock: Price ×  CPUE 0.334*** 0.12*** 
Cod: Price × Catcht−1  0.075*** 0.027*** 
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Saithe: Price × Catcht−1 0.334*** 0.12*** 
Haddock: Price × Catcht−1 0.049*** 0.018*** 
Cod: Price × Catcht−2 0.004 0.001 
Saithe: Price × Catcht−2 -0.005 -0.002 
Haddock: Price × Catcht−2 0.022 0.008 
* 𝑝𝑝 <  0.1, ** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.05, *** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.01 
 
Table 5. Estimation results of the second step from Equation (16)- inter-temporal analysis  
Explanatory variables Engine power  Tonnage  
Fuel price 0.6** 0.619*** 
Fuel pricet−1 -0.636** -0.655*** 
Fuel pricet−2 -0.016 -0.017 
Coastal landing  -0.014*** -0.014*** 
Coastal landingt−1 0.006 0.006 
Coastal landingt−2  0.006** 0.006** 
Cod: CPUE -0.185 -0.236 
Saithe: CPUE 0.127 0.101 
Haddock: CPUE 2.911 2.881 
Cod: Price × CPUE 0.005 0.011 
Saithe: Price × CPUE -0.009 -0.008 
Haddock: Price × CPUE -0.175 -0.178 
Cod: Price × Catcht−1  -0.007 0.008 
Saithe: Price × Catcht−1 0.019 0.021 
Haddock: Price × Catcht−1 -0.019 -0.018 
Cod: Price × Catcht−2 0.001 0.001 
Saithe: Price × Catcht−2 0.033** 0.034** 
Haddock: Price × Catcht−2 0.005 0.005 
Cod: Engine × CPUE 0.004* - 
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Saithe: Engine × CPUE -0.003 - 
Haddock: Engine × CPUE -0.033 - 
Cod: Tonnage × CPUE - 0.003 
Saithe: Tonnage × CPUE - -0.003 
Haddock: Tonnage × CPUE - -0.033 
Inverse of Mills ratio -0.869*** -0.846*** 
* 𝑝𝑝 <  0.1, ** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.05, *** 𝑝𝑝 <  0.01 
𝑅𝑅2 = 0.271 
Note: The dependent variable is trawling hours per month in a specific location. 
 
An increase in the fuel price in the given month and in the past two months does not 
affect the decision to allocate fishing effort in the current month in the given location. This is 
probably because of the impact of quota regulations. The introduction of quota mandates fishers 
to exhaust their quotas within the fishing year regardless of fuel price.  For the trawlers who 
have already decided to allocate fishing effort at a specific location, the rise in fuel price at time  
𝑡𝑡 − 1 negatively affects the amount of effort allocation at time 𝑡𝑡 in the chosen location. 
However, the higher fuel price at time 𝑡𝑡 is associated with increased effort at time 𝑡𝑡. This offers 
some insights into the possible effect of the quota constraints. As time elapses towards the end 
of the year, the concern over underutilization of quota is enhanced.  Hence, fishers increase the 
effort despite the higher fuel prices. The effort displacement over time with respect to fuel cost 
provides an insight that fishers try to balance out the fuel expenditure over the course of a year. 
The increased activity of coastal fleet in the current month and two months before in 
region B decreases the probability of fishing effort allocation in the current month in this region. 
For the trawlers who already decided to fish in region B, the activity of coastal fleet in the 
current month negatively affects the amount of the allocated fishing effort in the same period. 
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The activity of coastal boats with two months lag positively affects the magnitude of fishing 
effort allocation in the current month in region B.  
CPUE affects the probability of effort allocation decision through itself and the 
interaction term between CPUE and price. The overall effect of CPUE of cod, saithe and 
haddock on effort allocation decision are equal to: −3.413 +  0.187 × 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒, −1.096 +
 0.082 × 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 and −5.408 +  0.334 × 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒, respectively. This means that the CPUE has 
positive effect on the probability of effort allocation if and only if the prices are high enough to 
encourage trawlers to fish their quotas. Otherwise, trawlers would not waste the quota when the 
prices are low. Once trawlers decide to fish, the value of CPUE in the current period and two 
previous periods do not affect the magnitude of effort allocation.  
The interaction variable between catch and price shows revenue. The increase in 
generated revenue in cod, saithe, and haddock fisheries during the last period positively affects 
the possibility of utilizing the quotas in the current period in the same area. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction variable of catch and price of saithe at time  𝑡𝑡 − 2  
indicates that the large catches of saithe in the past increase the allocated effort in the same area. 
This results show that fishers update their expectation about CPUE and consider it as chance to 
consume the quotas.  
The statistically significant inverse of Mills ratio means that the model suffers from 
sample selection problem. The predictive power of the model is 28%.  
5 Discussion  
The intra and inter-temporal estimation results are obtained from a two-step Heckman 
selection model. In the first step Probit model is estimated to examine whether fishers would 
allocate effort based on the attractiveness of the selected regions. The second step estimates the 
continuous effort allocation conditional on the participation decision.  
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Our results are informative about trawlers' response to the changes in the relative 
attractiveness of the selected regions under quota regulations. Changes in CPUE and relative 
prices of fish as well as location-specific costs such as fuel price to travel to the fishing grounds 
and the intensity of coastal fishers’ participations defines the relative attractiveness of the 
fishing areas. Since our results reveal that region-specific costs have substantial effect on 
decisions underlying effort allocation, we narrow our focus in discussion part on this matter.  
With regard to the fuel price, intra and inter-temporal substitutions in the allocation of 
fishing effort were detected. With the increased fuel prices, trawlers are discouraged to fish in 
region B, as region B already incurs cost on trawl fishers due to the congestion of coastal fishers. 
Hence, trawlers choose region C to fish. Similarly, the magnitude of effort displacement is 
increased/ decreased in region C/ B with the higher fuel prices. Moreover, the participant fishers 
avoid region A because of two possible reasons. First is that region A is located farther and 
costs of fishing increase with distance. Second, since the fishing grounds of sub-Arctic areas 
are characterized by less desirable climatic conditions, fishers might avoid fishing in the high 
sea areas due to the increased risk of ending up in hazardous situations. 
From inter-temporal point of view, increased fuel price in the previous month negatively 
affects the amount of allocated effort in the current month in the same region. The reason could 
be that trawler might postpone to fish in a specific area in the hope of getting lower fuel prices 
in the remaining months. During the waiting time, trawlers might allocate fishing effort in the 
regions closer to the shore to balance out the total transportation cost over the year. The hike in 
fuel price in the current month increases the amount of effort in the same month in the chosen 
region. This could be ascribed to the cost of waiting for too long to get a lower price for the 
fuel. Since, trawlers need to exhaust the quota portfolio within the fishing year, waiting too long 
to get a lower fuel price can result in underutilization of quota and an economic loss.  
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The negative effect of the congestion of coastal fleet on trawlers’ decision-making 
underlying effort allocation is irrefutable. Based on our results, the intensified fishing activities 
of coastal fishers, reduces the probability of trawlers’ participation in region B. 
In the winter months, the spawning aggregation of cod, saithe, and haddock along the 
west coast of Norway lowers the cost per unit of effort (Hannesson, 2007; Sandberg, 2006). 
The lower cost per unit of effort together with the limited geographical mobility of the coastal 
fleet encourages coastal fishers to fish a big portion of their quotas at this time. Up to 80% of 
codfish quota belongs to the coastal fishers (Asche et al., 2014; Birkenbach et al., 2020). As a 
result of a large supply of cod, price of cod drops (Alizadeh Ashrafi et al., 2020; Hermansen & 
Dreyer, 2010) (See also Figure 6). With reduced prices, it is economically irrational for the 
trawlers to fish the cod quota in region B. Hence, trawlers avoid region B.  
Moreover, as our intra-temporal results show, during winter fishery trawlers would not 
participate in region A either, probably because of the harsh climatic condition of the Arctic 
areas during the winter months and/or the availability of less dense fish stocks as cod and 
haddock migrate to the north-west coast to spawn (i.e., high cost per unit of effort). Hence, 
trawlers are left with the only option and that is to fish saithe quota in region C. This result is 
consistent with the catch patterns in Figure 4. In region B, the largest landing of cod takes place 
in January, followed by a considerable and sudden decline towards the end of the year. Right 
after this drop, the catch of saithe in area C has increased. This might indicate that trawlers 
redirect fishing effort from cod fishery in region B to saithe fishery in region C. 
The adaptation of this strategy is confirmed by Birkenbach et al. (2020) to maximize 
profit. However, they provide a different reason for shifting from cod and haddock fisheries to 
saithe fishery. Birkenbach et al. (2020) concluded that in order to maximize profit trawlers need 
to consume the fishing quota of lower value species (in their case saithe) during a short period 
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at the beginning of the fishing year. In contrast, the supply of higher valued species (in their 
case cod) should be spread over the season. Our intra-temporal result provides a more rational 
explanation for observing this harvest strategy. Region C is preferred to fish saithe quota as, 
region B cannot be an option for the trawlers (See Figure 4 where there is no fishing in February 
and March in region B). Region A is not an option either due to the lower price of cod and 
haddock (See Figure 6). After spawning, when cod and haddock swim back to the Arctic to 
feed, the prices start to rise (See Figure 6) due to the lower landings, as coastal fleet has already 
fished their quotas during winter fishery (Asche et al., 2015; Hermansen & Dreyer, 2010). At 
this time trawlers utilize the remaining cod and haddock quotas (See Figure 4).  This result is 
in line with the result of study by Alizadeh Ashrafi et al. (2020) where they found that the 
magnitude of reduction in cod price during the winter fishery outweighs the reduction in cost 
of fishing, hence trawlers reserve the cod quota for the time when the cod price starts to rise 
towards the end of the year.  
With regard to the inter-temporal effort allocation, the intense fishing of coastal fishers 
in a given month, reduces both the probability to allocate effort and the amount of allocated 
effort in that month in region B. However, the intensified fishing activities of coastal fishers in 
the previous two months is associated with increased fishing effort of trawlers in the current 
month in region B. This could mean that congestion of coastal fleet and the price reduction in 
cod and haddock during winter fishery is a transient phenomenon, and as time elapses towards 
the end of the year the price of cod and haddock will rise (See Figure 6).  
Considering the above arguments, we see that trawlers are able to respond to the changes 
in location-specific cost in a rational manner. This finding is in agreement with the outcome of 
the study by Alizadeh Ashrafi et al. (2020),  where rational decision making underlying effort 
allocation in the cod trawl fishery is underpinned.  
34 
 
6 Conclusion  
The Norwegian bottom trawlers are generally engaged in multi-species fisheries, fishing 
for profits. The harvest strategy and effort allocation decisions aiming to maximize annual 
profits may be understood as game strategies, as the fishers need to consider multiple and 
interrelated factors; such as biological, environmental, economic, and managerial 
considerations, and constantly reallocate the fishing effort. 
The main target species of the investigated trawler fleet are cod, saithe, and haddock. 
These species migrate across feeding and spawning habitats. Hence, trawling takes place in a 
vast geographical area, from the sub-Arctic areas of the Barents Sea to the southern parts of the 
North Sea. The fishing locations are heterogeneous in terms of fish availability, market prices 
for fish, fuel expenditure and travel time, and accessibility to other fishing fleets. These factors 
fluctuate over the course of a year, followed by varying relative attractiveness of available 
fishing locations and harvest strategies.  
Despite the fact that these fisheries have long been studied, knowledge of fishing effort 
allocation is underdeveloped. In this regard, the present article aims to extend the insight on 
spatio-temporal allocation of fishing effort in the trawl fishery, and its profit maximizing 
harvest strategy. To do so, we have adopted a two-step Heckman’s estimator and modeled the 
fishing effort allocation across the three species and three regions over the course of a year. We 
have defined location heterogeneity in terms of fish availability, fish prices, fuel cost to traverse, 
and coexistence of coastal fleet. 
Our major finding is that the region-specific attributes such as proximity to shore and 
less steaming time as well as the presence of coastal boats and the intensity of their fishing 
activities during winter fishery have substantial effect on the adopted harvest strategy of the 
trawlers’ profit maximization.  
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Another finding is that the decisions underlying spatio-temporal effort allocation of 
trawlers are not made in a random or haphazard manner. Indeed, trawlers are capable of 
identifying the changes in the biological, environmental, and economic conditions in these 
regions, and respond to these changes in an economically rational way. The technical advances 
of the trawl vessel (e.g., powerful engine and large size) offer them temporal and spatial 
flexibility, and this could explain the ability of fishers to make rational choices regarding effort 
reallocation.  
The identification of the trawlers’ harvest strategy and the potential factors whose 
effects may explain the choices regarding effort allocation contribute to a better understanding 
of the fishers’ potential responses to biological, environmental, economic, and regulatory 
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